IN THE CASE OF JANE V. JOHN:
THE GENDER PAY-GAP IN THE GOVERNMENT PROFESSIONS

A Thesis by

Dana M. Simon

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I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content, and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts with a major in Sociology.

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David W. Wright, Committee Chair

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

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Dr. Kathleen Perez, Committee Member

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Dr. Brian Withrow, Committee Member

DEDICATION

To my professors, parents, family, and dearest friends

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ABSTRACT

The gender pay-gap in the government sector was investigated in this paper using the March 2006 Current Population Survey (CPS), Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASES). The data was analyzed using statistical techniques of a comparison of group means using a 2-tailed t-test, an analysis of variance, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and partitioning of variance. The main findings from this study are that individual's income increases with age, education, working in occupations with high prestige, and working at the federal level. The findings also showed that women are sorted into lower paying occupations and earn less income than men. It was concluded that women are not financial equals to men at any level of the government: federal, state, or local.

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1. Introduction

It has been forty years since the Equal Pay Act was initiated in the United States. This was enacted to benefit women economically and socially by making them occupational equals to their male counterparts. After all these years women are still lagging behind men financially in most occupations. In fact, the pay gap has widened in recent years. The pay gap between men and women is still an important issue today because it affects every woman wanting to obtain a job. A way for women to lessen the pay gap is by entering the government sector. Within this sector, more rules and regulations are followed so that women will be paid an equal wage to that of their male co-workers.

There are various theories that assume different variables affect an individual's economic outcome. Individual-level theories, such as rational choice and comparative advantage, assume that individuals have different attributes that affect his or her economic outcome (Becker, 1985; Coleman, 1990). Rational choice theory assumes that people earn human capital by making different choices to benefit him or her financially (Becker, 1985; Coleman, 1990); whereas, comparative advantage theory assumes that men and women make different decisions to benefit each sex accordingly (Parsons and Bales, 1955). Structural-level theories like dual economy and segmented labor market assume that the position a person occupies has a set range of income that is independent of that person's attributes. Dual economy theorists view the economic industry market as divided into two sectors- core and periphery (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978); whereas, segmented labor market theorists view the occupational labor market as comprised of two main segments- primary and secondary (Reid and Rubin, 2003; Waddoups and Assane,

1993). Differing from both individual and structural-level theories are gender discrimination-based theories, such as crowding, revolving door, and queuing. These theories assume that one's gender affects his or her economic outcome; and, since women's work is devalued in society then her income will be less than a man's. Crowding theory assumes that women are crowded into economically undesirable positions (Bergmann, 2005), revolving door theory assumes that women are mobile in all occupations but spend very little time in male-dominated occupations (Jacobs, 1989), and queuing theory assumes that the labor market uses different queues to fill and rank occupations (Reskin and Roos, 1990). A combination of these theories are used to develop an alternative model that will be used to analyze the gender wage gap in the government professions by using the March 2006 Current Population Survey (CPS), Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASES).

2. Literature Review

2.1 Individual Model

Individual-level theories assume that individual attributes contribute to the economic outcome of individuals (Becker, 1985; Coleman, 1990). The basic assumption of rational choice theory is that the world is comprised of rational, intellectual actors who make collective decisions and actions as a whole (Coleman, 1990). Humans make rational decisions in order to maximize their utilities. Choices can be made in order to gain occupational, economical, or status opportunities.

People that make choices in order to gain occupational or economical gains are earning human capital (Becker, 1985). Human capital is an important part of rational choice theory. Human capital can be described as the skills, knowledge, and other

capabilities that an individual acquires that will enable him or her to act in certain ways (Coleman, 1990). These skills are acquired to increase productivity. This increase in productivity will then cause an increase in economic earnings for the individual (Becker, 1985). Able-bodied people, who receive a relatively high marginal rate of return from their investments in human capital, are more likely to have a greater incentive to invest even more (Becker, 1985). Men and women make different choices in order to increase his or her human capital, which then creates different human capital between men and women.

Research suggests that human capital such as education, tenure, and total work experience are positively associated with income (Hersch, 1991). With this, recent research indicated that discrimination in employment actually increases the likelihood that individuals will further invest in human capital (Caputo, 2002). Recent studies on sex segregation in the service sector suggest that returns on human capital depend mostly upon the supply and demand of the labor market (Tam, 1997), especially upon women's human capital (Flynn, 2003). Women often have to over-qualify themselves in order to successfully fill certain jobs (Reskin and Roos, 1990).

Comparative advantage is a theory which assumes that there are differences within men and women that give each sex a certain advantage (Parsons and Bales, 1955). Women fulfill roles in domestic labor so these women seek jobs that would enable them to prosper in their domestic labor (Parsons and Bales, 1955). These types of jobs that allow women to continue to succeed in domestic labor are jobs that are highly flexible in terms of hours and are most often part-time jobs that pay low wages. Men fill their role as the provider by seeking jobs that will earn them the most income possible, and these

higher paid jobs allow men to be better providers for their families (Parsons and Bales, 1955). A way for both men and women to gain their comparative advantages is by seeking jobs in the government professions. These jobs are not only flexible in terms of hours, but they also on average have higher wages. These jobs suit both men and women even though each sex is seeking different returns on their investment in these jobs.

Recent research suggests that this comparative advantage viewpoint causes widespread discrimination against women's labor (Tam, 1997). This labor market discrimination often pushes young women into certain areas of study, where certain areas develop more valuable career-related human capital than others (Brown and Corcoran, 1997). However, these areas of study that develop less valuable human capital are predominantly female (Brown and Corcoran, 1997). Men and women, on average, have similar human capital investments, but vary on the amount of time spent in the labor force over a lifetime (Polachek, 1981). Often women choose jobs with flexible hours (Hersch, 1991).

2.2 Structural Model

Structural-level theories view society as a hierarchy of economic positions. That means that an individual's attributes does not determine that individual's income. Rather, the position which a person occupies has a specific range of income independent of an individual's attributes. Two of these theories are dual economy theory and segmented labor market theory.

The basic assumption of dual economy theory is that there are two economic sectors that make up the greater industry market (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert, 1978). The sectors are divided into the core and periphery sectors. The core sector is comprised

mostly of large, influential, monopolistic companies with unionized employees that have technology-intensive production and have claims in both the national and international markets (Baron and Bielby, 1984; Beck, Horan, Tolbert, 1978; Reid and Rubin, 2003). The peripheral sector is comprised of smaller firms with few employees that have labor-intensive production in restricted markets (Baron and Bielby, 1984; Beck, Horan, Tolbert, 1978; Reid and Rubin, 2003). The differing organization of these firms in the industry affects its earnings (Coverdill, 1988) and, in turn, its location within the economy (Baron and Bielby, 1984). The industries in the core sector are more profitable and are therefore able to pay their employees higher wages (Rosenfeld, 1983). Whereas, the industries in the peripheral sectors have less profit which causes these industries to pay their employees lower wages (Rosenfeld, 1983).

Women are unable to enter the core sector as much as men because of institutional barriers created by firms, unions, and government acts (Coverdill, 1988). Other reasons for the lack of women in the core sector are because there is less discrimination between men's and women's wages in the peripheral sector, women's devalued credentials result in sub-par jobs in the core sector, and under-representation in unions' interests (Coverdill, 1988; Rosenfeld, 1983). Research suggests that men receive substantial return to being union members, but women do not have the same wage advantage by being unionized (Hersch, 1991). Women's prominence in the peripheral sector and its accompanying low wages is dual-economy theory's explanation for sex difference in earnings (Coverdill, 1988).

The basic assumption of the segmented labor market is that the occupational labor market is composed of two main segments (Reid and Rubin, 2003). These two main

segments are the primary and secondary, and the primary can be divided further into independent and subordinate (Reid and Rubin, 2003; Waddoups and Assane, 1993). The primary independent segment is composed of professional, managerial positions that provide high wages and good benefits with loose administrative rules made mostly of internal codes of conduct (Jones and Rosenfeld, 1989; Waddoups and Assane, 1993). The primary subordinate segment is composed of task-oriented jobs, with fair wages, limited job advancement, and rigid administrative rules (Waddoups and Assane, 1993). The secondary segment is composed of unstable jobs in poor working conditions, with no job mobility, and a lack of rules and regulations (Waddoups and Assane, 1993). In the segmented labor market, a position has rewards not based upon the individual's performance (Reid and Rubin, 2003).

Research shows that women are most likely to occupy positions that are insecure and non-unionized and are most likely in the secondary segment (Bielby and Baron, 1986; Reid and Rubin, 2003). Women are less likely to hold positions that develop new skills and that have the opportunity for upward mobility (Bielby and Baron, 1986; Reid and Rubin, 2003; Waddoups and Assane, 1993). The service industry is a largely female-dominated labor market and these occupations are associated with low wages and quality of employment opportunities (Flynn, 2003). Recent research suggests that women employed in the greater sex segregated labor markets and in a poorly industrialized structure are highly susceptible to employment marginalization (Flynn, 2003). This suggests that there is significant barriers women face when attempting to enter into the individual primary segments (Waddoups and Assane, 1993).

Within the segmented labor market is the government industry. In the government, there are numerous rules and regulations to uphold income equality among the workers. There are even more rules and regulations that are strictly enforced at the federal level, than at the state and local levels. These rules and regulations are enforced so that employees are based on a fixed scale that is related to the position that individual occupies and the length of time that individual has occupied that particular position. Women often enter into this sector because of the opportunities of income equality and more protection of job security and stability that are present in the government industry

2.3 Gender Model

Individual and structural-level theories view gender as a variable that can be controlled similar to other variables like age and education. Theories based on gender discrimination are rooted in the belief that women are devalued in society. Therefore, the work women do is not valued as highly as men, so women are not paid as much as men. Because of this devaluation of women, society then sorts women into the lower paid jobs and men into the higher paid jobs. An example of this devaluation of women's work is the division of household labor.

Household labor is not valued in society, and is not equally divided between men and women. However, household labor is necessary in order to work in the economy. Household labor and products have become major contributors to the gross domestic product. The unequal division of domestic labor helps to perpetuate the sexual inequality in the labor market by not allowing women to invest in other areas that will increase their economic return (Coverman, 1983). Women do the majority of the work within the home; and, since domestic labor is free, this work is not valued and in turn women's

wages are lower than men's (Bergmann, 2005). Recent studies show that women do at least half (Himsel and Goldberg, 2003) and as much as seventy percent of the total domestic labor (Kroska, 2004). Women often bear the task of doing the tedious day-to-day tasks like cooking and cleaning; whereas, men do the more sporadic tasks like lawn and auto maintenance (Blair and Lichter, 1991; Kroska, 2004; Mattingly and Bianchi, 2003).

