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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SYMBOLS:

OBSERVATIONS OF STUDENT-FACULTY RELATIONS
WITHIN THE ANTHROPOLOGY CLUB,

Beverly M. Larson
I. INTRODUCTION

Symbolic Interaction (SI), as a sub-discipline of sociology or social psychology, first materialized through the work of the Chicago School -- Cooley, Horton, Thomas, and most important, George Herbert Mead. One of Mead's concepts is that

The human individual is born into a society characterized by symbolic interaction. The use of significant symbols by those around him enables him to pass from the conversation of gestures -- which involves direct, unmeaningful response to the overt acts of others -- to the occasional taking of the roles of others. This role-taking enables him to share the perspectives of others. Concurrent with role-taking, the self develops, i.e., the capacity to act towards oneself (Meltzer 1972:17).

With such starting ideas, others began to search for the ways in which consensus between individuals is reached through symbols: how the self is related to society.

Today, two main schools of SI exist, one centered around the followers of Herbert Blumer (Chicago School) at Berkeley, and of Manford Kuhn at Iowa State. Both schools concentrate on the study of process -- they differ on their choice of methods and underlying assumptions. Blumer sees the self as creating its own environment, role making, while Kuhn is more inclined to see the self as responding to normative prescriptions, or role playing. These different assumptions lead to different methodologies. Blumer, being more humanistic, questions whether human behavior is predictable. Kuhn, more deterministic, has developed a rigorously scientific operationalization of the units of social interaction.

While Blumer rejects the idea of structure, the Iowa school accepts it with the qualification that process pre-
cedes structure: All social structures exist only in motion...social structures always exist in some form of reciprocal action (movement) between two or more interactants" (Couch 1975:241). The Iowa School's techniques for explaining process, and therefore the building of structure, are

1) Use of the inductive method for observing events;
2) Breaking these events down into the smallest possible units;
3) Operationalizing the definitions of these units;
4) Noting the patterns that emerge, that is, arriving at the "forms of relations" emergent.

The definitions of forms of relations used in this paper are from the Iowa School, specifically, Sehested (1975) and Weiland (1975). These different forms of relations are taken to be hierarchical in the sense that they go from simple to complex, one being built out of the other:

**Uncommitted Relations**

1) Autonomy: Participants have a common focus, but no mutual responsiveness to each other. Example: a group watching a movie.

2) Autocracy: Same as autonomy, except one participant is the focus of the other(s) so a difference of self and others develops. These relations are non-cooperative. Example: an assassination, or a mother changing a baby's diaper.

3) Mutuality: Participants are mutually responsive to each other; it is present-centered with no shared focus or social objective. Example: a party.

**Committed Relations**

4) Solidarity: Consists of a shared focus, mutual responsiveness, a projected shared future, and shared standpoints. Can exist at four levels: (1) solidarity responsiveness, (2) solidarity reaction, (3) solidarity action (external and internal), and (4) solidarity relationship. A "we" consciousness is developed.
5) Accountability: A differentiation of self and other occurs (the "me" is identified) so that self and other have different lines of action and commitments (a division of labor). An "I-you" consciousness is developed.

6) Authority: Is like accountability but the future of both members of the interacting unit is controlled by one of them alone. It is different from autocracy in that there is a shared projected future and both parties consent to the relation. An "I-it" consciousness is developed.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLIDARITY RELATIONS

All of the above forms of relations allow people to act toward and away from others but it is through solidarity that people first learn to act with others. It is in this way that symbols are acquired, their meanings agreed upon and shared, which allows for complex communication, conceptualization and abstraction.

Solidarity can be defined (Sehested 1975) as two or more people taking parallel actions toward the same focus and who are mutually responsive to each other's actions: 1) A shared focus is present to which each person responds in a similar way; 2) Mutual responsiveness between the co-participants is present in which the individuals also respond to each other or acknowledge each other's response as being the same; 3) A projected shared future that locates each individual to the others (congruent functional identity) is established the same for each co-participant; and, 4) Shared standpoints (how individuals see themselves as relating to their environment) are presumed for the coparticipants.

Different levels of solidarity can be distinguished based on how people will jointly act together in the future. In most instances, these levels are evolutionary in that the
preceding level(s) must first be present before another can develop. The most elementary level is of solidarity responsiveness in which the coparticipants have a mutual awareness that they have had a common experience in the past. This most basic form of solidarity experience is formed when two people become aware that they are attending to the same focus, but not necessarily to each other's reactions to the focus. When both individuals respond to the focus in the same way and are aware that they are responding the same way, solidarity responsiveness has been developed. At this low level, no joint action has as yet been projected, only a mutual awareness of shared experience is recognized, which each has experienced independently of the other. Eye contact or touch is usually the medium through which this level is experienced and is past and present oriented.

To illustrate this, a hypothetical organizational meeting of an Alcoholics Anonymous chapter can be used. As individuals enter the meeting hall, they assume that the others present are also alcoholics (have a shared common experience) and assume, perhaps incorrectly, they have come to find help for their problems (shared standpoint). They seat themselves without acknowledging the presence of others (autonomy) and focus their attention on the speaker at the podium (autocracy). As the speaker talks, he may make statements that elicit grunts of approval or disapproval from the audience. If individuals in the audience should turn to each other and make eye contact or touch one another, acknowledging each other's similar reactions to the speech, they have elicited a solidarity reaction. If, after the speech, the audience
does no more than leave the hall, no further joint action has been projected by the solidarity reaction. If, however, at the end of the speech the audience is invited to drink coffee and informally chat, the vocalization between individuals (mutual responsiveness) may provide the basis for development of the next main level of solidarity, solidarity action.

People may share their past experiences with each other verbally -- in this context standpoints are made known -- which may be discovered to be shared by others present. The shared focus may then be abstracted into "alcoholism", not just the person at the podium directing their attention. For those present to form a group which won't dissolve after the first meeting, a shared future must be projected. This development leads to solidarity action wherein coparticipants act towards a shared focus to achieve a social objective, in this case, to solve their drinking problems. Congruent functional identities are established and parallel lines of future action must be indicated. Congruent functional identities are a projection of a shared future wherein each can locate the self in relation to the others. As a "we" or "us" consciousness is developed, coparticipants see their future actions as being equal to each other.

Different types of relationships can be present simultaneously within a group so that along with the development of solidarity, authoritarian, autocratic, and autonomous relations may be present. Some people at the AA meeting may choose to stand and drink coffee alone then leave (autonomy). Others might have been forced to attend the
meeting by a court ruling (authoritarian). Through vocalizations these different standpoints are made known and the shared focus is lost. Responsiveness to each other's reactions might establish a new shared focus on which solidarity action may resume: Two people discover they were both forced to attend the meeting by the court, think it is disgusting, and decide to leave together to get a beer.

Solidarity action may be external and directed towards an object, or internal and as basic as "talking about" something through shared symbols. This talking about something may be the basis for taking action towards an object (a move from internal to external solidarity action). This is the most difficult stage in group formation. Congruent functional identities must be established if solidarity action and relationships are to exist and this must be done as equals if the "we" is to remain. It is much easier for the group's form to become authoritarian or accountable at this point. In accountability, a division of labor would occur -- each person would have a different task to perform which he alone would be responsible for. In authority relations, the superordinate would assign each individual his future task and the emphasis would be on how well the subordinate performed. An autonomous relationship could be reinstated where each person was responsible for his own actions alone, with no responsibility to the group. This would most likely be the case with the AA meeting--everyone returning home with no commitments made to the group.

