Epistemic utility and theory-choice in science: Comments on Hempel
Abstract
Professor Hempel has sketched a number of turns in the problem of
induction, showing us in the process that the traditional problem of
justifying inductive inference is inextricably bound up with problems
concerning rational criteria of hypothesis and theory acceptance. In
taking us through these various turns he surveys, and provides us
valuable insights into, several of the guiding trends of a vast and often
highly technical literature. In the interests of highlighting this valuable
feature of his paper and to provide some focus for our subsequent
discussion, I shall briefly review some of these turns, placing
emphasis on what Hempel notes as the central relevance of certain
questions raised by Richard Rudner concerning the character of
scientific criteria of hypothesis acceptance. There are a number of, to
my mind unsettled, issues concerning the task of the scientist qua
scientist-particularly, the range of considerations that figure in the
acceptance of hypotheses, and, indeed, how such "acceptance" is to
be construed-and I shall direct the latter part of my commentary to
these issues.
Description
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