Employers benefit from this devaluation of domestic labor because they are able to pay women less; therefore, the wage structure for women is going to be lower. The impact that it has on the economy is that women are often left to be domestic servants even at their jobs, even if they do not do the domestic labor at home (Bergmann, 2005). Because women are associated with doing this free labor at home, they become oppressed in the economy. Studies find that the time spent on domestic labor is most detrimental to women who have greater earnings potential and those women who are employed but lack the resources to purchase domestic assistance (Coverman, 1983; Shirley and Wallace, 2004).

Three gender discrimination-based theories that can be used to describe economic outcome are crowding theory, revolving door theory, and queuing theory. The basic assumption of the crowding theory in occupations is that most employers rarely hire minorities into desirable jobs (Bergmann, 2005). Employers rarely hire minorities or women because of hiring discrimination, causing an influx of minority and/or women candidates into female-dominated jobs (Bergmann, 2005; England, 2005). It is in the interest of employers to keep females in separate and subordinate positions from males because the majority of males wish to keep them in these places (Bergmann, 2005). With

women in these positions, males are able to occupy the more interesting and thus, higher-paid positions. These female-dominated markets are often comprised of lower-paying and less desirable jobs which creates an over-crowding in these types of positions (Bergmann, 2005). The over-abundance of workers in these positions creates a continuous lack of mobility and stagnant low wages.

Women mostly work in occupations where men are either absent or severely underrepresented (Reskin, 1993). A recent study showed that the sex composition of a position affected the accompanying wages (Karlin, England and Richardson, 2002). This study showed that if a job is comprised mostly of females, the less likely the wage is to increase over time (Karlin, England, and Richardson, 2002). Earlier research has shown that women in female-dominated occupations earn 6-15% less than women with similar characteristics in other occupations (Sorensen, 1989). This study also suggests that women, who have large investments in human capital, have children, have short commuting distances, and work part-time, work in female-dominated occupations (Sorensen, 1989). Recent research suggests that women in female-dominated occupations are still suffering financially (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005). The female-dominated occupations are few in number and pay out the lowest earnings (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005).

The basic assumption of the revolving door theory is that women have great mobility in all fields: female-dominated, male-dominated, and gender-neutral. Women are obviously entering female-dominated occupations in great numbers and have fair opportunities to enter into gender-neutral occupations (Jacobs, 1989). Women have a particularly difficult time getting hired into male-dominated occupations and once there

receive little assistance in learning the workplace dynamics and the recognition they deserve (Jacobs, 1989). However, women spend very little time in the male-dominated fields; they soon retreat back to the traditional female roles (Jacobs, 1989). Because of this, women are in a sense walking through revolving doors throughout their careers (Jacobs, 1989). This instability in the labor market is affected by social forces other than early socialization of women into gender-segregated industries (England, 2005). Hiring discrimination could be a link to the lack of women in male-dominated occupations, but this discrimination does not always benefit the employer and in some cases hurts the company because of market competition (Jacobs, 1989).

Research has found mobility not only within sex-typical occupations, but also across sex-typical occupations (Rosenfeld, 1983). Employers view women as not being highly committed to the labor market because of family responsibilities (Rosenfeld, 1983). Atrophy is a term that is associated with a loss of earnings due to intermittently leaving the workforce (Polachek, 1981). Research suggests that this is particularly problematic to women with children who intermittently enter the workforce, because this causes a loss in human capital investment (Polachek, 1981). Therefore, women are more likely to be in professions that have the lowest amount of atrophy, but that do not value human capital investment (Polachek, 1981; England, 1984). These professions are either clerical or unskilled.

The basic assumption of queuing theory is that the labor market uses different queues to fill and rank an occupation's sex composition. Over the last century, many occupations' sex composition began to shift from one to the other (Reskin and Roos, 1990). This shift from either male to female or female to male was caused by a few

different factors. These factors include wars, immigration, specializing more general jobs to decrease wages (for example clerical work and newer technology), social recognition, and better opportunities created for the dominant sex (Reskin and Roos, 1990). This queuing of the labor market sex composition is done through a dual-queuing process (Reskin and Roos, 1990). The labor market uses labor queues to rank a group of workers' attractiveness to a particular company; and employers usually apply these as gender queues because they prefer to hire males over females (Reskin and Roos, 1990). Job queues are used by the workers to rank the order of positions within that company and thus their attractiveness to the workers (Reskin and Roos, 1990). Since employers seek to hire the worker from the highest labor or gender queue, these workers are able to choose the most attractive job (Reskin and Roos, 1990). For this reason, men are most likely to fill the more desirable jobs (Reskin and Roos, 1990). The shape of the labor queue depends upon the size of the groups in each gender queue (Reskin and Roos, 1990). This means that if a small number of highly attractive jobs are available and a large number of less attractive jobs are available, then the employer will fill the highly attractive jobs with a few members of the higher ranked group and the less attractive jobs with many members of the lower ranked group (Reskin and Roos, 1990). Since the higher attractive positions garner higher wages and the less attractive positions pay low wages, men will have a greater amount of income than women because they occupy the highly attractive positions (Reskin and Roos, 1990). This queuing is used to describe the expansion of the male-dominated labor market in the 1970s (Reskin and Roos, 1990).

Research suggests that employers place men and women in different job classifications, even though their roles were not distinct enough to place them in separate

detailed occupational classifications (Bielby and Baron, 1986). Recent findings suggest that employers are willing to move women into male-dominated positions if a decline in skill is necessary to fill the job, but are not likely to fill these deskilled positions (Kmec, 2005). These studies also suggest that an increase in the starting wage of a position increases the odds of a woman's employment in a female-dominated occupation (Kmec, 2005). Gender discrimination is often found in the form of wage discrimination against female labor (Tam, 1997).

2.4 Alternative Model



(adapted from Wright, 1992)

The explanation of the wage gap between men and women in the government professions will be tested using a theoretical model with income being the dependent variable in this model. This model consists of three different levels of theories. They are individual-level theories, structural-level theories, and gender-level theories.

Individual-level theories view humans as rational beings that make choices to further their income (Becker, 1985; Coleman, 1990). Therefore, the greater human capital one earns through decisions made about education, job-related skills or other decisions positively affecting their income, the greater income that person will receive. Structural-level theories believe that society is structured through a hierarchy of economic positions. The organization of a company determines an individual's income;

as well as, the position that person occupies in that company. The higher positions such as a manager will be paid more than a janitor. These different positions have different rates of return for individual attributes. If a manager furthers his education for the better of an organization, then he or she will be rewarded with an increase in pay. If a janitor furthers his or her education, then there will be no effect on his or her pay because this attribute does not benefit the organization so this individual will not be rewarded with an increase in wages. Gender-level theories believe that one's gender affects their income. Since females are devalued in society, their income is substantially less than males, regardless of their individual attributes or economic position. Females are then sorted into lower paid positions within various organizations.

3. Data and Methodology

3.1 Data Used

The data used for this study is the March 2006 Current Population Survey (CPS), Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASES) conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The universe is the civilian, non-institutional population of the United States living in various housing situations and members of the Armed Forces living either on or off military bases (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). The CPS uses a national probability sample and interviewed the sample once a month for four consecutive months in a given year. The sample was interviewed on topics related to employment and various demographic variables.

The sample for this study was restricted to individuals that were employed in the government sector (federal, state, or local levels), not in the military and eighteen to sixty-four years old. The final sample size was 14,136. The CPS is a national probability

sample; therefore, weights are available and are used in this study for analysis. Since weights tend to increase the sample size and decrease the standard error, large weighted samples often give false significant values. In order to minimize this bias, relative weights were created by dividing the weight by its mean. Relative weights are used to maintain the sample size, but generate similar distribution of the weighted population.

3.2 Variables

3.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is total annual income. This is an interval-level variable that is measured in dollars. The minimum value of the income variable is $300 and the maximum value is $125,000. Most researchers log income because it has a skewed distribution in comparison to the normal curve; therefore, the income variable was logged. However, due to the sample restrictions, in this study income is more normally distributed. Therefore, income in raw dollars will be used for this analysis. The income variable was also ranked into a quintile and centile measures.

3.2.2 Independent Variables

3.2.2.1 Individual Model Segment

The independent variables from the individual model segment that are used for analysis are education, age, region lived, veteran status, U.S. citizenship status, and area respondent lives (either urban or rural).

The original educational attainment nominal variable was transformed into a five-level ordinal variable indicating the respondent had attained an education of less than high school, high school diploma, some college, college degree, or an advanced college degree. These categories were then recoded into five binary variables for their respective

categories. From the five-level ordinal educational attainment variable, an additional binary variable was created that combined the categories "college degree such as BA, BS, etc," and "advanced degree such as MA, JD, PhD, etc" into a new variable denoting the respondent attained a college degree or higher. Educational attainment is expected to have a positive effect on income.

An interval-level variable was used to measure the age of the respondent. Age is expected to have a positive effect on income.

The region a respondent lived in was a four-level nominal variable with the categories: "Northeast," "Midwest," "South," and "West." Each of these categories was made into four binary variables with one indicating the region lived in for their respective categories. Analysis indicated that the Midwest region was the region with the lowest income. Given this, living in the Midwest region is expected to have a negative effect on income.

The original citizenship variable was collapsed from a five-level nominal variable into a binary variable indicating whether or not the respondent was an immigrant to the United States. For this variable, one indicated that the respondent was an immigrant to the United States. Being an immigrant is expected to have a negative effect on income.

The area in which the respondent lives was collapsed from a four-level nominal variable into a binary variable denoting whether or not the respondent lived in an urban or rural area. For this binary variable, one indicated that the respondent lived in a rural area. Living in a rural area is expected to have a negative effect on income.

3.2.2.2 Structural Model Segment

The independent variables from the structural model segment that are used for analysis are number of employees in respondent's company, work status, level of government, and union membership.

The number of employees in a respondent's place of employment was transformed from an ordinal-level variable into three separate binary variables. Those binary variables represent the size of the business. Companies with less than twenty-four employees are considered small-sized businesses; companies with between twenty-five and ninety-nine employees are considered medium-sized businesses; and companies with one hundred or more employees are considered to be large-sized businesses. Company size is expected to have a positive effect on income; whereas, respondents working in the largest companies are expected to earn the most income.

The work status of the individual was transformed from a nominal variable into a binary indicating the respondent was a part-time worker. This includes all types of employment except those working full-time, full-year. Being a part-time worker is expected to have a negative effect on income.

The level of government a respondent worked for was transformed from a nominal variable representing the class of the worker in the government industry into three separate binary variables. These variables indicated that the respondent worked at the federal, state, or local levels. The level at which the respondent worked is expected to have a positive effect on income, with individuals working at the federal level expected to earn the most income.

The union membership variable was transformed from a nominal variable into a binary variable indicating that the respondent was a member of his or her employer's union. Union membership is expected to have a positive effect on income.