But perhaps through internal solidarity action (talk) a small group decides to commit themselves to a rehabilitation center for Gestalt therapy (external solidarity action).
They then have made their drinking problem publicly known and would be labeled (named) by outsiders, which would intensify their solidarity. They then would start the last level of solidarity, a solidarity relationship. If they unanimously agree to form a Gestalt group within the rehabilitation center, they have pledged to act together in unison. Their group consciousness is to the degree that each one's individual acts will be seen in light of benefiting or hurting the group as a whole. They may begin to see themselves as an object and give this object a name, much like other clubs do (the Odd Fellows, the Masons, the River Rats, etc.). In high levels of solidarity relationships, it is assumed that all coparticipants will respond to new foci in the same ways without negotiating standpoints or forming solidarity action. The relationship is not bounded by time or space.

If the group is to remain in solidarity form, it is essential that the commitment to act is fulfilled, although external solidarity action alone, without internal solidarity action, is unlikely to lead to a solidarity relationship. People must talk about and reinforce their standpoints. Solidarity commitments may be made without solidarity responsiveness beforehand; in these cases group enthusiasm dies quickly. Those people sent to the rehabilitation center by court order have been committed to a relationship without having gone through a solidarity responsiveness stage. It would be probably that this type of group would not be as lasting as those which had previously been responsive to each other and the shared focus.
III. FORM OF RELATIONS OBSERVED FOR THE ANTHROPOLOGY CLUB, WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY, FALL SEMESTER 1975

In the Fall of 1975, observations were made of the Anthropology Club at Wichita State University, with particular emphasis being placed on whether a solidarity relation would be developed. The club, however, evolved through several forms of social relations from the organizational meeting to the final meeting of the semester. Brief periods of autonomy, mutuality, and solidarity in the organizational meetings were necessary for the accountable relation that persisted through the other meetings to form. Autonomous, authority, and solidarity relations existed simultaneously for various sub-groups within the club.

Organizational Meeting

The organizational meeting of the club was held in the Campus Activities Center. Even though individuals within the room had perhaps known each other previously and conversations (mutual responsiveness) were conducted by dyads and triads, as a group, the form of relation was autonomous. People related to the same focus but not to each other. The focus shared by all was an interest in anthropology. The meeting began and the advisor introduced herself and the focus became shared—all present in the room attended to her and through her retelling of the past history of the club, all were exposed to a common shared past. This autonomous form of relation was to be present at all the meetings in one way or the other and may have been responsible for the group not being able to form a lasting solidarity relationship.

The advisor then had everyone in the group introduce
themselves. This produced a brief period of mutual responsiveness. Each person related to each other not as an object but as an individual person. People responded to each others' smiles and eye contact. The shared focus of "anthropology" was not important in this stage. Through this type of contact, individuals in the group became coparticipants but did not think of themselves as a collectivity. No commitment to a shared future had as yet been made; no mention of future meetings or activities had been brought up.

The nomination and voting for club officers was the only observed instance of solidarity of all present at any meeting. If, in the formation of committed relations, accountability cannot be established until after solidarity (Weiland 1975:92), voting for officers in an organization is a very significant step.

In the first level of solidarity, that of solidarity responsiveness, coparticipants are aware of a common experience (all present were interested in anthropology and shared the club's past history through the advisor's speech) and attended to the same focus (the advisor conducting the election). The advisor presented the purpose of the club and made her stand-point known. Through the mutual responsiveness of introducing each other, a commonality of shared experience was developed. Each responded to the other, rather than the group. Calling for an election, however, implied a shared common future, which leads to the next level of solidarity, action: coparticipants acted towards a shared focus to achieve a social objective -- continuation of the anthropology club. In order for solidarity action to occur, all functional identities must be the same;
that is, each person's vote must have equal weight -- no "vetoes" are allowed. At this point, all present had identified themselves as students in anthropology, except for the advisor, who did not vote, and one other person present, who also did not vote. In the act of voting, all functional identities were congruent and all actions parallel. A "we" consciousness was briefly present as all affirmed the election of the president. In other formal organization situations, this same idea is produced when votes are taken by vocal "ayes" and "nays" in unison, or when "amens" are said in unison to signify the action or standpoint of the person speaking is accepted by all.

Not everyone voted for the same person, but there are several ways in which the group could have continued. A secret ballot does not place all standpoints in the open. Those who don't agree with the outcome of an election can modify their standpoint by re-negotiating with themselves: they can perhaps reason, that if the majority voted for so-and-so, he must be the best person; I was wrong in not voting for him and I now agree he should be president. An alternate reaction would be to decide not to come to any future meetings. That person would return to an autonomous relation in the group, not projecting himself into the shared future of the club. It is conceivable that some other people might, if not happy with the result of the election, make their dissatisfaction vocal. In this case, there is no shared standpoint; the dissidents try to establish solidarity responsiveness again by drawing attention to themselves and try to re-negotiate a new standpoint more to their liking. They have destroyed the "we" consciousness of
solidarity action. In order for it to be reformed, a new focus on which all can agree must be found. If this cannot be done, the group will dissolve. The dissidents can leave the group, in which case those remaining will be further strengthened in their "we-they" consciousness. An authoritarian context may also be present which will force the will of the superordinates onto the subordinate dissidents to keep still and not express their dissatisfaction. In general, this seems to be the observed situation for the Anthropology Club; in fact, the main reason for its continuation.

Voting for officers is an instance of internal solidarity action. In external solidarity action the focus of the co-participant's action is outside the group; they act toward it as an object. Internal solidarity action employs verbalization and symbolization to talk about something abstract. The object of the talk may be to plan for future external solidarity action. This is the case with the election of officers, the executive branch of an organization, the branch which executes or acts out the will of the group. It is important to realize two points:

1) Election and affirmation of officers is done with group consensus (solidarity action). This is perhaps why formal organizations have rituals in which group consensus is stressed. It serves the same purpose as the group amen in a church service -- all present acknowledging acceptance of the stated position. (For the same reasons given in the paragraph above, another form of relation, the authoritarian, may influence actions to be the opposite of standpoints).

2) Through the election of officers the coparticipants have lost their congruent functional identities. The officers have committed themselves to future actions which the other coparticipants have not. The form of the club has become accountable.
In accountable relationships, a shared focus exists, but differentiated functional identities indicate different lines of future actions for coparticipants. The future for both is interdependent. An "I-you" consciousness is developed. Each coparticipant is responsible only for how he has committed himself to act; i.e., what his functional identity requires. The functional identities of the club officers require that they direct the meeting. The newly elected president, as he walked to the front of the room and differentiated himself from the others, became the shared focus of the group's attention. At all other meetings the president always stood in front of the rest of the club, symbolizing his functional identity. This symbolization always reminded members of the form of relation of the group -- accountable -- which undoubtedly influenced their reactions.

The president asked the group for suggestions on what they would like to see the group do in the future. This seemed to be an effort to recreate mutual responsiveness again to negotiate a shared standpoint on a new focus that would lead to solidarity action -- decide what the topic for the next anthropology club meeting would be. Many ideas were brought up; co-participants were mutually responsive to each other, but in this case, no shared standpoint was developed. Whereas everyone had agreed that officers should be elected, no one could agree what subjects for meetings would be best in the future. The functional identities set up in the accountable relation eased the situation: the president said that the officers would get together and talk things over. From that point on, the choice
of topics for club meetings was not brought up at a general meeting but once, and at that time no comments were made by coparticipants (mutual responsiveness was not developed) and the subject was dropped.

