Ulterior oversight: Minority party investigations and the politics of exclusion
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2026-06-16
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Article
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Committee reports,Minority party,Oversight,US Congress
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Citation
Butcher, J. M., and C. A. Drolc. 2026. “Ulterior Oversight: Minority Party Investigations and the Politics of Exclusion.” Legislative Studies Quarterly51, no. 3: e70080. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.70080.
Abstract
The minority party in Congress faces structural barriers to influencing policy and controlling the oversight agenda. Yet even when excluded, it can use investigations and formal reports to challenge majority narratives and sustain political visibility. Building on foundational theories of legislative behavior, oversight, and recent work on minority party strategy, we examine when and how the minority uses formal oversight reports and differentiate their behavior from the majority. Using data from the Congressional Oversight Records Database (CORD), we find that minority-issued reports become shorter under unified government, less frequent when the minority is rolled more often on the floor, and longer when the minority has recently lost majority control or when its members have greater committee experience. These findings show that minority oversight is both constrained and strategic; it expands in depth when experience and recent displacement provide motivation but contracts in scope when institutional exclusion is greatest. These findings contribute to emerging research built around CORD by showing that oversight serves as a durable yet limited outlet for the minority party seeking to challenge or advance their own narratives.
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Wiley
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03629805