3.2.2.3 Gender Model Segment

The independent variables from the gender model segment that are used for analysis are sex, marital status, race/ethnicity, presence of children under the age of 18 in the household, type of family, and occupational sex segregation.

The sex of the respondent is a binary variable in which one indicates female. Being female is expected to have a negative effect on income.

Marital status is a three-level nominal variable with categories of "currently married", "ever married, including separated, widowed and divorced", and "never married." These nominal categories were then recoded into three separate binary variables for each category. Marital status is expected to have a varying effect on income. Those individuals that have ever or are currently married are expected to have a positive effect on income, and the never married variable is expected to have a negative effect on income.

The original race variable was collapsed and recoded into a five-level nominal variable. The original ethnicity variable was transformed into a binary variable. For this variable, zero indicated that the respondent had a non-Hispanic ethnicity and one indicated that the respondent had a Hispanic ethnicity. The race and ethnicity variables were combined into one race/ethnicity variable with six nominal categories. For this variable, the categories were "white non-Hispanic," "black, non-Hispanic," "Indian, non-Hispanic," "Asian non-Hispanic," "other non-Hispanic," and "all races, Hispanic." The

new race/ethnicity variable was further recoded into a binary variable indicating a respondent with a minority race/ethnicity background. For this new binary variable, zero indicated the respondent was "white, non-Hispanic," and one indicated the respondent was of a "minority race/ethnicities." The race/ethnicity of a respondent is expected to have a negative effect on income if the respondent is of a minority race/ethnicity background.

The presence of children under six variable was transformed into a binary variable indicating that the respondent had children under the age of six in the home. Having children under the age of six in the home is expected to have a negative effect on income.

The type of family that the respondent was a part of was transformed by combining the kind of family and type of family. The kind of family variable indicated who the reference person for the survey was and the original type of family variable indicated whether the respondent was a member of a primary family or some other type of family. The new type of family variable indicated whether the respondent was a member of a two-parent family, single parent family, or living alone. These were then made into three separate binary variables. Being a member of a two-parent family is expected to have a positive effect on income. Either being in a single-parent family or living alone is expected to have a negative effect on income.

The occupational sex segregation variable was created by dividing the percent of women within a four-digit occupational code by the total percent of women in the labor force. In the index, all values that are less than one indicate women are under-represented in the occupation, a value of one indicates that men and women are equally represented in the occupation, and all values that are greater than one indicate that

women are over-represented in the occupation. It is expected that an over-representation of women in occupations will have a negative effect on income.

3.3 Method of Analysis

For univariate measures, mean, standard deviation, and median for the full sample, between men and women, and at the federal, state, and local levels of government were provided. For comparisons between men and women, a group means comparison of a 2-tailed t-test was used. For comparisons among all government sectors, an analysis of variance was used. For multivariate analysis, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used on the full saturated model of aggregated and disaggregated factors to identify significant factors and independent effects. Another test of multivariate measures was using a partitioning of variance on the saturated model. This was used to identify a change in the R-square for the three different theoretical models. The OLS regression and partitioning of variance tests were run separately for the full sample and men and women; as well as for the full sample and federal, state, and local levels of government. These tests were used to compare the unstandardized coefficients across men and women (and across federal, state, and local levels of government). These tests were also used to compare the standardized coefficients within each group.

3.4 Hypotheses

Based upon the review of literature on the above theoretical assumptions and the supporting empirical evidence, the following hypotheses were investigated:

1. As an individual's age increases, income will increase, net of other factors.
2. The more education an individual attains, the greater income that individual earns, net of other factors.

3. Individuals working in higher ranking occupations will earn the greatest amount of income, net of other factors.
4. Individuals working at the federal level will earn more income than those working at the state and local levels, net of other factors.
5. Women will be sorted into occupational positions that earn less income than men.
6. Women will earn less income than men, net of other factors.

4. Results

4.1 Table 1

For the dependent variable, total annual income, results indicate that women, on average, earn an annual income significantly less than men ($33,126 versus $44,729) and a median annual income lower than men ($32,000 versus $43,000). The pay-gap between men and women on average annual income is 74.3% and for median annual income is 74.4%.

For independent variables measuring individual-level factors, women attain more years in education than men (14.78 versus 14.50), are less likely to have a high school diploma or less (20.3% versus 23.5%), are less likely to have some college education (27.6% versus 30.9%), and are more likely to have a college degree or higher (49.3% versus 42.1%). The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women were age, living in a rural area, and living in the Midwest.

For independent variables measuring structural-level factors, women work less hours per week (38.3 versus 41.4), are less likely to be a federal government worker (11.4% versus 22.2%), are more likely to be employed by the local government (57.6%

versus 47.0%), more likely to work in occupations that have higher prestige (50.9 versus 48.7), to work in a white-collar high-skill job, (63.0% versus 44.0%), or to work in a white-collar low-skill job (22.0% versus 11.0%). Women are less likely than men to work in a blue-collar high-skill job (5.0% versus 31.0%), or in a blue-collar low-skill job (11.0% versus 14.0%). To lend support for Hypothesis 5, a combined 68% of women work in either white-collar high-skill or blue-collar high-skill positions; whereas 75% of men work in these positions. The variables that were not statistically different between men and women were the median number of hours worked per week, being a union member, or being employed by the state.

For independent variables measuring the gender-level factors, women are more likely to work in occupations that are overly represented by women (1.50 versus 0.78), are less likely to be married (61.4% versus 65.2%), and are more likely to have ever been married (18.7% versus 11.5%). Women are less likely to have never been married (19.9% versus 23.4%), more likely to be a single parent (17.5% versus 10.3%), and be of a minority race or ethnicity background (30.6% versus 27.8%). Having children under the age of six was not shown to be significantly different between men and women.

4.2 Table 2

For the dependent variable, total annual income, results indicate that employees at the federal level earn, on average, significantly more than those working at either the state or local levels ($50,469 versus $35,759 and $35,721). Federal employees also have a higher median income ($48,883) than state ($34,000) or local ($35,000) workers.

For independent variables measuring individual-level factors, federal employees are older (43.9) than state (41.4) or local (42.4) employees, are more likely to have a high

school diploma (24.0%) than state (19.5%) or local (22.2%) employees, to have at least some college experience (35.8%) than state (29.3%) or local (26.7%) employees, and to have at least a college degree (48.0% versus 44.2% (L)). However, on average, state employees have the most years of education (14.86 versus 14.32 (F) and 14.65 (L)). State employees are most likely to live in a rural area (21.6% versus 15.4% (F) and 17.6% (L)). Local government employees are most likely to work in the Midwest region (23.0% versus 20.4% (S)). The variables that did not show a significant difference at all levels of government were having a college degree or higher at the state level, and federal employees living in the Midwest region.

For independent variables measuring structural-level factors, federal employees work more hours per week (41.1) than local (39.53) employees, and work in a white-collar low-skill job (36.0% versus 16.0% (S) and 12.0% (L)). State government employees are most likely to work in occupations with higher prestige (50.9 versus 48.0 (F) and 50.1 (L)), to work in a white-collar high-skill job (59.0% versus 41.0% (F) and 56.0% (L)), or to work in a blue-collar high-skill job (14.0%). Local government employees are most likely to be a union member (11.0% versus 7.5% (S)), and to work in a blue-collar low-skill job (14.0% versus 7.0% (F) versus 11.0% (S)). The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women were average number of hours worked per week at the state level, median number of hours worked per week at all levels, being a union member at the federal level, and working in a blue-collar high-skill job at the federal and local levels.

For independent variables measuring gender-level factors, local employees are most likely to be female (62.6% versus 41.2% (F) and 57.9% (S)), and therefore, be

working in a mostly female occupation (1.26 versus 0.94 (F) and 1.22 (S)). Federal employees are more likely than state employees to be married (63.5% versus 57.6%), but less likely to have ever been married (16.5% versus 16.3%), or to have never been married (20.2% versus 25.9%). Federal employees are more likely than local employees to be of a minority race/ethnicity background (37.1% versus 27.7%). The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women were being married, ever married, or never married at the local levels, having children under the age of six or being a single parent at all levels of government employment, and being of a minority race/ethnicity background at the state level.

4.3 Table 3

For the dependent variable, total annual income, results indicate that at the federal level, women earn, on average, significantly less than men ($43,984 versus $55,014), at the state level, women earn, on average, significantly less than men ($31,985 versus $40,948), and at the local level, women earn, on average, significantly less than men ($31,756 versus $42,364). At the federal level, women have a lower median annual income than men ($42,000 versus $51,000), at the state level, women have a lower median annual income than men, ($30,000 versus $38,500), and at the local level, women have a lower median annual income than men, ($30,000 versus $40,000). The mean pay-gap between men and women at the federal level is 80%, at the state level is 78.1%, and at the local level is 75%. The median pay-gap at the federal level is 82.4%, at the state level is 77.9%, and at the local level is 75%.

For independent variables measuring individual-level factors at the federal level, women are younger than men (42.8 versus 44.7), have less years of education (14.17

versus 14.43), and are less likely to have at least a college degree (35.0% versus 39.9%). The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women at the federal level were having a high school diploma, having at least some college education, living in a rural area, and living in the Midwest region.

For independent variables measuring individual-level factors at the state level, women are more likely to have at least some college education (30.5% versus 27.6%). The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women at the state level were age, years of education, having a high school diploma, having at least a college degree, living in a rural area, and living in the Midwest region.

For independent variables measuring individual-level factors at the local level, women are older than men (42.8 versus 41.4), have more years of education (14.88 versus 14.28), are less likely to have a high school diploma (20.3% versus 25.3%), or some college experience (24.0% versus 31.3%), more likely to have at least a college degree (52.8% versus 38.9%), and more likely to live in a rural area (18.5% versus 16.3%). Living in the Midwest region did not show to be significantly different between men and women.

For independent variables measuring structural-level factors at the federal level, women work less hours per week than men (39.9 versus 41.9), more likely to work in a white-collar high-skill job (45.0% versus 39.0%), or in a white-collar low-skill job (46.0% versus 29.0%), but less likely than men to work in a blue-collar high-skill job (5.0% versus 23.0%), or in a blue-collar low-skill job (5.0% versus 9.0%). This lends support for Hypothesis 5 because 50% of women work in white-collar high-skill positions versus 62% of men working in these positions. The variables that did not show

a significant difference between men and women at the federal level were median number of hours worked per week, being a union member, and occupational prestige.

For independent variables measuring structural-level factors at the state level, women work less hours per week than men (38.0 versus 40.36), are more likely to work in a white-collar high-skill job (62.0% versus 55.0%), or in a white-collar low-skill job (23.0% versus 7.0%), but less likely than men to work in a blue-collar high-skill job (5.0% versus 25.0%), or in a blue-collar low-skill job (10.0% versus 12.0%). This lends support for Hypothesis 5 because 67% of women work in white-collar high-skill positions versus 80% of men working in these positions. The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women at the state level are median number of hours worked per week, being a union member, and occupational prestige.