One standpoint was shared at the organizational meeting about future action -- the idea of a party. This is interesting since a party is an instance of mutuality: there is no shared focus or social objective, it is present-centered and those present are attentive and responsive to each other on a one-to-one basis.

**Accountable, Authority and Autonomous Relations Within the Club**

At the following meetings of the club several forms of relations existed simultaneously. The club officers, through meetings separate from the general meetings, had developed what appeared to be a solidarity relationship which they presumed, or wanted to extend, to the entire club membership. The majority of people present at the meetings, though, only acted in an autonomous relation. They were present to hear the guest speaker (their common focus) and not relate to the anthropology club or others present. Over-riding these two relations was the authoritarian relationship of faculty to students. It became difficult to know what form of relationship was being observed since some solidarity acts can occur without solidarity being present (Weiland 1975:91), and it may be possible for one form of relationship to be manifest even though another form may be responsible. Authoritarian relationships can make subordinates appear to agree, and so on. Relations existing prior to and simultaneous but outside the anthropology club may have contributed to
the confusion in distinguishing the form the club took. Individual accounts obtained from various members of the club revealed this to be so, but are highly subjective. Each individual account indicated each person viewed the club as having the form of relation he was most involved in:

1) The club officers had entered into what appeared to be a solidarity relationship. Their functional identities were similar (almost congruent) in comparison to those of the other club members. Their relationship did not seem to be one of accountability to each other. They may have, as individuals, accountable relations to the club but among themselves there was no visible "I-you" consciousness. They always asked "What can we do to help the anthropology club?" They faithfully attended meetings and acted as a unit, even sitting together at meetings. Most interaction at meetings was done by the officers (excepting the faculty).

The officers tried to extend the solidarity relationship to the entire club. The president always used the pronoun "we" when asking the group's okay before planning further activities. The students in the club, acting in an autonomous relationship, did not feel obligated to commit themselves one way or the other, and did not, in most instances, become responsive. The president took their silence for a sign of group consensus or indifference.

2) Individual conversations with students only occasionally present at meetings confirmed that their relationship within the club was autonomous. Most came to the meetings only to hear the guest speaker. If the topic was not of interest to them, they did not attend the meeting.

3) The authoritarian relationship of faculty to students seemed to dominate the proceedings whenever the faculty were present. At those meetings, applause (a sign of responsiveness) was always initiated by a faculty member. Faculty viewed the situation in an "I-it" fashion, the "it" being the club. When asked in a separate conversation why the first speaker was selected, the faculty advisor said, "The reason I did that is I want people to think that this year's club is going to do things. We (inferring to those in charge as a collectivity) had to get started right away and it needed a push -- without a push nothing gets done." The first speaker was also a faculty member. At the end of his speech he turned the meeting over to a representative of another organization, who asked for donations for his own organization. The faculty speaker had not discussed this beforehand with the club officers or the faculty advisor. When asked why he hadn't, he answered that he had known beforehand and that was enough (authoritarian).
4) Other forms of relationships between different combinations of students and faculty also existed. A solidarity relationship among archaeology students may or may not have existed, but was assumed by other club members. Personal friendships, etc., existed which, although they could not be detected at all club meetings, influence it nonetheless.

Mutuality

The anthropology club's Halloween party was entirely different from the normal club meetings. The mutual responsiveness of a party (and the intoxicants) erased the distinctions of authoritarian, accountable, and autonomous relations of club meetings. This is perhaps so because mutuality is not a committed relationship. Everyone at the party interacted as individuals, each choosing to remember or ignore the relations of authority present at other times. There was no shared focus and no steps made toward solidarity action at the party.

At the next regular meeting of the club there was some indication that the mutual responsiveness of the party was carried over. During the meeting, some groups of people carried on their own conversations (mutuality) so that the focus of the meeting was not shared. When the president first asked if the club would accept a challenge by the geology club to a volleyball game, there was no responsiveness from the group. The president repeated the question and people began to respond. A show of hands was made for all who wanted to play. This was a break from the established pattern of interaction within the club. It could be interpreted as internal solidarity action (talking about playing volleyball) moving to external solidarity action (committing through a show of hands an intent to play ball); or as an accountable relation where functional identities are given to only those who committed themselves to play volleyball. No faculty members were present.
at this meeting, so it is not possible to say whether the mutuality of the party or the absence of authority figures effected the interaction. The external solidarity action never materialized and the anthropology club never took up the challenge of the geology club.

IV. EXPLANATION OF WHY THE ANTHROPOLOGY CLUB EXHIBITED AN AUTHORITY RELATION AND NOT A SOLIDARITY RELATION

So far this paper has dealt only with the forms of relations observed, and has not attempted to explain how these came into being and are perpetuated. I had presumed the club would take a form of solidarity, but since it hadn't, I was at a loss to explain why not. I held the belief that the purpose of the anthropology club was for one and all to pursue and share their interest in anthropology and that anyone present at a meeting would have the same opportunities and rights to do so.

Since the form of the club, for the most part, was authoritarian or accountable, an unequal distribution of power existed and a political structure can therefore be said to exist (Bailey 1969:12). Structure, in Bailey's terms, "is a set of rules about behavior: these rules list the rights and duties of particular roles" (1969:10). A political structure, using terms drawn from game theory, then "...contains rules about prizes, personnel, leadership (teams), competition and control" (Bailey 1969:20). Bailey makes a distinction between contract teams, in which membership is for a gain or profit, and moral teams, in which members are committed to an ideal or leader (1969:28). Most importantly, leadership in moral teams is through the manipulation of symbols (Bailey 1969:83).
So, to begin an explanation of why the club exhibited the forms of relations it did, the reason for the existence of the club seemed to exist in an authoritarian context, while the justification for the club's existence was egalitarian or in the form of solidarity. Barthes' (1957) use of myth as depoliticized speech can be applied to this situation. While he used the concept of depoliticizing of myth to explain acceptance by the bourgeoisie of the myth of freedom of opportunity, when none really exists, it can also be applied to a university system in which a definite class system does exist and there is a scarcity of rewards. These are not the material objects of production, in an economic sense, but are "capital of the mind" -- an idea developed by Alain Touraine (cited in Sennett and Cobb 1972:184). The myth perpetuated in American universities is that all have an equal chance to achieve higher status through their mental abilities.

But how are these mental abilities to be evaluated? There can be no higher statuses, no upward mobility, if all are equal. So, a few "elite" must be separated from the masses, and to do so, "badges of ability" (Sennett and Cobb 1972) are bestowed on the select few at the expense of the many. This is done by those in authority in the university who act as judges or umpires in what Bailey (1969) refers to as moral teams. Rewards, then, are not objects, but statuses, and leadership in this type of political group is through the manipulation of symbols.

Symbols can also be seen as values. F. Barth (1966) has explained how values can come to be shared by a group -- that is, how group consensus is formed. Assuming that individuals only engage in transactions that will give them greater reward than what they lose, in order to minimize their losses in a transaction,
they will look towards the experience of others rather than make a trial-and-error decision on their own, and in this way individuals "collectively grope towards a consistency of values" (Barth 1966:14). It becomes logical to follow what has been done by those already wearing "badges of ability" -- those in authority -- who can then easily impose their values on their subordinates.

