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dc.contributor.authorBirondo, Noell N.
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-29T19:11:21Z
dc.date.available2016-04-29T19:11:21Z
dc.date.issued2016-04-01
dc.identifier.citationBirondo, Noell N. 2016. Virtue and prejudice: giving and taking reasons. Monist, vol. 99:no. 2:pp 212-223en_US
dc.identifier.issn0026-9662
dc.identifier.otherWOS:000372486900008
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv037
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10057/12025
dc.descriptionClick on the DOI link to access the article (may not be free).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, displays a sadly illiberal form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a distortion in Jesse Prinz's recent discussion of the "Normativity Challenge" to Aristotelian virtue ethics, thus highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully move beyond.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMonist;v.99:no.2
dc.titleVirtue and prejudice: giving and taking reasonsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.holder© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Hegeler Institute. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.comen_US


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