For independent variables measuring structural-level factors at the local level, women work less hours per week than men (38.2 versus 41.7), are less likely to be a union member (10.1% versus 12.5%), are more likely to work in occupations with a high prestige (51.4 versus 47.9), are more likely to work in a white-collar high-skill job (66.0% versus 40.0%), or in a white-collar low-skill job (17.0% versus 5.0%), but less likely to work in a blue-collar high-skill job (4.0% versus 38.0%), or in a blue-collar low-skill job (12.0% versus 18.0%). This lends additional support for Hypothesis 5 because 70% of women work in white-collar high-skill positions versus 78% of men working in these positions. The median number of hours worked per week did not show to be a significant difference between men and women at the local level.

For independent variables measuring gender-level factors at the federal level, women are more likely to work in a mostly female occupation (1.25 versus 0.72), are less

likely to be married (57.1% versus 68.0%), more likely to be a single parent (19.9% versus 10.9%), and of a minority race/ethnicity (42.1% versus 33.7%). The variables that did not show a significant difference between men and women at the federal level were having ever been married, never been married, and having children under the age of six.

For independent variables measuring gender-level factors at the state level, women are more likely to work in a mostly female occupation (1.47 versus 0.88), and less likely to be married (55.7% versus 60.1%), but more likely to have ever been married (20.6% versus 11.0%). Women are less likely than men to have never been married (23.8% versus 28.9%), and more likely to be a single parent (18.8% versus 11.3%), and to be of a minority race/ethnicity background (31.2% versus 24.6%). Having children under the age of six did not show to be significantly different between men and women.

For independent variables measuring gender-level factors at the local level, women are more likely to work in a mostly female occupation (1.56 versus 0.75), have ever been married (17.1% versus 11.4%), and less likely to have never been married (17.7% versus 21.4%), and to have children under the age of six (15.3% versus 17.1%). Women are more likely than men to be a single parent (16.4% versus 9.4%). The variables that did not show to have a significant difference between men and women were being married and being of a minority race/ethnicity background.

4.4 Table 4A

Table 4A provides results from the OLS regression analysis using the three model segments of aggregated factors of the alternative model on total annual income for the full sample and by sex. The adjusted R-squared is 0.516 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the model explains approximately 52% of the variance in total

annual income. The separate analysis by sex reports statistically significant R-squared values of 0.486 (49%) for men and 0.503 (50%) for women. As shown in the full sample results, being female results in a reduction of $5,023 in annual income, net of other factors. This provides support to Hypothesis 6, which states that women will earn less than men, net of other factors.

For individual-level factors, increases in age results in an increase of $324 in annual income, net of other factors. This provides support for Hypothesis 1. Men receive a greater return in annual income for an increase in age, net of other factors ($363 versus $268). For every year of education an individual attains, annual income increases $2,136, net of other factors. This provides support for Hypothesis 2. Women receive a greater return in annual income for every increase in educational attainment, net of other factors ($2,412 versus $1,872). Living in a rural area results in a decrease of $6,299 in annual income, net of other factors. Men's annual income suffers more from living in a rural area, resulting in a decrease in annual income, net of other factors (-$7,914 versus -$4,977). Living in the Midwest region is detrimental to individuals, because it causes a decrease of $929 in annual income, net of other factors. Men receive a decrease of $1,366 in annual income from living in the Midwest region, net of other factors. Living in the Midwest region is a non-significant factor and has no independent effect on annual income for women.

For structural-level factors, an increase in weekly hours worked results in an increase of $723 in annual income, net of other factors. Women receive a greater return on weekly hours worked than men, net of other factors ($734 versus $653). Union members receive an increase of $2,805 in annual income, net of other factors. Women

receive an increase of $2,982 in annual income for being a union member, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $2,221 in annual income for being a union member, net of other factors. Federal workers earn an increase of $10,776 in total annual income, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $10,807 in annual income for being a federal employee, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $10,717 in annual income for being a federal employee, net of other factors. For women, working in the local government results in a decrease of $718 in total annual income, net of other factors. For the full sample and for men only, the results do not show a significant and independent effect of being a local government employee on annual income. The above results provide support for Hypothesis 4. Working in a higher ranking occupation results in an increase of $290 in total annual income, net of other factors. This provides support for Hypothesis 3. Men receive a greater return for working in a higher ranking position than women do, net of other factors ($343 versus $241).

For gender-level factors, working in an occupation that is mostly female results in a decrease of $6,147 in total annual income, net of other factors. Men's annual income suffers more than women's from being in a female-dominated occupation, net of other factors (-$6,728 versus -$5,027). Married men receive an increase of $3,610 in total annual income, net of other factors; whereas, women's annual income decreases $1,355, net of other factors, for being married. Marriage was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income for the full sample. The presence of children under the age of six results in an increase of $1,729 in annual income, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $1,631 in total annual income for having children under the age of six, net of other factors. Having children under the age of six was a non-significant factor

and had no independent effect on annual income for women. Men who are of a minority racial/ethnic background receive an increase of $2,310 in annual income, net of other factors. For the full sample and women, being from a minority racial/ethnic background was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

4.5 Table 4B

Table 4B provides results from the OLS regression analysis using the three model segments of disaggregated factors of the alternative model on total annual income for the full sample and by sex. The adjusted R-squared is 0.496 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the model explains approximately 50% of the variance in total annual income. The separate analysis by sex reports statistically significant R-squared values of 0.469 (47%) for men and 0.477 (48%) for women. As shown in the full sample results, being female results in a reduction of $5,142 in annual income, net of other factors. This provides additional support to Hypothesis 6, which states that women will earn less than men, net of other factors.

For individual-level factors, an increase in age results in an increase of $330 in total annual income, net of other factors. Men receive a greater return than women in income for every year older, net of other factors ($357 versus $285). This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1. Individuals, who attain a high school diploma, receive an increase of $3501 in total annual income from individual attaining less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Men receive a greater return than women in annual income by attaining a high school diploma rather than attaining less than a high school diploma, net of other factors ($5,282 versus $2,388). Individuals who attain at least some college education receive an increase of $6,362 in annual income over

individuals who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Men receive a greater return than women in annual income by attaining some college education rather than less than a high school diploma, net of other factors ($7,867 versus $5,205). Individuals, who attain a college degree or higher receive an increase of $15,840 in annual income over those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $16,093 in annual income by attaining a college degree or higher rather than less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Women receive an increase of $15,623 in annual income by attaining a college degree or higher rather than less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. The above results provide additional support for Hypothesis 2.

Living in a rural area results in a decrease of $6,429 in total annual income, net of other factors. Men's annual income suffers more than women for living in a rural area, net of other factors (-$8,154 versus -$4,969). Individuals, who live in the Midwest region, receive a decrease of $849 in total annual income, net of other factors. Men's annual income results in a decrease of $1,410 for living in the Midwest region, net of other factors. For women, living in the Midwest region was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on total annual income.

For structural-level factors, an increase in hours worked per week results in an increase of $737 in annual income, net of other factors. Women receive a greater return than men in annual income for working more hours per week, net of other factors ($742 versus $677). Union members receive an increase of $2,930 in annual income, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $2,544 in annual income for being a union member, net of other factors. Women receive an increase of $3,155 in annual income for

being a union member, net of other factors. Federal employees receive $9,919 more in annual income than state government employees, net of other factors. Men receive a greater return than women in annual income for being a federal employee rather than being a state government employee, net of other factors ($10,906 versus $9,247). Women working for the local government receive $735 less in annual income than state government employees, net of other factors. The above results provide support for Hypothesis 4. Working for the local government was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income for the full sample or for men.

Individuals, who work in white-collar high-skill jobs, receive $11,429 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Men receive a greater return than women in annual income for working in a white-collar high-skill job rather than in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors ($12,925 versus $10.163). Individuals, who work in white-collar low-skill jobs, receive $8,475 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Women receive a greater return than men in annual income for working in white-collar low-skill jobs rather than blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors ($9,187 versus $5,483). Individuals, who work in blue-collar high-skill jobs, receive $8,907 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Women receive an increase of $7,434 in annual income for working in blue-collar high-skill jobs rather than in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $8,977 in annual income for working in blue-collar high-skill jobs rather than in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. The above results provide additional support for Hypothesis 3.

For gender-level factors, working in a female-dominated occupation results in a decrease of $6,485 in annual income, net of other factors. Men receive a decrease of $6,081 in annual income for working in a female-dominated occupation, net of other factors. Women receive a decrease of $6,505 in annual income for working in a female-dominated occupation, net of other factors. Currently married men receive a greater return than women in annual income rather than having ever been married, net of other factors ($2,610 versus -$1,130). Being married was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income for the full sample. Individuals who have never been married receive $1,228 less in annual income than those who have ever been married, net of other factors. Men who have never been married receive a decrease of $2,503 in annual income over those who have ever been married, net of other factors. For women, having never been married was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

The presence of children under the age of six results in an increase of $1,792 in annual income, net of other factors. Men receive an increase of $1,515 in annual income for having children under the age of six, net of other factors. The presence of children under the age of six was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income for women. Individuals, who are of a minority racial /ethnic background, receive a decrease of $906 in annual income, net of other factors. Men's annual income decreases by $2,475 in annual income with having a minority racial/ethnic background, net of other factors. Minority racial/ethnic background was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on women.

4.6 Table 5A

Table 5A provides results from the OLS regression analysis using the three model segments of aggregated factors of the alternative model on total annual income for the full sample and by government worker levels. The adjusted R-squared is 0.516 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the model explains approximately 52% of the variance in total annual income. The separate analysis by government worker levels reports statistically significant R-squared values of 0.472 (47%) for federal-level workers, 0.507 (51%) for state-level workers, and 0.500 (50%) for local-level workers. As shown in the full sample results, federal-level employees receive $10,776 more in annual income than state-level employees, net of other factors; whereas, local-level employees receive $366 less in annual income than state-level employees, net of other factors. This provides additional support to Hypothesis 4, which states that federal workers will earn more than workers at the state and local levels, net of other factors.

For individual-level factors, an increase in age results in an increase of $324 in annual income, net of other factors. Workers at the federal level receive a greater amount of return than state or local-level employees for every increase in age, net of other factors ($441 (F) versus $342 (S) and $441 (F) versus $290 (L)). This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1. A yearly increase in educational attainment results in an increase of $2,136 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a greater return in annual income than state and local-level employees for each additional year of educational attainment, net of other factors ($2,723 (F) versus $2,041 (S) and $2,723 (F) versus $2,114 (L)). This provides additional support for Hypothesis 2.

