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Hermeneutical injustice and epistemic basing failure; [Injusticia hermeneútica y fallo epistémico de fundamentación]
Bondy, Patrick R.
Bondy, Patrick R.
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2025-05-21
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Article
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Argumentation,Beliefs,Epistemic injustice,Epistemology,Simion
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Citation
Bondy, P. (2025). Injusticia epistémica y fallo epistémico de fundamentación. Revista Iberoamericana De Argumentación, (Monográfico 5), 6–19. https://doi.org/10.15366/ria2025.m5.001 (Original work published 20 de mayo de 2025)
Abstract
This paper introduces a problem relating to hermeneutical injustice that is grounded in epistemic basing failure. Mona Simion has recently argued for an extension of Miranda Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice, to cover cases where subjects have good reasons for important beliefs available to them, but they fail to form the relevant beliefs. This paper further argues that hermeneutical injustices can arise in cases where subjects have good reasons available, and they do hold the relevant beliefs that are supported by those reasons, but they fail to hold their beliefs on the basis of the good reasons that are available to them. © PATRICK BONDY.
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Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
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Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentacion
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21728801