To get the best new CEO, must the old CEO go? Power distribution in external CEO successions
Perry, John T. Yao, Xin Chandler, Gaylen N.
Perry, John T.
Yao, Xin
Chandler, Gaylen N.
Other Names
Location
Time Period
Advisors
Original Date
Digitization Date
Issue Date
2011-09-15
Type
Article
Genre
Keywords
Executive succession,Organizational politics,Upper echelons
Subjects (LCSH)
Citation
Perry, J. T., Yao, X., & Chandler, G. N. (2011). To get the best new CEO, must the old CEO go? Power distribution in external CEO successions. Managerial and Decision Economics, 32(8), 505-525. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1551
Abstract
When chief executive officers (CEOs) are replaced by external successors, they frequently retain high levels of power. We found that outgoing CEOs’ announced post-succession involvement is negatively related to their successors’ power. Additionally, we found that the magnitude of the stock market reaction to succession announcements is greater when the outgoing CEOs are allowed to continue to retain significant influence, and diminished when the new CEOs are awarded significant position power when they become CEO. These results suggest that to improve long-term performance, companies should keep outgoing CEOs around and not grant new CEOs too much power.
Table of Contents
Description
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Journal
Managerial and Decision Economics
Book Title
Series
Digital Collection
Finding Aid URL
Use and Reproduction
Archival Collection
PubMed ID
DOI
ISSN
0143-6570
1099-1468
1099-1468