Sennett feels that in American society today, a person is "subject to a scheme of values that tells [him] he must validate the self in order to win other's respect and his own" (1972:75), and he must turn to those in authority to do so.

... the more a person becomes emotionally involved in rewards from higher authority, the more dependent he becomes on someone else who is not a comrade for the things that give him self-respect (Sennett and Cobb 1972:197).

Sennett would then see the prime motivation for receiving rewards not in materialistic goods but in validation of the self via the shared values of a society, in the case of the university, recognition from authorities by way of degrees, grades, etc. The idea that all men are equal, then, can be regarded as a myth when it is manipulated at this level of abstraction since at the more specific level of university sorting, people are in no way equal. Myth, then, can be manipulated and symbolized as a value, or as Barthes puts it, "Myth is a value" (1957:123). It works to sustain the system in that the observed differences between individuals must be due to the fault of the individual, not the system, therefore making him doubt his self-worth, remain passive, give up, etc. (Sennett and Cobb 1972:256). For the system to remain believable, the individual's "injured dignity served a purpose in maintaining the legitimacy of a reward system that cannot deliver on its promises" (Sennett and Cobb 1972:155). Through badges of
ability the few gain dignity while the masses lose it and the few legitimize their power.

In other words, within the anthropology club, not being given a badge of ability such as receiving a reward, being elected an officer, receiving good grades, or being a faculty member, etc., is the individual's own fault, and he doesn't have the right to make his viewpoints known. He is not an equal and can't enter into a solidarity relationship. In a group he remains autonomous. But in such situations as parties, he is less likely to do so because there is no projected future and there are no differentiated functional identities. A laboratory experiment which attempted to isolate factors contributing to behaviors observed in groups where cohesiveness was based on either personal attractiveness, desire to perform a specific task or goals, or on prestige, reported

If cohesiveness was based on group prestige, group members tried to risk as little as possible to endanger their status: they acted cautiously, concentrated on their own actions, and adjusted to their partners as the social environment. One partner would easily assume a dominant role, and the submissive member was influenced more, without their actually trying to establish this relationship (Back 1958:197).

In regards to motivation, it is helpful to remember Bailey's distinction between contract teams where followers agree to support a leader in turn for a certain reward, and moral teams, whose members are morally committed to an ideal or a leader (1969:28). I would argue that the university system makes students members of a contract team. They compete for grades, diplomas, etc., while the faculty don't have to prove their worth in this way, at least to their students, and view the situation as participation in a moral team. The faculty see their reward in the good of anthropology, for their department, for the
student's own good, and other altruisms. It must be remembered that these are idealized types and in reality many forms of relations and teams can be seen to exist simultaneously.

There does seem to be agreement among some researchers, such as F. Barth and Couch, that there is a "developmental primacy of action over institutionalized value" (Barth 1966:16), meaning that repeated action must first precede acceptance of values and symbols and that a lack of consistency in shared values results from a failure of transactions to take place.

Within both moral and contract teams, Bailey states that...

...there have been several anthropological studies which show how rituals which symbolize and reinforce common religious values are performed when men are beginning to show too much concern for their own personal interests and to quarrel with one another over the distribution of material benefits.

Under certain conditions, when his followers are beginning to look too closely at the balance-sheet of their relationship with the leader, it is a sensible tactic for him not to use his resources to reward the dissatisfied followers, but to stage a ritual of collective solidarity, which, hopefully, served to renew his long-term credit remain in legitimate control (1969:44-5).

The faculty want to instill their value system, their idea of a moral team, onto the students. Yet just wanting to do so is not enough. Through symbols such as seating arrangements, beginning discussions and applause, etc., faculty members make known that they are in control. This is an ambiguous situation; it needs to be "naturalized" in Barthes' terms.

This may be the reason why the faculty pushes for the preservation of the anthropology club: it is a ritual attesting to the "solidarity relationship" of all participants when, in fact, it is their very knowledge that such a relationship doesn't exist. This is the depoliticizing of myth Barthes talks of, the erasing
of signs of power and inequality, the naturalization of the existing order. The myth is perpetuated to hold the existing social structure together and at the same time the social structure perpetuates the myth. This idea, better expressed by Geertz, is that "models of" and "models for" patterns of behavior are inter-transposable (1965:208). "In ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined [fused] under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world" (Geertz 1965:213). F. Barth uses the same notion of circularity to insert a feedback concept which allows for slight changes over time in both social structure and symbolic system to be interrelated.

In summary, like Barthes, Geertz sees cultural patterns as symbolic systems and these symbols "deal with bafflement, pain, and moral paradox by synthesizing a peoples' ethos and their world view" (Lessa and Vogt 1965:205).
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Weiland, Marion
THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUALISM
ON
THE AMERICAN PERSONALITY

Marcia Bressler Buck
I.

INDIVIDUALISM DEFINED

The term "individualism" is rather ambiguous; but Friedrich A. Hayek, in his Individualism and Economic Order, stated that the term was created by the Saint-Simonians, in opposition to their centrally-planned "socialism". This "individualism" enigma has formed the basis of our democratic society, and indeed, has prevailed in the American mind from pre-Revolution days to the present. "True" individualism began its intellectual development with John Locke, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke, but a second kind of individualism was developed by the French -- Descartes and Rousseau being the most famous of these thinkers. This strand of thought is called "rationalistic individualism", which F. A. Hayek claims "tends to develop into the opposite of individualism; namely, socialism or collectivism".

The essential characteristics of true individualism are (1) that it is a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces determining the social life of man, and that (2) it is a set of political maxims, derived from those forces determining the social life of man.

This study of man and society begins from man whose whole nature and character is determined by his interaction with other men; not from the wide misconception that society is a collection of completely isolated individuals. Unless we are born and dropped in a wilderness containing no humans, we
cannot develop without interaction with other humans and thus be affected by that interaction.

A central theme of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke was that "combined efforts of individual actions often create things greater than their individual minds can comprehend".3

This is the major characteristic of the Western individualism -- that man is not necessarily rational or intelligent, and that his errors are only corrected through social interaction which aims at making the best of that imperfection. On the other hand, the collectivist assumption is that everything man achieves is the direct result of and therefore subject to, the control of individual reason.

But the major point of concern with Adam Smith's and Edmund Burke's doctrine was not on achievement of man when good, but of protection from man when bad. Or, that man should have as little opportunity to do harm when he was at his worst. Therefore, the social system should be one in which it will be possible to grant freedom to all, by assuming that the leaders will be at different times good and bad, intelligent and more often stupid; instead of granting freedom to the "good and the wise" few, as the French collectivists wished.

The doctrine of Smith and Burke then, was to find a set of institutions by which man could be induced from his own choice and from internalization of social goals, to do all he could for the needs of all others. This seemed to go hand in hand with the system of private property, although confined by "well constructed institutions" where the rules and principles of conflicting individual interests are compromised to the balanced advantage of all. Therefore, after this introductory
study of "individualism" we can trace the two theories in their development to our democratic society and to socialist society.

DEMONCRACY

Relating this true individualism to nationalism, we can say that democracy springs from principles of individualism, and that the area of command ought to be restricted by law, but that it is opposed to a common misconception of democracy—that we must accept as true the views of the majority. "While democracy is founded on the convention that the majority view decides on common action, it does not mean that what is today the majority view ought to become the generally accepted view." Indeed, democracy, in reality, allows the possibility of a view of a minority to eventually become the view of a majority.

