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dc.contributor.authorBagai, Rajiv
dc.contributor.authorTang, Bin
dc.contributor.authorKim, Euna
dc.identifier.citationBagai, R.; Bin Tang; Euna Kim, "Effectiveness of Probabilistic Attacks on Anonymity of Users Communicating via Multiple Messages," Systems Journal, IEEE , vol.7, no.2, pp.199,210, June 2013 doi: 10.1109/JSYST.2012.2221855en_US
dc.descriptionClick on the DOI link to access the article (may not be free).en_US
dc.description.abstractA major objective of any system-wide attack on an anonymity system is to uncover the extent to which each user of the system communicated with each other user. A probabilistic attack attempts to achieve this objective by arriving at some probability values for each of the system's possible input-output message pairs of reflecting actual communication. We show that these values lead to a probability distribution on the set of all possible system-wide communication patterns between users, and develop a combinatorial technique to determine this distribution. We give a method to measure from this distribution the effectiveness of any such attack or, alternatively, the level of anonymity remaining in the system in the aftermath of the attack. We also compare our metric with three earlier attempts in the literature to solve a similar problem, and demonstrate that the scope of our metric is far wider than those of all earlier ones.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-1116849 and by the U.S. Navy Engineering Logistics Office under Contract N41756-08-C-3077.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSystems Journal, IEEE;v.7: no.2
dc.subjectCombinatorial matrix theoryen_US
dc.subjectProbabilistic attacksen_US
dc.subjectSystem-wide anonymity metricen_US
dc.titleEffectiveness of probabilistic attacks on anonymity of users communicating via multiple messagesen_US
dc.description.versionPeer reviewed
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2012 IEEE

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