Individuals living in a rural area receive a decrease of $6,299 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees' annual income suffers more than state-

level employees for living in a rural area, net of other factors (-$7,416 versus -$5,015). Local-level employees' annual income suffers more than state-level employees for living in a rural area, net of other factors (-$6,742 versus -$5,015). Individuals living in the Midwest region receive a decrease of $929 in annual income, net of other factors. For all three levels of government employment, living in the Midwest region was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

For structural-level factors, working more hours per week results in an increase of $723 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a greater return than state and local-level employees in annual income, net of other factors ($845 (F) versus $692 (S) and $845 (F) versus $721 (L)). Union members receive an increase of $2,805 in annual income, net of other factors. State-level employees receive an increase of $4,225 in annual income by being a union member, net of other factors. State-level employees receive an increase of $3,330 in annual income by being a union member, net of other factors. For federal-level employees, being a union member was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income. Individuals in higher ranking positions receive an increase of $290 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive the greatest return in annual income for occupying higher ranking positions, net of other factors ($493 versus $195 (S) and $327 (L)). This provides additional support for Hypothesis 3.

For gender-level factors, being female causes a decrease of $5,023 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a decrease of $4,223 in annual income for being female, net of other factors. State-level employees receive a decrease of $4,723 in annual income for being female, net of other factors. Local-level

employees receive a decrease of $5,165 in annual income for being female, net of other factors. The above results provide additional support for Hypothesis 6. Individuals working in a mostly female occupation receive a decrease of $6,147 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees' annual income suffers more than state-level employees by being in a female-dominated occupation, net of other factors (-$6,382 versus -$4,579). Local-level employees' annual income suffers more than state-level employees for working in a female-dominated occupation, net of other factors (-$6,688 versus -$4,579).

Married state-level employees receive an increase of $1,862 in annual income, net of other factors. For the full sample, federal-level, and local-level employees, being married was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income. The presence of children under the age of six results in an increase of $1,729 in annual income, net of other factors. Local-level employees with children under the age of six receive an increase of $2,502 in annual income, net of other factors. Having children under the age of six was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income for federal and state-level employees. For federal-level employees, having a minority racial/ethnic background results in a decrease of $2,522 in annual income, net of other factors. For the full sample, state and local-level employees, individuals of a minority racial/ethnic background was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

4.7 Table 5B

Table 5B provides results from the OLS regression analysis using the three model segments of disaggregated factors of the alternative model on total annual

income for the full sample and by government worker levels. The adjusted R-squared is 0.496 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the model explains approximately 50% of the variance in total annual income. The separate analysis by government worker levels reports statistically significant R-squared values of 0.454 (45%) for federal-level workers, 0.486 (49%) for state-level workers, and 0.482 (48%) for local-level workers. As shown in the full sample results, federal-level employees receive $9,919 more in annual income than state-level employees, net of other factors; whereas, local-level employees receive $534 less in annual income than state-level employees, net of other factors. This provides additional support to Hypothesis 4, which states that federal workers will earn more than workers at the state and local levels, net of other factors.

For individual-level factors, an increase in age results in an increase of $330 in annual income, net of other factors. This provides additional support for Hypothesis 1. Federal-level employees receive a greater return than local-level employees in annual income for every yearly increase in age, net of other factors ($431 versus $303). State-level employees receive an increase of $346 in annual income for every yearly increase in age, net of other factors. Individuals, who attain a high school diploma, receive $3,501 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. State-level employees who attain a high school diploma receive $3,746 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Local-level employees who attain a high school diploma receive $3,574 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. For federal-level employees, attaining a high school diploma rather than less than a high

school diploma was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

Individuals, who attain at least some college education, receive $6,362 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. State-level employees who attain at least some college education receive $6,207 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Local-level employees who attain at least some college education receive $7,025 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. For federal-level employees, attaining at least some college education rather than less than a high school diploma was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

Individuals, who attain a college degree or higher, receive $15,480 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Federal-level employees who attain a college degree or higher receive $16,603 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. State-level employees who attain a college degree or higher receive $14,256 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. Local-level employees who attain a college degree or higher receive $16,991 more in annual income than those who attain less than a high school diploma, net of other factors. The above results provide additional support for Hypothesis 2.

Individuals living in a rural area receive a decrease of $6,429 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a decrease of $7,172 in annual income for living in a rural area, net of other factors. Local-level employees' annual

income suffers more than state-level employees by living in a rural area, net of other factors (-$6,681 versus -$5,156). Individuals living in the Midwest region receive a decrease of $849 in annual income, net of other factors. For all levels of government employment, living in the Midwest region was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

For structural-level factors, an increase in the number of hours worked per week results in an increase of $737 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive the greater return than state-level employees in annual income for working additional hours per week, net of other factors ($837 versus $709). Local-level employees receive an increase of $739 in additional hours worked per week, net of other factors. Union members receive an increase of $2,930 in annual income, net of other factors. State-level employees receive an increase of $4,752 in annual income for being union members, net of other factors. Local-level employees receive an increase of $3,448 in annual income for being union members, net of other factors. For federal-level employees, being a union member was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

Individuals working in white-collar high-skill jobs receive $11,429 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a greater return than state-level or local-level employees on annual income for working in white-collar high-skill jobs rather than in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors ($17,841 versus $10,809 (S) and $10,168 (L)). Individuals working in white-collar low-skill jobs receive $8,475 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Federal-level

employees working in white-collar low-skill jobs receive $7,047 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. State-level employees working in white-collar low-skill jobs receive $9,569 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Local-level employees working in white-collar low-skill jobs receive $10,401 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors.

Individuals working in blue-collar high-skill jobs receive $8,907 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Federal-level employees working in blue-collar high-skill jobs receive $9,533 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. State-level employees working in blue-collar high-skill jobs receive $7,210 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. Local-level employees working in blue-collar high-skill jobs receive $9,562 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill jobs, net of other factors. The above results provide additional support for Hypothesis 3.

For gender-level factors, being female causes a decrease of $5,142 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a decrease of $4,390 in annual income for being female, net of other factors. State-level employees receive a decrease of $4,926 in annual income for being female, net of other factors. Local-level employees receive a decrease of $5,327 in annual income for being female, net of other factors. The above results provide additional support for Hypothesis 6. Individuals working in mostly female occupations receive a decrease of $6,485 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a decrease of $7,249 in annual income

by working in female-dominated occupations, net of other factors. State-level employees receive a decrease of $5,741 in annual income by working in female-dominated occupations, net of other factors. Local-level employees receive a decrease of $6,569 in annual income by working in female-dominated occupations, net of other factors.

Currently married state-level employees receive $1,623 more in annual income than those who have ever been married, net of other factors. For the full sample, federal and local-level employees, being married was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income. Never married individuals receive $1,228 less in annual income those individuals that have ever been married, net of other factors. For all levels of government, having never been married was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

The presence of children under the age of six, results in an increase of $1,792 in annual income, net of other factors. Local-level employees receive an increase of $2,469 in annual income, net of other factors. For federal and state-level employees, having children under the age of six was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income. Individuals of a minority racial/ethnic background receive a decrease of $906 in annual income, net of other factors. Federal-level employees receive a decrease of $2,434 in annual income for having a minority racial/ethnic background, net of other factors. For state and local-level employees, being from a minority racial/ethnic background was a non-significant factor and had no independent effect on annual income.

4.8 Table 6

Table 6 provides results from the partitioning of variance analysis using the three model segments of the alternative model on total annual income for the full sample and by sex to identify the best model segment predictor. The adjusted R-squared is 0.516 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 52% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.419, with an R-squared change from the full model of 0.097 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the individual model segment explains approximately 18.8% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.364 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change from the full model of 0.152, suggesting that the structural model segment explains approximately 29.5% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender-model segment is 0.457 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change from the full model of 0.059, suggesting that the gender model segment explains approximately 11.4% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the structural model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 30% of the variance in total annual income of the full model.

For males only, the adjusted R-squared is 0.486 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 49% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.378 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.108, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 22.2% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.361 (significant at the

.000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.125, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 36.1% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender model segment is 0.454 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.032, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 6.6% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the structural model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 36% of the variance in total annual income of males.

For females only, the adjusted R-squared is 0.503 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 50% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.401 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.101, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 20.1% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.315 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.188, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 37.4% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender model segment is 0.487 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.016, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 3.2% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the structural model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 37% of the variance in total annual income of females.

4.9 Table 7

Table 7 provides results from the partitioning of variance analysis using the three model segments of the alternative model on total annual income for the full sample

and by level of government employment to identify the best model segment predictor. The adjusted R-squared is 0.515 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 52% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.419, with an R-squared change from the full model of 0.097 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the individual model segment explains approximately 18.8% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.364 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change from the full model of 0.152, suggesting that the structural model segment explains approximately 29.5% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender-model segment is 0.457 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change from the full model of 0.059, suggesting that the gender model segment explains approximately 11.4% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the structural model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 30% of the variance in total annual income of the full model.

For federal-level employees only, the adjusted R-squared is 0.472 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 47% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.352 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.120, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 25.4% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.362 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.110, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 23.3% of the variance in total annual

income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender model segment is 0.428 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.045, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 9.5% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the individual model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 25% of the variance in total annual income of federal-level employees.

For state-level employees only, the adjusted R-squared is 0.507 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 51% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.402 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.105, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 20.7% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.391 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.116, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 22.9% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender model segment is 0.463 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.045, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 8.9% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the structural model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 23% of the variance in total annual income of state-level employees.

For local-level employees only, the adjusted R-squared is 0.500 (significant at the .000 level), suggesting that the full model explains approximately 50% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the individual model segment is 0.400 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.101, suggesting that

the individual model explains approximately 20.2% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the structural model segment is 0.354 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.146, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 29.2% of the variance in total annual income. The adjusted R-squared without the gender model segment is 0.425 (significant at the .000 level), with an R-squared change of 0.076, suggesting that the individual model explains approximately 15.2% of the variance in total annual income. This suggests that the structural model segment is the best predictor of total annual income by explaining approximately 29% of the variance in total annual income of local-level employees.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

5.1 Hypotheses

1. As an individual's age increases, income will increase, net of other factors.

This hypothesis was supported by the multivariate analysis using OLS regression in Tables 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B. In Tables 4A and 5A, net of other factors, as an individual gets older, his or her annual income will increase approximately $324 per year. In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, as an individual gets older, his or her annual income will increase approximately $330 per year. These results indicate that as an individual's age increases, income increases, net of other factors.

2. The more education an individual attains, the greater income that individual earns, net of other factors.

This hypothesis was supported by the multivariate analysis using OLS regression in Tables 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B. In Tables 4A and 5A, net of other factors, the more years of education an individual attains, his or her annual income increases by $2,136 per year.