EQUALITY

All men may be created equally, but all men are not socially equal -- they are born into differing social conditions and raised and developed with differing social attitudes. Therefore, after creating formal social rules that apply to all in the same manner (via a vehicle such as the Constitution), we leave each individual to find his own level. As de Tocqueville (another in the Smith-Burkean tradition) defines it: "there is all the difference in the world between treating people equal and attempting to make them equal. While the first is the condition of a free society, the second means a new form of servitude". In the latter, he refers to the collective society.
FREEDOM

Central to the idea of true individualism and democracy is freedom -- a word with many meanings -- but used in the social sense to describe "that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in society," or independence of the arbitrary will of another.

Whether a man is free or not does not depend on the range of choice but on whether he can expect to shape his course of action in accordance with his will or whether someone else has power to manipulate the conditions to make him act according to that person's will. Freedom thus assumes that the individual has some assured private sphere, that there is some set of circumstances in his environment with which others cannot interfere.

Political freedom, to carry one step further, is the participation of men in the choice of their government in the process of legislation and in the control of administration. The application of the concept of freedom to a collective rather than to individuals is comparable to a nation wanting to be free from foreign influence and to determine its own fate -- freedom as absence of coercion of a people as a whole. Even though the desire for individual freedom and the desire for group freedom may rest on similar bases, they are still separate and distinct.

Freedom is only positive through what we make of it -- it does not assure us of any particular opportunities but allows us to decide what we can do with the circumstances in which we find ourselves. A person in the U. S. is free to attend college, but he is not assured that he will be able to attend Harvard
University. He does have the assurance that he may attend a college/university -- within his own constraints -- here that may be perhaps money for tuition, or geographical limits, or previous academic background.

Those freedoms/rights guaranteed through capitalism are indeed those which frequently oppose socialist thought -- the right to own private property, the right to own means of production; however, we do realize such common freedoms as freedoms of the consumer, such as freedom to spend and save, freedoms of the producer, such as employment choice, collective bargaining and free enterprise. Individual or personal freedoms are outlined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights -- right to dissent, right to free press, right to religion, right to free speech, as well as occupational choice and trial by jury, to name but a few. Naturally, the idea of absolute freedom is like any absolute -- it exists in theory only. Our freedoms in America are constrained by law, environment, governmental regulation; and in the case of consumers and producers, time and money; in the case of occupational choice, education and social background may be constraints; in the case of free market enterprise, oligopolies and monopolies are constraints.

It is believed but cannot be statistically proven, that Americans exercise their right to economic freedom second only to free speech. This habit of a constructive use of freedom is an important method of reassuring that freedom.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

One could concentrate solely on analyzing and defining liberalism, freedom, and democracy as set forth in the begin-
ning of our nation in the Constitution. I merely want to focus on the attitudes behind the writing of the Constitution which formed the American personality, also those personality "traits" that emerged from its writing.

The movement in the beginning was based solely on the traditional conceptions of the liberties of Englishmen. Naturally, the writers of the Constitution wanted to insure that coercive conditions they had met in England would not be tolerated in America.

The Constitution was seen as a protection of the people against all arbitrary action -- including and especially by their own government. "The idea of a constitution involves not only the idea of hierarchy of authority or power but also that of a hierarchy of rules or laws -- where those possessing a higher degree of generality and proceeding from a superior authority control the contents of the more specific laws that are passed by a delegated authority". (The idea of making higher law explicit by putting it on paper was first done by the colonists).

The Constitutional system, therefore, does not involve an absolute limitation of the will of the people but a subordination of immediate short-term goals to long-range goals. "In effect, this means a limitation of the means available to a temporary majority for the achievement of particular objectives by general principles laid down by another majority for a long period in advance". Or in other words, a temporary majority will abide by more general principles laid down by the Constitution over their will for a particular outcome to a particular issue.
This division of authority implies a preference for reliance of proven principles over ad hoc solutions and that the hierarchy of rules does not end with the Constitution. In other words, because a law is not explicitly stated in the Constitution, it is assumed that a group of men can form a society and laws for it because they already share a system of common beliefs, and to which the explicit laws must conform in order to be accepted as legitimate. In this instance, Divine Providence was seen by writers of the Constitution as the ultimate "right" (as the opposite of "wrong").

Separation of powers was not the only purpose of the American Constitution, but it was to be a constitution of liberty, a constitution that would protect the individual against all arbitrary coercion.

Another kind of spirit emerged from the writing of the Constitution other than the obvious individual freedom spirit. Suspicion of tradition came about after the Colonists had shaken off their "traditions", and indeed, that suspicion remains powerful today -- it could be one reason why change is always allowed under our system, and sometimes welcomed. Also a sense of rationalism, pragmatism, and a desire for deliberate explicit construction (in the legal sense) arose out of Constitutionalism, and the fact that it was the first time that people deliberately designed and constructed a kind of government under which they wanted to live. (I am writing out of the historical context. There have been recent views claiming that the Constitution, due to being written by the well-educated landowners and other aristocrats, caused the
initial "have-havenots" division).

The recognition of a Divine Providence in the Constitution reflected the intense religious backgrounds of many of the new Americans -- also a "spirit" that began with our nation's beginning. In various times it has led to the possible misconception that "God is always on our side". It is obvious, if not from references to God in the Constitution and the explicit guarantee of religious freedom, but in the so-called Puritan work ethic (although this "spirit" is not limited to "Puritans"). Indeed, the strong emphasis on work is a major characterization of American style and it exists today and especially today, although the motives for working may have shifted somewhat. The motives of work in the beginning were obviously to feed oneself and family, and if possible, to fill the needs of others outside the family, and ultimately the needs of society. Indeed, this is why business grew, especially after the immediate needs of the individual were satisfied more and more quickly and efficiently. Today, the motive for work is sometimes criticized as being too money-oriented, and profit-seeking, but it still is used for sustenance purposes. One must remember the fact that our lifestyle is now so complex that without money, a number of us would most probably starve (although a change is taking place and Americans are thinking in terms of "getting back to the land" and learning how to feel themselves, recognizing of course, also that certain subgroups of our culture have always lived in direct harmony with the land, such as native Americans, and Amish-Mennonite sects.) Basically, we still operate under the assumption that our needs and goals are America's needs and goals -- to grow
and prosper.

Looking at the negative aspects of America's personality, one definite unfavorable aspect has emerged from the individualism enigma -- that of selfishness and greed. That selfishness has led some of our famous men in history -- Rockefeller, Fiske, Carnegie, Hunt, Howard Hughes, Robert Vesco, and Hearst -- to name a few, to riches and power. And, since riches and power are seen as desirable ends, if a man attained these by his own individual means, whether "shady" or on-the-level, he was at least tolerated by society -- indeed, society is always awed by the talents of such characters.

That attitude is especially in view now when a man who has experienced the long, hard road to success wants to surround himself with symbols of his success. Today's symbols of the good life are various forms of expensive transportation -- beautiful but inefficient automobiles, personal airplanes, and yachts -- at least one sizeable mansion, numerous tracts of land, investments -- the list goes on and on. It is this man who claims he has worked for his position and he will spend his money as he wishes. One certainly cannot deny him this freedom or absolute right, nor can we generalize and claim that he does no good for society. However, he is typically the man who still holds onto his luxuries in the face of the energy-starving nation, the poverty-stricken ghetto blacks, Appalachian coal miners, and starving (but still proud) American Indians. The solutions are not simple and the blame is on each and every American who contains at least a trace of this inherent selfishness.
John Kenneth Galbraith claims that one of America's most serious illnesses is that we are production-growth-oriented. Perhaps this also arises out of the success story of America. But, I see multitudes of advertisements every day on television, radio and billboards, creating false needs and desires in unknowing Americans. I say we also suffer from being consumption-oriented. Indeed the two extremes feed each other.

