Cooperation between neighboring vehicles is an effective solution to the problem of malicious node identification in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). However, the outcome is subject to nodes' beliefs and reactions in the collaboration. In this paper, a plain game-theoretic approach that captures the uncertainty of nodes about their monitoring systems, the type of their neighboring nodes, and the outcome of the cooperation is proposed. In particular, one stage of a local voting-based scheme (game) for identifying a target node is developed using a Bayesian game. In this context, incentives are offered in expected utilities of nodes in order to promote cooperation in the network. The proposed model is then analyzed to obtain equilibrium points, ensuring that no node can improve its utility by changing its strategy. Finally, the behavior of malicious and benign nodes is studied by extensive simulation results. Specifically, it is shown how the existing uncertainties and the designed incentives impact the strategies of the players and, consequently, the correct target-node identification.