In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, if an individual earns a high school diploma rather than less than a high school diploma, increases his or her annual income by $3,501 per year. In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, if an individual earns at least some college education rather than less than a high school diploma, his or her annual income increases by $6,362 per year. In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, if an individual earns a college degree or higher rather than less than a high school diploma, his or her annual income increases by $15,840 per year. These results indicate that the more education an individual attains, the greater income that individual earns, net of other factors. These results are consistent with previous findings on the impact of education on income (Brown and Corcoran, 1997; Hersch, 1991; Polachek, 1981).

3. Individuals working in higher ranking occupations will earn the greatest amount of income, net of other factors.

This hypothesis was supported by the multivariate analysis using OLS regression in Tables 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B. In Tables 4A and 5A, net of other factors, working in a higher ranking occupation results in an increase of $290 in total annual income. In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, individual working in a white-collar high-skill position receive $11,429 more in total annual income than individuals working in blue-collar low-skill positions. These results indicate that individuals working in higher ranking occupations earn the greatest amount of annual income, net of other factors. These results are consistent with previous literature on the economic impact of working in higher ranking occupations (Coverdill, 1988; Rosenfeld, 1983)

4. Individuals working at the federal level will earn more income than those working at the state and local levels, net of other factors.

This hypothesis was supported by the multivariate analysis using OLS regression in Tables 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B. In Tables 4A and 5A, net of other factors, federal workers receive $10,776 more in annual income than state workers, and state workers receive $366 more in annual income than local workers. In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, federal workers receive $9,919 more in annual income than state workers, and state workers receive $534 more in annual income than local workers. These results indicate that federal workers earn the greatest amount of income, net of other factors.

5. Women will be sorted into occupational positions that earn less income than men.

This hypothesis was supported by the bivariate analysis using a group means comparison of a 2-tailed t-test in Tables 1 and 3. This was supported by using the skill-level positions because they are based upon income, instead of using the occupational prestige variable which is the employee's opinion of their occupation's rank. In Table 1, 68% of women work in either white-collar high-skill or blue-collar high-skill positions: whereas, 75% of men work in these positions. In Table 3, at the federal level, 50% of women work in a white-collar high-skill or blue-collar high-skill position versus 62% of men working in these positions. In Table 3, at the state level, 67% of women work in a white-collar high-skill or blue-collar high-skill position versus 80% of men working in these positions. In Table 3, at the local level, 70% of women work in white-collar high-skill or blue-collar high-skill positions; whereas, 78% of men work in these positions. All of the above results provide support for Hypothesis 5. Results from Tables 1 and 3, indicate that women were less likely to be employed than men in positions that earn higher income. These results are comparable with previous research done on women

being sorted into lower-paying occupations (Coverdill, 1988; Flynn, 2003; Rosenfeld, 1983).

6. Women will earn less income than men, net of other factors.

This hypothesis was supported by the multivariate analysis using OLS regression in Tables 4A, 4B, 5A, and 5B. In Tables 4A and 5A, net of other factors, being female results in a reduction of $5,023 in annual income. In Tables 4B and 5B, net of other factors, being female results in a reduction of $5,142 in annual income. These results indicate that women still earn less than men in government professions, net of other factors. This finding is consistent with numerous studies done on women being paid less than men in other employment sectors (e.g.; Bergmann, 2005; Coverdill, 1988; Flynn, 2003; and Jacobs, 1989).

5.2 Limitations

Not all of the areas identified in the literature review section were able to be tested because of the CPS dataset. This dataset is a cross-sectional dataset so it only provides data for one moment in time. It does not provide longitudinal information. That means that some of the variables could be not completely accurate. For example, the education variable could be inaccurate because a person could have been completing his or her education at the time of the survey, but had not yet received a degree until after the data was compiled. Without longitudinal information, a person's work history and length of time in the labor market is not available. These variables are valuable to many of the individual, as well as the structural-level theories. The revolving door theory was unable to be supported due to a lack of variables indicating an individual's previous occupation. In order to find support for this theory, variables identifying not only an individual's

previous occupation, but type of location, length of previous occupation, reason for leaving previous occupation, and other variables surrounding job mobility would be necessary. There also is not any information on the division of household labor. The literature suggests that this has a major impact on not only women's income, but also on men's (Coverman, 1983; Bergmann, 2005; Shirley and Wallace, 2004). Valuable information about a spouse's education, type of employment, and employment status is pertinent to both men and women's income and is not included in the CPS dataset.

5.3 Implications

Society's view of women as sole domestic caretakers needs to be altered and eliminated in order for the pay-gap between men and women to be narrowed. Women are receiving a decrease of at least $1,000 in annual income for being married, net of other factors. Men are being rewarded at least $2,000 in annual income for being married, net of other factors. Clearly the government is punishing married women for working. The government's view could be altered by the general society's view of women still needing to be at home instead of in the workforce.

A way to alleviate this problem would be to have more Americans continue pushing for the same Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) that was not passed by the states in 1982. This amendment would be a great step towards narrowing and hopefully eliminating the gender pay-gap that still exists today. The ERA is no longer an Amendment that the majority of the American people are aware of; however, it is still an Amendment that is presented to Congress every year. There needs to be greater attention brought to this issue. Otherwise, women will remain in second place, financially. The fact that women are still trying to get this Amendment to pass 83 years after it was written is absurd.

More women and men need to stand up for the rights of women to get this Amendment to finally be accepted by the entire United States of America. (For more information see the Equal Rights Amendment website at http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/).

Another policy implication that arises from this study is that more rules and regulations need to be in place at the state and local government levels. The mean pay-gap is most narrow at the federal level (80%) than at the state level (78.1%), or local level (75%). If there were more rules and regulations placed at the state or local levels, than the pay-gap between men and women would be narrower. Perhaps state and local levels should take some notes from the federal government and pay their female employees better in comparison to their male peers. This is not to say that the federal government is perfect, because women are still being paid at least $4,200 less than men, net of other factors. The federal government even needs to pay a little closer attention to women's wages and regulate the pay-gap and finally eliminate it. Women often enter the government sector because of the belief that there will be an equal playing field. This study, however, shows that even in the government sector, women still experience wage discrimination.

More women need to be employed in the upper tiers of the government sector; as well as, more women moving out of the local and state levels and into the federal level. This study indicates that an increase of $290 in annual income is earned by working in higher occupations, net of other factors. This study also indicates that employees in white-collar high-skill positions earn $11,429 more in annual income than those working in blue-collar low-skill positions, net of other factors. It was also indicated that women working at the federal level earn the most in annual income; however, the fewest number

of women work at this level. Obviously there is significant barriers women face to enter into this level of government. A way to increase the number of women working in the upper tiers of the federal government is through educational training. Previous research indicates that women are least likely to be in educational programs that garner the highest wages (Brown and Corcoran, 1997). Therefore, women need to be encouraged to enter the higher paid educational programs that will enable them to enter into the economically advantaged federal government. Within the federal government, more women need to be promoted as well. This process of women being sorted into lower paid occupations and their individual attributes devalued needs to be stopped immediately.

If more research was done on the pay-gap between men and women at the government level, then the proposed policy might be noticed and possibly enforced. Research done on an even larger scale might provide better insight into the government sector pay-gap. If more researchers were able to conduct a study like this, then some type of policy or even awareness would come out of it. While the awareness might seem like a relatively useless effect, it is a great start. Policymakers are only going to change the pay-gap if it is brought to their attention. Further research in this area, including variables regarding job mobility, is necessary for women to be paid an equal amount to their male counterparts in the government professions.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
Values for Full Sample and by Sex

Variables:	Full Sample	Men [1] [2]	Women	
Dependent Variable:				(pay-gap)
Annual earnings (mean):	$38,081	$44,729 *** ^	$33,216	(74.3%)
Annual earnings (median):	$36,000	$43,000	$32,000	(74.4%)
(stddev):	(22465)	(23980)	(19930)	
Independent Variables:				
Individual-level factors:				
Age (years)	42.3	42.3	42.4	
	(11.63)	(11.87)	(11.44)	
Education in years	14.67	14.50 ***	14.78	
	(2.62)	(2.69)	(2.56)	
% HS Dipl or less (0,1)	21.6%	23.5% ***	20.3%	
% Some college (0,1)	29.0%	30.9% ***	27.6%	
% BA/BS deg. or higher (0,1)	46.2%	42.1% ***	49.3%	
	100%	100%	100%	
% Rural (0,1)	18.5%	17.8%	19.0%	
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.39)	
% Midwest Region (0,1)	21.4%	21.2%	21.5%	
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	
Structural-level factors:				
Work hours per week	39.6	41.4 *** ^	38.3	
(median)	40.0	40.0	40.0	
	(9.89)	(9.64)	(9.88)	
% Union member (0,1)	9.2%	9.7%	8.9%	
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	
% Federal Worker (0,1)	15.9%	22.2% *** ^	11.4%	
% State Worker (0,1)	31.0%	30.9%	31.1%	
% Local Worker (0,1)	53.1%	47.0% *** ^	57.6%	
	100%	100%	100%	
Occupational Prestige	50.0	48.7 ***	50.9	
	(13.73)	(14.34)	(13.19)	
% White-collar High-skill (0,1)	55.0%	44.0% *** ^	63.0%	
% White-collar Low-skill (0,1)	17.0%	11.0% *** ^	22.0%	
% Blue-collar High-skill (0,1)	16.0%	31.0% *** ^	5.0%	
% Blue-collar Low-skill (0,1)	12.0%	14.0% ***	11.0%	
	100%	100%	100%	
Gender:				
Occupational Sex-Segregation	1.20	0.78 *** ^	1.50	
	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.48)	
% Married (0,1)	63.0%	65.2% ***	61.4%	
% Ever-married (0,1)	15.7%	11.5% ***	18.7%	
% Never-Married (0,1)	21.4%	23.4% ***	19.9%	
	100%	100%	100%	
% with children under 6 (0,1)	15.5%	15.7%	15.3%	
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	
% Single Parent (0,1)	14.5%	10.3% *** ^	17.5%	
	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.38)	
% Minority (0,1)	29.4%	27.8% ***	30.6%	
	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.46)	
Sample n (weighted):	14,136	5,974	8,162	
	100.0%	42.3%	57.7%	