In line with today's energy shortages, another trait has begun to haunt us -- the misconception that America is the land of plenty -- full of natural resources and wide open spaces, clean air and water, and that it will always remain so. This misconception has allowed Americans from the very beginning to waste valuable resources and to crowd those wide open spaces with ugly signs, billboards, trash and concrete -- in the name of progress. I am sure the Native Americans would agree that such exploitation of the land and of its natives began with the growth-oriented white settlers.

We have continually pushed ahead, conquering new frontiers. Now we look to space and the depths of the oceans for our needed frontiers. I'm sure we will probably desperately search for more frontiers when we've conquered the universe and the oceans, if such a day comes.

II.

Before discussing political-economic freedom and its impact and development, it will be useful to chronologize the major events in America's history, which helped to characterize public and/or economic policy.
In the beginning when individual freedoms were stressed via the Constitution and the formation of a new government based on liberty, creativity resulted from freedom of persons to carry out their individual interests. Creativity in experimenting with innovative farming methods of scientific inventions helped America to grow and develop. Land was free for the taking and a man did not have to serve another for his livelihood to the extent that it is practiced today.

It was an era of entrepreneurship, risk and daring. This era laid down the groundwork for the industrial revolution when many new inventions came on the scene, and more fell by the wayside. The industrial revolution signaled the growth of cities, and transportation became paramount in importance. Railroads and steel went hand in hand in becoming great symbols of growth of America and also symbols of business which started the division between big business and small business. The U. S. was fast becoming a great nation. Up until this time, government was expected to stay out of business affairs, but with the fast growth of the huge rail, steel and oil trusts the government had to intervene.

There were many who argued that though it was regrettable that some people were victimized by the rush towards industrialization, it was the price of progress and it was against democratic principles to attempt to restrict and restrain the wealthy from using their wealth to accumulate more wealth, for private property is the cornerstone of democracy. And, the country had, after all, declared corporations to be persons whose contractual and property rights could not arbitrarily be altered.
However, as big business did everything to control the legislature, the market and prices, opposing forces built up on the political-economic fronts resulting in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.

At the beginning of this century, the U. S. was a world leader. World War I fostered national unity and also created a new and greater demand for technology, research and creativity. With the Great Depression came the necessity of looking toward government for salvation and for control of the business cycle and of the disastrous downswings. Another war meant more demand, a huge production level and more innovative technology -- now heading in the area of chemicals. After the war, Americans began demanding more work-saving devices, luxury and leisure items. All this demand for technology led to the buildup of the massive corporations who had the capital for research and the patents for the new inventions. They also had government sanctions, for these activities meant progress for the American people.

Then in the 1950's and 1960's, a new fear of socialism/communism was aroused by the Red Scare, the Cold War, and the space and arms race with the Soviets. Space Age technology was at its ultimate and also the greatest demand for products the country had ever seen. In this fast race for more and more goods, the consumer of these goods became aware of the fact that sometimes he was being victimized -- that the goods could have been made safer or more dependable. Consumer safety also led to demands for labor safety and health. Also, there was growing concern for environmental protection from the pollution
emitted from the producers of these goods. This issue has in the 1970's shown a growing resentment by Americans against the great companies who had become so powerful. There are now great demands on government for protection of individual rights, this time from the power of huge corporations -- not from the power of a despotic leader or a coercive government. This is the first time in history that such a situation has developed.

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC FREEDOM

In the political field, dispersion of power has been assured by the three divisions of federal government. However, power of giant corporations is not guarded against; except in name only perhaps by the antitrust regulation and slight regulation in antidiscrimination and occupational safety and health. Since the "absence of economic power reduces political power... and competition becomes the classical mechanism through which a free economy upholds political liberty," it is logical that the reverse is also true -- and that very definitely the presence of economic power by the planning sector of our economy is a great threat to our future political/economic and perhaps even civil freedom. Even Adam Smith had recognized long before Marx that "competition could be relied upon to yield significant social benefits only to the extent that there was some proximate equality of bargaining power between competing individuals and groups."

From this threat, the public has been demanding governmental protection, for consumer safety, environmental safety, minority employment, safe working conditions. The demand for government action has been increasing for such reasons as: 1) maintaining
our defense system is very costly and requires deep government intervention into the economy; 2) our society has changed drastically from agrarian to industrial, rural to urban, and with this change, have come complex problems requiring a reversal of laissez faire solutions, and 3) with rising incomes, the demand for some goods and services, such as luxury items, rises faster than for others, such as basic items; and the government is the chief provider of many of those basic services -- such as public education, public works, and social insurance; therefore, the government is deeply involved in the market system.

F. A. Hayek argues that "freedom in economic affairs...has never existed in the past...without personal and political freedom." Also, Milton Friedman, a contemporary economist, is famous for his belief that political and economic freedom are means to the same end. He says, "there is such an intimate connection between economics and politics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, and that in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom."

Friedman also claims (opposite to J. K. Galbraith) that the market system serves as a check and balance to political power in a free market society. One good point has been made that an impersonal market separates economic activities from political views and protects persons from being discriminated against in their economic activities for reasons irrelevant to their productivity. And, those groups in our society which have the most at stake economically, are by and large the minority groups which easily become the object of the distrust of the majority.
Friedman also believes government should function as an umpire, "to provide a means whereby we can modify the rules and to enforce compliance with the rules on the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game. The need for government arises because absolute freedom is impossible." Milton Friedman is perhaps today's most famous laissez-fairest. He has listed some of modern government programs as excessive -- or too much government intervention, and therefore, a threat to our freedom. Some of these are: 1) parity price support programs for farmers; 2) tariffs on imports or restrictions on exports, such as oil import quotas; 3) government control of output, such as through the farm program; 4) rent control or general price and wage controls; 5) legal minimum wage rates, or legal maximum prices, such as the legal maximum of zero on the rate of interest that can be paid on demand deposits by commercial banks; 6) detailed regulation of industries, such as by the ICC; 7) the censorship and control of radio and television by the Federal Communications Commission; 8) present social security programs, especially those compelling elderly persons in effect to spend specific fractions of their income on the purchase of retirement annuity, and to buy the annuity from a publicly operated enterprise; 9) licensure provisions in various cities and states which restrict particular enterprises or occupations or professions to people who have a license; 10) so-called "public-housing" and other subsidy programs fostering residential construction such as FHA, and VA mortgages; 11) peacetime draft; 12) national parks; 13) legal prohibition of carrying of mail for profit; 14) publicly owned and operated toll roads.
LAISSEZ FAIRE AND FREE COMPETITION

Laissez faire began from Revolution days -- according to Thomas Jefferson.\(^{14}\) The purpose of government was to "restrain men from injuring one another ... shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement." But even he recognized that merely keeping the peace would be inadequate. The necessity of some kind of control mechanism developed over the railroad monopolies and trusts. This control eventually was legislated in the Sherman Act. Government intervention into business thereby has increased ever since, especially since the 1930's to the present. During Jefferson's time, the economy's needs were much simpler than today's complex mixed economy, dominated by huge corporations employing more personnel than some states' population. Just as a child looks to his father when his mother says "no", the American public has learned to turn to government for answers to social and environmental problems when business refuses to act. It has refused to act mainly due to the fact that social problems are not easily quantified to be put into the market mechanism.

