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dc.contributor.authorSchwartz, James S. J.
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-13T15:58:09Z
dc.date.available2015-11-13T15:58:09Z
dc.date.issued2015-10
dc.identifier.citationJames S.J. Schwartz Mathematical Structuralism, Modal Nominalism, and the Coherence Principle Philosophia Mathematica (2015) 23 (3): 367-385en_US
dc.identifier.issn0031-8019
dc.identifier.otherWOS:000363236800004
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10057/11583
dc.descriptionClick on the DOI link to access the article (may not be free).en_US
dc.description.abstractAccording to Stewart Shapiro's coherence principle, structures exist whenever they can be coherently described. I argue that Shapiro's attempts to justify this principle (along with his position, ante rem structuralism) are circular, as he relies on criticisms of modal nominalism which presuppose the coherence principle. I argue further that when the coherence principle is not presupposed, his reasoning more strongly supports modal nominalism than ante rem structuralism.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhilosophia Mathematica;v.23:no.3
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.titleMathematical structuralism, modal nominalism, and the coherence principleen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.holder© The Author [2015]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.en_US


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