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dc.contributor.authorChou, Remi
dc.contributor.authorYener, Aylin
dc.identifier.citationR. A. Chou and A. Yener, "Secret-Key Generation in Many-to-One Networks: An Integrated Game-Theoretic and Information-Theoretic Approach," in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 5144-5159, Aug. 2019en_US
dc.descriptionClick on the DOI link to access the article (may not be free).en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers secret-key generation between several agents and a base station that observe independent and identically distributed realizations of correlated random variables. Each agent wishes to generate the longest possible individual key with the base station by means of public communication. All keys must be jointly kept secret from all external entities. In this many-to-one secret-key generation setting, it can be shown that the agents can take advantage of a collective protocol to increase the sum rate of their generated keys. However, when each agent is only interested in maximizing its own secret-key rate, agents may be unwilling to participate in a collective protocol. Furthermore, when such a collective protocol is employed, how to fairly allocate individual key rates arises as a valid issue. This paper studies the tension between cooperation and self-interest with a game-theoretic treatment. This paper establishes that cooperation is in the best interest of all individualistic agents and that there exist individual secret-key rate allocations that incentivize the agents to follow the protocol. In addition, an explicit coding scheme that achieves such allocations is proposed.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation under Grant CNS-1314719.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIEEE Transactions on Information Theory;v.65:no.8
dc.subjectCoalitional game theoryen_US
dc.subjectHash functionsen_US
dc.subjectMultiterminal secret-key generationen_US
dc.subjectPolar codesen_US
dc.subjectStrong secrecyen_US
dc.titleSecret-key generation in many-to-one networks: an integrated game-theoretic and information-theoretic approachen_US
dc.rights.holder© 2019, IEEEen_US

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