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

[2] ^ effect size greater = >.20

TABLE 2
Values for Full Sample and by Government Worker

Variables:	Full Sample	Federal [1] [2]	State [1] [2]	Local [1] [2]
Dependent Variable:				
Annual earnings (mean):	$38,081	$50,469 *** ^	$35,760	$35,722 *** ^
Annual earnings (median):	$36,000	$48,883	$34,000	$35,000
(stddev):	(22465)	(24642)	(21440)	(21109)
Independent Variables:				
Individual-level factors:				
Age (years)	42.3	43.9 ***	41.4 ***	42.4 ***
	(11.63)	(10.76)	(12.21)	(11.48)
Education in years	14.67	14.32 ***	14.86 ***	14.65 ***
	(2.62)	(2.37)	(2.74)	(2.61)
% HS Dipl or less (0,1)	21.6%	24.0% ***	19.5% ***	22.2%
% Some college (0,1)	29.0%	35.8% ***	29.3% ***	26.7% ***
% BA/BS deg. or higher (0,1)	46.2%	48.0% ***	45.5%	44.2% ***
	100%	100%	100%	100%
% Rural (0,1)	18.5%	15.4% ***	21.6% ***	17.6% ****
	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.38)
% Midwest Region (0,1)	21.4%	18.0%	20.4% ***	23.0% ***
	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.42)
Structural-level factors:				
Work hours per week (mean):	39.6	41.1 ***	39.0	39.53 ***
(stddev):	(9.89)	(7.56)	(10.66)	(10.00)
% Union member (0,1)	9.2%	6.8%	7.5% ***	11.0% ***
	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.31)
Occupational Prestige	50.0	48.0 ***	50.9 **	50.1 ***
	(13.73)	(12.00)	(14.20)	(13.88)
% White-collar High-skill (0,1)	55.0%	41.0% *** ^	59.0% ** ^	56.0% ***
% White-collar Low-skill (0,1)	17.0%	36.0% *** ^	16.0% *** ^	12.0% *** ^
% Blue-collar High-skill (0,1)	16.0%	16.0%	14.0% ***	17.0%
% Blue-collar Low-skill (0,1)	12.0%	7.0% ***	11.0% ***	14.0% ***
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Gender:				
% Female (0,1)	57.7%	41.2% *** ^	57.9% ***	62.6% *** ^
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.48)
Occupational Sex-Segregation	1.20	0.94 *** ^	1.22 *** ^	1.2595 *** ^
	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.65)
% Married (0,1)	63.0%	63.5% ***	57.6% ***	66.0%
% Ever-married (0,1)	15.7%	16.3% ***	16.5% ***	15.0%
% Never-Married (0,1)	21.4%	20.2% ***	25.9% ***	19.1%
	100%	100%	100%	100%
% with children under 6 (0,1)	15.5%	14.1%	15.3%	16.0%
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.37)
% Single Parent (0,1)	14.5%	14.6%	15.6%	13.8%
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.34)
% Minority (0,1)	29.4%	37.1% ***	28.4%	27.7% ***
	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Sample n (weighted):	14,136	2,250	4,378	7,508

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05, significance indicates difference between current and following group

[2] effect size greater = >.20

TABLE 3
Values for Sex by Government Worker Levels

	Federal		State		Local	
Variables:	Men [1] [2]	Women	Men [1] [2]	Women	Men [1] [2]	Women
Dependent Variable:						
Annual earnings (mean):	$55,014 *** ^	$43,984	$40,948 *** ^	$31,985	$42,364 *** ^	$31,756
(Pay-gap)	(80.0%)		(78.1%)		(75.0%)	
Annual earnings (median):	$51,000	$42,000	$38,500	$30,000	$40,000	$30,000
(Pay-gap)	(82.4%)		(77.9%)		(75.0%)	
(stddev):	(24938)	(22700)	(23724)	(18734)	(22282)	(19318)
Independent Variables:						
Individual-level factors:						
Age (years)	44.7 ***	42.8	41.4	41.4	41.8 ***	42.8
	(10.78)	(10.65)	(12.59)	(11.92)	(11.74)	(11.30)
Education in years	14.43 **	14.17	14.90	14.83	14.28 *** ^	14.88
	(2.40)	(2.31)	(2.92)	(2.60)	(2.64)	(2.57)
% HS Dipl or less (0,1)	23.2%	25.2%	20.8%	18.5%	25.3% ***	20.3%
% Some college (0,1)	34.6%	37.6%	27.6% *	30.5%	31.3% ***	24.0%
% BA/BS deg. or higher (0,1)	39.9% *	35.0%	48.4%	48.0%	38.9% ***	52.8%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
% Rural (0,1)	15.0%	15.8%	22.1%	21.3%	16.3% *	18.5%
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.39)
% Midwest Region (0,1)	17.1%	19.3%	21.4%	19.7%	23.1%	22.9%
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Structural-level factors:						
Work hours per week	41.9 *** ^	39.9	40.36 *** ^	38.0	41.76 *** ^	38.2
(median)	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
	(7.64)	(7.31)	(10.99)	(10.30)	(9.49)	(10.06)
% Union member (0,1)	6.4%	7.3%	7.8%	7.2%	12.5% **	10.1%
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.30)
Occupational Prestige	48.0	48.0	50.6	51.1	47.9 *** ^	51.4
	(12.82)	(10.74)	(15.29)	(13.35)	(14.28)	(13.48)
% White-collar High-skill (0,1)	39.0% **	45.0%	55.0% ***	62.0%	40.0% *** ^	66.0%
% White-collar Low-skill (0,1)	29.0% *** ^	46.0%	7.0% *** ^	23.0%	5.0% *** ^	17.0%
% Blue-collar High-skill (0,1)	23.0% *** ^	5.0%	25.0% *** ^	5.0%	38.0% *** ^	4.0%
% Blue-collar Low-skill (0,1)	9.0% ***	5.0%	12.0% *	10.0%	18.0% ***	12.0%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Gender:						
Occupational Sex-Segregation	0.72 *** ^	1.25	0.88 *** ^	1.47	0.75 *** ^	1.56
	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.56)	(0.49)	(0.60)	(0.45)
% Married (0,1)	68.0% *** ^	57.1%	60.1% **	55.7%	67.2%	65.3%
	(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.48)
% Ever-married (0,1)	12.2%	22.1%	11.0% ***	20.6%	11.4% ***	17.1%
	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.38)
% Never-Married (0,1)	19.8%	20.8%	28.9% ***	23.8%	21.4% ***	17.7%
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.38)
% with children under 6 (0,1)	13.9%	14.4%	15.0%	15.5%	17.1% *	15.3%
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.36)
% Single Parent (0,1)	10.9% *** ^	19.9%	11.3% *** ^	18.8%	9.4% *** ^	16.4%
	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.37)
% Minority (0,1)	33.7% ***	42.1%	24.6% ***	31.2%	27.2%	28.0%
	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Sample n (weighted):	1,323	927	1,844	2,534	2,807	4,701
Total:	2250		4378		7508	

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

[2] effect size greater = >.20

TABLE 4A
OLS Regression Saturated Model of Aggregated Factors
Values for Full Sample and by Sex
(Dependent Variable= Annual Earnings)

Variables:	Full Sample			Men				Women		
	unstd.	[1]	std.	unstd.	[1]	std.	[2]	unstd.	[1]	std.
Independent Variables:										
Individual-level factors:										
Age (years)	$324	***	0.168	$363	***	0.180	<>	$268	***	0.154
Education in years	$2,136	***	0.249	$1,872	***	0.210	<>	$2,412	***	0.310
% Rural (0,1)	-$6,299	***	-0.109	-$7,914	***	-0.126	<>	-$4,977	***	-0.098
% Midwest Region (0,1)	-$929	***	-0.017	-$1,366	**	-0.023		-$443		-0.009
Structural-level factors:										
Work hours per week	$723	***	0.318	$653	***	0.263	<>	$734	***	0.364
% Union member (0,1)	$2,805	***	0.036	$2,221	***	0.027		$2,982	***	0.043
% Federal Worker (0,1)	$10,776	***	0.175	$10,807	***	0.187		$10,717	***	0.171
% State Worker (0,1)	ref group			ref group				ref group		
% Local Worker (0,1)	-$366		-0.008	$183		0.004		-$718	*	-0.018
Occupational Prestige	$290	***	0.177	$343	***	0.205	<>	$241	***	0.160
Gender:										
Female	-$5,023	***	-0.110	n/a				n/a		
Occupational Sex-Segregation	-$6,147	***	-0.172	-$6,728	***	-0.158	<>	-$5,027	***	-0.122
% Married (0,1)	$577		0.012	$3,610	***	0.072	<>	-$1,355	***	-0.033
% with children under 6 (0,1)	$1,729	***	0.028	$1,631	**	0.025		$588		0.011
% Minority (0,1)	-$493		-0.010	-$2,310	***	-0.043		$660		0.015
(Constant)	-$37,990			-$35,031				-$44,405		
Adjusted R squared	0.516			0.486				0.503		
Sample n=	14,135			5,973				8,161		

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

[2] statistically significant difference between males and females at the .05 level or higher

TABLE 4B
OLS Regression Saturated Model of Disaggregated Factors
Values for Full Sample and by Sex
(Dependent Variable= Annual Earnings)

Variables:	Full Sample		Men			Women	
	unstd. [1]	std.	unstd. [1]	std.	[2]	unstd. [1]	std.
Independent Variables:							
Individual-level factors:							
Age (years)	$330 ***	0.171	$357 ***	0.177	<>	$285 ***	0.163
% Less than High School (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group	
% HS Dipl or less (0,1)	$3,501 ***	0.064	$5,282 ***	0.093	<>	$2,388 *	0.048
% Some college (0,1)	$6,362 ***	0.128	$7,867 ***	0.152	<>	$5,205 ***	0.117
% BA/BS deg. or higher (0,1)	$15,840 ***	0.352	$16,093 ***	0.331		$15,623 ***	0.392
% Rural (0,1)	-$6,429 ***	-0.111	-$8,154 ***	-0.130	<>	-$4,969 ***	-0.098
% Midwest Region (0,1)	-$849 *	-0.015	-$1,410 *	-0.024		-$348	-0.007
Structural-level factors:							
Work hours per week	$737 ***	0.325	$677 ***	0.272	<>	$742 ***	0.368
% Union member (0,1)	$2,930 ***	0.038	$2,544 **	0.031		$3,155 ***	0.045
% Federal Worker (0,1)	$9,919 ***	0.162	$10,906 ***	0.189	<>	$9,247 ***	0.147
% State Worker (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group	
% Local Worker (0,1)	-$534	-0.009	$124	0.003		-$735 *	-0.018
% White-collar High-skill (0,1)	$11,429 ***	0.253	$12,925 ***	0.268	<>	$10,163 ***	0.247
% White-collar Low-skill (0,1)	$8,475 ***	0.143	$5,483 ***	0.072	<>	$9,187 ***	0.191
% Blue-collar High-skill (0,1)	$8,907 ***	0.144	$8,977 ***	0.173		$7,434 ***	0.078
% Blue-collar Low-skill (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group	
Gender:							
Female	-$5,142 ***	-0.113	n/a			n/a	
Occupational Sex-Segregation	-$6,485 ***	-0.181	-$6,081 ***	-0.142		-$6,505 ***	-0.158
% Married (0,1)	$269	0.006	$2,610 ***	0.052	<>	-$1,130 **	-0.028
% Ever-married (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group	
% Never-Married (0,1)	-$1,228 *	-0.022	-$2,503 **	-0.044		$169	0.003
% with children under 6 (0,1)	$1,792 ***	0.029	$1,515 *	0.023		$829	0.015
% Minority (0,1)	-$906 **	-0.018	-$2,475 ***	-0.046		-$13	0.000
(Constant)	-$10,860		-$10,937			-$13,310	
Adjusted R squared	0.496		0.469			0.477	
Sample n=	14,135		5,973			8,161	