The dogmatic laissez faire attitude is based on a conviction that where effective competition can be created, it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other. Liberalism is opposed to using inferior methods for competition because not only is it the most efficient method, but because it is the only method known by which our activities can be adjusted to each other without coercive and arbitrary intervention of authority -- it makes "conscious social control" unnecessary.

The successful use of competition does, however, require
certain kinds of government action -- to prohibit the use of harmful substances, to require special precautions around dangerous production, to limit working hours or to require sanitary and safe working conditions -- is fully compatible with free competition. The only question here is whether in a certain instance, the advantages gained are greater than the social costs which they impose.

Basic conditions for a free market are obviously that 1) parties in the market should be free to sell and buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction, 2) anyone should be free to produce, sell and buy anything that may be produced or sold; and 3) entry into different trades should be open to all on equal terms and that the law should not tolerate any attempts to restrict this entry by individuals or groups; also any attempt to control prices or quantities of particular commodities depriving competition of its power to effectively coordinate individual efforts.

Free competition depends on adequate organization of the institutions of money, markets and information channels (some of which can never be adequately provided by private institutions), and it also depends on the legal system. Definitions of terms such as "private property" or "restraint of trade" as applied in certain cases greatly affect free competition and have led to its destruction in many areas of business. And, there are fields where no legal arrangements can insure a main condition of free enterprise; namely, that the owner of private property benefits from all useful services rendered by his property and suffers for all damages it may cause others. I refer to costs and the fact
that costs cannot be fairly delegated in certain cases -- for instance, roads will not be paid for by each and every user, nor that the costs from effects of pollution be confined to the causer or the "owner" of that pollution. Thus direct regulation by authority is necessary in these areas. In the words of Adam Smith: "Though services may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, they are, however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals\(^{15}\)- the tasks provide a great area for state activity.

Friedrich A. Hayek is a specialist in the field of individual rights and in his book, *The Road to Serfdom*,\(^ {16}\) he warns the U. S. and Britain of the threat of "planners" -- a term also used by Galbraith to mean the planning sector of business activity, which dominates the "market" sector, and dictates the rules of the game to those in the free market sphere. The logic of his book is mainly that free enterprise, full employment, social security, and freedom from want cannot be had unless they come from the free energies of individuals and when "society" and "the good of the whole" become major goals of state action, individual rights invariably get in the way, and thus they must go. Hayek, in 1944, saw the planners destroying competition in industry after industry, and particularly since the 1940's, the political system seemingly joined forces with the economic system, that the planners are gaining hold of the government, swinging laws and regulation, even government protection and contract money in their favor. Hayek, indeed, claims that capitalism and socialism are terms that describe society in past and future tense respectively. He
says that the only alternative to a return to complete competition is a control of the planning system by the state. We are in a state of in-between the two extremes -- a state in which relatively few people realize that we may be being fooled into believing that we still have a free market system and this belief is reinforced by our country's fear of the word "socialism" -- especially after the red scare and the cold war in the '50's and '60's. But we must realize that although free competition can bear and does require a certain amount of government intervention and regulation, it cannot be combined with planning in any way as to still be able to operate as an effective guide to production. In other words, planning and competition can only be combined by planning for competition, not by planning vs. competition. However, it is the latter condition which modern scholars, especially John K. Galbraith, believe our system is heading.

One major theory that we are headed toward an inevitable socialistic society is the fact that technology changes have made competition impossible in a constantly increasing number of fields and that the only choice left for us is between control of production by private monopolies or by direction by the government. Galbraith calls the planning system the technocracy -- a fitting term in this theory.

Galbraith and Friedman are obviously two extremes. A moderate view in between these two views may be that of George A. Steiner, who agrees that the conglomerate form of business organization is growing in importance and that issues raised concerning competition "is all to the good, for vigorous debate on antitrust issues is an important step in preserving freedom."
CONCLUSIONS

In order to maintain our political and economic freedom, then, we must do some things less efficiently than we might have had government been allowed to do them, and it also means we must experience higher costs of financing through private over public financing, etc. We must keep the private sphere as large and diversified as possible to guarantee our freedom. The question today seems to be that how do we as individuals protect ourselves from the two great forces looming over us -- big business and big government. It seems that if we aim at controlling big business by screaming for government to regulate those monopolies and oligopolies, we are asking for more and more government intervention into our own lives. Do the benefits outweigh the costs? The question is not an easy one to answer.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 4

3. Ibid., p. 7


5. Ibid., p. 16.

6. Ibid., p. 11

7. Ibid., p. 178


11. Friedman, Milton *Capitalism and Freedom*, 1963, p. 8

12. Ibid., p. 25

13. This list is from *Capitalism and Freedom*, Milton Friedman, 1963, pp. 35-36.


15. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 52

16. Ibid., p. 142

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THE PEASANT CONCEPT: ITS APPLICABILITY TO RURAL SOUTHEAST ASIA

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It is axiomatic that as social scientists accumulate insights relating to a particular phenomenon it becomes possible to define said phenomenon with greater specificity. Sooner or later this increased awareness of a phenomenon's previously obscure aspects forces the social scientist into making a choice with respect to the original conceptualization. On the one hand he may elect to amend the original concept with qualifying statements or, on the other, he may decide that in light of an expanding body of empirical knowledge it is necessary to totally reconceptualize the phenomenon under study and redefine its meaning. Needless to say, seldom will there be a consensus of opinion as to which choice is the proper one, and it is frequently the case that the ensuing controversy obfuscates the issue even further.

The essay which follows appraises the "peasant" concept in light of a growing body of ethnographic data relevant to those societies heretofore categorized as "peasant", and, following this, makes a few observations of a general sort with respect to the study of traditional rural society in developing areas. The ethnographic focus is on Southeast Asian rural society; however, it is felt that in its essential form the thesis presented here is applicable to African and Latin American rural society as well.

For the past half century the attention of anthropologists has been increasingly drawn to rural societies of the so-called "peasant" type, and a recent estimate notes that over one-half of current anthropological research activities deal with such
societies (Gamst 1974). Concurrent with this interest in peasant societies there has emerged a growing body of theoretical literature regarding the efficacy of the term "peasant".

Thirty years ago Alfred Kroeber made a rather cursory reference to "peasants", noting that

Peasants are definitely rural -- yet live in relation to market towns; they form a class segment of a larger population which usually contains urban centers, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures (Kroeber 1948:234).

With the issuance of this now classic definition of peasant, there has ensued a growing controversy, and more than a little confusion, about what type of society is to be labeled "peasant", and what types are to be understood as being something other than peasant. Accordingly, the last quarter century has witnessed a number of attempts to define the concept more precisely.

(Peasants are) rural people in old civilizations, rural people who control and cultivate their land for subsistence and as a part of a traditional way of life and who look to and are influenced by gentry or townspeople whose way of life is like theirs but in a more civilized form (Redfield 1956:45-46).

The definition of a peasant is a countryman -- a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with a comparatively simple technology and a simple interest in the land he works (Firth 1950:503).

(Peasants) represent the rural expression of large, class-structured, economically complex, pre-industrial civilization, in which money is commonly used, and in which market disposition is the goal for a part of the producer's efforts (Foster 1965:311).

