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dc.contributor.authorHershfield, Jeffrey A.
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-01T16:06:31Z
dc.date.available2012-06-01T16:06:31Z
dc.date.issued2012-06
dc.identifier.citationHershfield, Jeffrey. 2012. "Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth". Philosophia. 40 (2): 357-363.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000303883300014
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10057/5112
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9336-3
dc.descriptionClick on the link below to access the article (may not be free).en_US
dc.description.abstractA principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot adequately accommodate the complex role that truth plays in the norms governing assertion and similar speech acts.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhilosophia;2012, v.40, no.2
dc.subjectTruthen_US
dc.subjectDeflationary theoryen_US
dc.subjectAustin, J. L.en_US
dc.subjectHorwich, Paulen_US
dc.subjectDummett, Michaelen_US
dc.subjectSpeech actsen_US
dc.subject.classificationPHILOSOPHY
dc.titleMissed it by that much: Austin on norms of truthen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionPeer reviewed
dc.rights.holderCopyright by Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011


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