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dc.contributor.authorFeleppa, Robert
dc.date.accessioned2021-12-15T19:48:22Z
dc.date.available2021-12-15T19:48:22Z
dc.date.issued2021-11-22
dc.identifier.citationFeleppa, R. (2021). Rationality Assumptions and their Limits. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 51(6), 574–599. https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931211052017en_US
dc.identifier.issn0048-3931
dc.identifier.issn1552-7441
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1177/00483931211052017
dc.identifier.urihttps://soar.wichita.edu/handle/10057/22405
dc.descriptionClick on the DOI link to access the article (may not be free).en_US
dc.description.abstractIn “Different Cultures, Different Rationalities” (2000) Stephen Lukes weighs in on the controversies concerning the killing of Captain Cook by Hawaiians and what it says about the role of rationality assumptions in translation. While at first seeming to adopt a Davidsonian anti-relativist position concerning the enabling role of assumptions of common rationality in interpretation, Lukes rejects Davidson’s view, and opts instead for a “totalizing” strategy inspired by Mauss. Here I explore rationales for Lukes’ position and endeavor to reconcile Lukes’, Davidson’s, and Mauss’s positions by developing a case for a limited interpretive requirement of shared rationality.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSAGE Publications Inc.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhilosophy of the Social Sciences;Vol., Iss. 6
dc.subjectDavidsonen_US
dc.subjectEmotionsen_US
dc.subjectEthnographyen_US
dc.subjectIncommensurabilityen_US
dc.subjectInterpretationen_US
dc.subjectMaussen_US
dc.subjectRationalityen_US
dc.subjectRelativismen_US
dc.titleRationality assumptions and their limitsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.holder© The Author(s) 2021en_US


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