The nature and grounds of Xunzi's disagreement with Mencius
Soles, David E.
Soles, David E.
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1999
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Article
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Mencius,Xunzhi,Asian philosophy
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Soles, D. E. (1999). The nature and grounds of Xunzi’s disagreement with Mencius. Asian Philosophy, 9(2), 123–133. https://doi.org/10.1080/09552369908575494
Abstract
This, paper argues that the debate between Mencius and Xunzi, as to whether human nature is intrinsically good or evil, represents not so much a disagreement as to the empirical facts of human nature as a disagreement over the nature of morality. Specifically, it argues that Mencius holds a virtue-theoretic conception of morality while Xunzi subscribes to a rule-based conception of morality. These differences in their conceptions of morality lead the two philosophers to radically different evaluations of human nature although they are in substantial agreement as to the empirical facts of human nature. © 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
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Taylor & Francis
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Asian Philosophy
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09552367