"Into the dragon's lair": Culture, counter-insurgency, and the Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam

Abstract

The aim of this thesis was to examine the development of the Marine Corps' Combined Action Program (CAP) during the Vietnam War and determine if the CAP would have been the war-winning strategic formula. In an attempt to wrest control of Vietnamese villages from the Viet Cong, the CAPs engaged in a combination of aggressive patrolling and civic action operations that brought the Marines involved into extremely close contact with the intricacies of counter-insurgency and Vietnamese culture. It was concluded that given the nature of the program's development, the American emphasis on overwhelming force, the complicated strategic duality of the Vietnam War, and the deep complexity of the Vietnamese culture, the Combined Action Platoons would not have altered the war's outcome. However, this project also determined that the knowledge acquired by the CAPs could serve as a foundation for the continued development of counter-insurgency operations that might prove applicable to current and future operations.