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

[2] statistically significant difference between males and females at the .05 level or higher

TABLE 5A
OLS Regression Saturated Model of Aggregated Factors
Values for Full Sample and by Government Worker Level

(Dependent Variable= Annual Earnings)

Variables:	Full Sample			Federal Level			State Level			Local Level		
	unstd. [1]		std.	unstd. [1]		std. [2]	unstd. [1]		std. [2]	unstd. [1]		std. [2]
Independent Variables:												
Individual-level factors:												
Age (years)	$324	***	0.168	$441	***	0.192 <>	$341	***	0.194	$290	***	0.158 <>
Education in years	$2,136	***	0.249	$2,723	***	0.261 <>	$2,041	***	0.261	$2,114	***	0.262 <>
% Rural (0,1)	-$6,299	***	-0.109	-$7,416	***	-0.109 <>	-$5,015	***	-0.096 <>	-$6,742	***	-0.122
% Midwest Region (0,1)	-$929	**	-0.017	-$1,017		-0.016	-$803		-0.015	-$594		-0.012
Structural-level factors:												
Work hours per week	$723	***	0.318	$845	***	0.259 <>	$692	***	0.344	$721	***	0.341 <>
% Union member (0,1)	$2,805	***	0.036	-$1,909		-0.019	$4,225	***	0.052	$3,330	***	0.049
% Federal Worker (0,1)	$10,776	***	0.175	n/a			n/a			n/a		
% State Worker (0,1)	ref group			n/a			n/a			n/a		
% Local Worker (0,1)	-$366		-0.008	n/a			n/a			n/a		
Occupational Prestige	$290	***	0.177	$493	***	0.240 <>	$195	***	0.129 <>	$302	***	0.199 <>
Gender:												
Female	-$5,023	***	-0.110	-$4,223	***	-0.084	-$4,773	***	-0.110	-$5,165	***	-0.118
Occupational Sex-Segregation	-$6,147	***	-0.172	-$6,382	***	-0.144 <>	-$4,579	***	-0.128 <>	-$6,688	***	-0.205
% Married (0,1)	$577		0.012	$1,625		0.032	$1,862	***	0.043	-$415		-0.009
% with children under 6 (0,1)	$1,729	***	0.028	$818		0.012	$710		0.012	$2,502	***	0.043
% Minority (0,1)	-$493		-0.010	-$2,522	**	-0.049	-$595		-0.013	$327		0.007
(Constant)	-$37,990			-$54,037			$34,797			-$36,054		
Adjusted R squared	0.516			0.472			0.507			0.500		
Sample n=	14,135			2,249			4,377			7,507		

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

[2] statistically significant difference between males and females at the .05 level or higher

TABLE 5B
OLS Regression Saturated Model of Disaggregated Factors
Values for Full Sample and by Government Worker Level
(Dependent Variable= Annual Earnings)

Variables:	Full Sample		Federal Level			State Level			Local Level		
	unstd. [1]	std.	unstd. [1]	std.	[2]	unstd. [1]	std.	[2]	unstd. [1]	std.	[2]
Independent Variables:											
Individual-level factors:											
Age (years)	$330 ***	0.171	$431 ***	0.188		$346 ***	0.197		$303 ***	0.165	<>
% Less than High School (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group			ref group		
% HS Dipl or less (0,1)	$3,501 ***	0.064	$3,457	0.060		$3,746 *	0.069		$3,574 **	0.070	
% Some college (0,1)	$6,362 ***	0.128	$4,180	0.081		$6,207 ***	0.132		$7,025 ***	0.147	
% BA/BS deg. or higher (0,1)	$15,840 ***	0.352	$16,603 ***	0.327		$14,256 ***	0.332		$16,991 ***	0.402	
% Rural (0,1)	-$6,429 ***	-0.111	-$7,172 ***	-0.105		-$5,156 ***	-0.099	<>	-$6,861 ***	-0.124	
% Midwest Region (0,1)	-$849 *	-0.015	-$1,327	-0.021		-$759	-0.014		-$461	-0.009	
Structural-level factors:											
Work hours per week	$737 ***	0.325	$837 ***	0.257	<>	$709 ***	0.352		$739 ***	0.350	
% Union member (0,1)	$2,930 ***	0.038	-$1,394	-0.014		$4,752 ***	0.058		$3,448 ***	0.051	
% Federal Worker (0,1)	$9,919 ***	0.162	n/a			n/a			n/a		
% State Worker (0,1)	ref group		n/a			n/a			n/a		
% Local Worker (0,1)	-$534	-0.012	n/a			n/a			n/a		
% White-collar High-skill (0,1)	$11,429 ***	0.253	$17,841 ***	0.357	<>	$10,809 ***	0.248		$10,168 ***	0.239	<>
% White-collar Low-skill (0,1)	$8,475 ***	0.143	$7,047 ***	0.137		$9,569 ***	0.165		$10,401 ***	0.163	
% Blue-collar High-skill (0,1)	$8,907 ***	0.144	$9,553 ***	0.141		$7,210 ***	0.115		$9,562 ***	0.170	
% Blue-collar Low-skill (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group			ref group		
Gender:											
Female	-$5,142 ***	-0.113	-$4,390 ***	-0.088		-$4,926 ***	-0.113		-$5,327 ***	-0.122	
Occupational Sex-Segregation	-$6,485 ***	-0.181	-$7,249 ***	-0.163		-$5,741 ***	-0.160		-$6,569 ***	-0.201	
% Married (0,1)	$269	0.006	$1,508	0.029		$1,623 *	0.037		-$495	-0.011	
% Ever-married (0,1)	ref group		ref group			ref group			ref group		
% Never-Married (0,1)	-$1,228 *	-0.022	-$1,667	-0.027		-$1,188	-0.024		-$616	-0.011	
% with children under 18 (0,1)	$1,792 ***	0.029	$1,433	0.020		$737	0.012		$2,469 ***	0.043	
% Minority (0,1)	-$906 **	-0.018	-$2,434 **	-0.048		-$818	-0.017		-$278	-0.006	
(Constant)	-$10,860		-$9,381			-$11,908			-$10,252		
Adjusted R squared	0.496		0.454			0.486			0.482		
Sample n=	14,135		2,249			4,377			7,507		

[1] =*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

[2] statistically significant difference between males and females at the .05 level or higher

TABLE 6
Comparison of Individual, Structural, and Gender-Level Models
(Dependent Variable= Annual Earnings)

Variables:	Full	w/o Individual Model	w/o Structural Model	w/o Gender Model
Independent Variables:				
Individual-level factors:				
Age (years)	0.168	X	0.204	0.156
Age squared	-0.126	X	-0.195	-0.124
Education in years	0.249	X	0.397	0.233
Rural (0,1)	-0.109	X	-0.107	-0.111
Midwest Region (0,1)	ns	X	-0.033	ns
Structural-level factors:				
Work hours per week	0.318	0.373	X	0.367
Union member (0,1)	0.036	0.050	X	0.039
Federal Worker (0,1)	0.175	0.195	X	0.211
State Worker (0,1)	ref group	ref group	X	ref group
Local Worker (0,1)	ns	ns	X	ns
Occupational Prestige	0.177	0.329	X	0.148
Gender:				
Female	-0.110	-0.102	-0.158	X
Occupational Sex-Segregation	-0.172	-0.156	-0.215	X
Married (0,1)	ns	0.085	ns	X
With children under 6 (0,1)	0.028	-0.024	0.038	X
Minority (0,1)	ns	ns	ns	X
Adjusted R-sq. *	0.516	0.419	0.364	0.457
Rsq change from Full Model (.516)		**0.097**	**0.152**	**0.059**
% Change in Rsq.		**-18.8%**	**-29.5%**	**-11.4%**
Males Only:**	0.486	0.378	0.361	0.454
Rsq change from Full Model		**0.108**	**0.125**	**0.032**
% Change in Rsq.		**-22.2%**	**-36.1%**	**-6.6%**
Females Only:**	0.503	0.401	0.315	0.487
Rsq change from Full Model		**0.101**	**0.188**	**0.016**
% Change in Rsq.		**-20.1%**	**-37.4%**	**-3.2%**

(standardized betas shown, all sig. at .001 unless noted ns)

* (all Rsq. Changes sig. @ .000)

** standardized betas not shown for male or female equations

TABLE 7
Comparison of Individual, Structural, and Gender-Level Models
(Dependent Variable= Annual Earnings)

Variables:	Full	w/o Individual Model	w/o Structural Model	w/o Gender Model
Independent Variables:				
Individual-level factors:				
Age (years)	0.168	X	0.204	0.156
Age squared	-0.126	X	-0.195	-0.124
Education in years	0.249	X	0.397	0.233
Rural (0,1)	-0.109	X	-0.107	-0.111
Midwest Region (0,1)	ns	X	-0.033	ns
Structural-level factors:				
Work hours per week	0.318	0.373	X	0.367
Union member (0,1)	0.036	0.050	X	0.039
Federal Worker (0,1)	0.175	0.195	X	0.211
State Worker (0,1)	ref group	ref group	X	ref group
Local Worker (0,1)	ns	ns	X	ns
Occupational Prestige	0.177	0.329	X	0.148
Gender:				
Female	-0.110	-0.102	-0.158	X
Occupational Sex-Segregation	-0.172	-0.156	-0.215	X
Married (0,1)	ns	0.085	ns	X
With children under 6 (0,1)	0.028	-0.024	0.038	X
Minority (0,1)	ns	ns	ns	X
Adjusted R-sq. *	0.516	0.419	0.364	0.457
Rsq change from Full Model (.516)		**0.097**	**0.152**	**0.059**
% Change in Rsq.		**-18.8%**	**-29.5%**	**-11.4%**
Federal Level Only: **	0.472	0.352	0.362	0.428
Rsq change from Full Model		**0.120**	**0.110**	**0.045**
% Change in Rsq.		**-25.4%**	**-23.3%**	**-9.5%**
State Level Only:**	0.507	0.402	0.391	0.463
Rsq change from Full Model		**0.105**	**0.116**	**0.045**
% Change in Rsq.		**-20.7%**	**-22.9%**	**-8.9%**
Local Level Only:**	0.500	0.400	0.354	0.425
Rsq change from Full Model		**0.101**	**0.146**	**0.076**
% Change in Rsq.		**-20.2%**	**-29.2%**	**-15.2%**

(standardized betas shown, all sig. at .001 unless noted ns)
* (all Rsq. Changes sig. @ .000)
** standardized betas not shown for male or female equations