I would add (to Foster's definition) the cultivation of the soil as another crucial criterion because it is the man-land relation which orders so much of what is distinctive of peasant life (Lewis 1962:179).

Populations that are existentially involved in cultivation and make autonomous decisions regarding the processes of cultivation (are peasant). This
category is thus made to cover tenants and sharecroppers as well as owner-operators, as long as they are in a position to make the relevant decisions on how their crops are grown. It does not, however, include fisherman or landless laborers (Wolf 1969:xiv).

The above definitions are among those most frequently cited, and are indicative of the broad range of empirical diversity which confronts, and confounds, attempts at neat classification of rural society. A review of these and other definitions of peasantry reveals two ways by which this diversity has been reckoned with. On the one hand, one encounters definitions constructed so broadly as to embrace a wide span of occupational types. Opposed to this "general" approach is the "specific" approach, characterized by explicitly stated criteria which must be satisfied if societies are to be considered "peasant". The above definitions of Kroeber, Redfield and Firth, for example, stand in contrast to those of Lewis and Wolf in this respect, the latter two individuals preferring to specify their criteria more closely (Wolf 1955:503).

Both approaches, the general and the specific, present problems. The general approach could conceivably result in all societies other than industrial or those in a relatively pristine state of primitiveness being collected under the label "peasant", with the result that the comparative value of the term is reduced to nothingness (Helms 1969). On the other hand, a rigid specification of definitional criteria, while perhaps enhancing comparative utility, would result in such an array of "extra-peasant" classifications that the original problem, that of "drawing the line" between different societal types, would be multiplied accordingly.
The problem facing the generalist and the purist alike is the existence of those types which, though possessing peasant characteristics, fail to conform to what is referred to variously as the "classic" (Kaplan and Saler 1966:203), or "hard-core" (Shanin 1973:5), or "model" type (Wolf 1955:520) peasant. Redfield referred to the marginal groups as the "edges" of peasantry (1956:20). The primary distinction between the generalist and the purist, or specificist, position, it would therefore seem, has to do with whether these groups are to be viewed as "inside" or "outside" edges!

A review of the literature dealing with Southeast Asian rural society reveals that of the two major definitional approaches, the generalist definition of peasantry is the type most often relied upon. Perhaps most notable is the definition offered by Firth (1946, 1950), which characterizes peasantry as rural subsistence oriented producers who, though most often agriculturalists, need not necessarily be so in order to qualify as a peasant.

Geertz's study of Javanese society employs a model of peasantry distinctively Redfieldian in flavor, identifying Javanese aristocracy and Javanese peasantry as repositories of the Great and Little Traditions respectively (1960:227-8). In a similar manner, the broadly constructed Redfieldian model has been adopted by Halpern in his analysis of rural Laotian society (1967:37-8), and by Phillips for Thai society (1965:40-41).

Swift, in his study of Malay society, also adopts a generalist position regarding the delimitation of peasantry. While not denying the significance of subsistence agriculture for the peasant economic system, he points out that the chief concern
of the Malay peasant may well be the larger market economy;

The peasant concentrates on cash production, and
the higher his money income the less he will find
for himself in the village and the jungle... The
variable which determines the amount of subsistence
production is the price of rubber. When this is
buoyant the peasant abandons the plots for domestic
consumption he made during a period of depressed
prices (Swift 1965:27).

If, as has been noted, the general type of definition is
limited in comparative usefulness, how might we explain the
apparent preference for this approach in rural Southeast Asian
ethnography? A partial answer would seem to lie in the hetero-
genesis of the Southeast Asian socioeconomic spectrum. For
example, fieldwork in rural Malay society instills in the investi-
gator an intuitive awareness that he is indeed dealing with
"peasants". Yet, when he attempts to lend conceptual refinement
to this awareness he is bedeviled with the padi farmer who taps
rubber on an estate in his spare time, the coconut grower who
fishes part-time, and the aborigine who tends permanent rice
fields throughout the week and travels by bus on weekends to the
city where he sells medicinal herbs he has gathered. It is there-
fore hardly surprising to find this "peasantry" being defined in
a general and open-ended manner, as does Firth when he speaks of
"countrymen engaged in rural pursuits".

An excellent example of the difficulty facing the Southeast
Asian ethnologist who would grapple with the peasant concept is
presented by Hollensteiner in her study of Philippine rural society:

Wolf would eliminate fisherman altogether from the ranks
of peasantry. Firth, however, includes fisherman and
rural craftsmen along with agriculturalists as peasants.
Nevertheless, in terms of social relationships, which is
Foster's criteria for defining peasantry, Hulo residents
as a whole would seem to qualify. They may be included
in Redfield's broad definition of peasantry... (1963:6-7).
After these gymnastics in which she attempts to touch all the bases, Hollensteiner concludes that Redfield never intended his definition to be rigid, and on the basis of Redfield's definition finally adjudges her society (Hulo) to be "basically peasant".

Attempts to utilize specific type definitional criteria in the study of Southeast Asian rural society have proven, in the main, rather futile. Indeed, attempts in this direction have served to point up the rather atypical character of Southeast Asian "peasantry". Foster, who favors a specific type definition of peasantry and thus criticizes Firth's definition on the basis of "its simplicity and consequent wide application", is forced to make the following admission on the following page of the same publication:

As a consequence of comments from the floor...and from subsequent discussions with a number of people, including my colleague, Clifford Geertz, I see that the Southeast Asian peasant community, as found in such countries as Indonesia and Thailand, may be sufficiently different from the peasants here described as to limit in those areas the validity of some of the generalizations that follows (1962:175).

In a similar manner, Goldschmidt and Kunkel found themselves "not able to fully account for the distinctive character of peasants of Southeast Asia" (1971:1069). Indeed, owing to the specific nature of their initial criteria, they found few Southeast Asian societies could qualify as "peasant".

The above statements of Goldschmidt and Kunkel, and Foster, and the tendency of Southeast Asian ethnologists to employ generalist definitions when dealing with Southeast Asian "peasants", point to the fact that we are dealing with something other than the "classic" peasant. An exhaustive inquiry into the precise nature of the above-mentioned "distinctive character of peasants
in Southeast Asia" is well beyond the scope of the present dis-
cussion. However, it is worthwhile to consider briefly a few
relevant political, historical and ecological factors, the effects
of which when taken together throw considerable light on the above-
mentioned distinctiveness.

If we assume, as does Wolf, that

it is only when a cultivator is integrated into a
society with a state -- that is, when the cultivator
becomes subject to the demands and sanctions of power
holders outside his social stratum -- that we can
appropriately speak of peasantry (1966:11),

we are afforded a valuable clue as to the nature of the peculiari-
ties of present-day Southeast Asian rural society. For, prior to
European contact, minimal conditions for the existence of state
level society; i.e. population concentration and the caloric
requirement with which to sustain it, were largely absent in
Southeast Asia. This dearth of state-level nuclei was in large
part due to prevailing ecological circumstances.

A good deal has been written on social organization in
tropical and subtropical environments (Pelzer 1945, Gourou 1956,
Ooi Jin-Bee 1958). While not a determinant in the strict sense
of the word, a tropical climate has been a weighty variable in-
fluencing Southeast Asian social organization. Heavy rainfall
which leaches nutrients from the soil, as well as tropical vegeta-
tion continuously combating men's efforts to clear land, are
impediments to permanent-site agriculture. In addition, many of
the region's river systems issue from mountainous terrain with
such force that regular flooding and excessive silting hamper
efforts at large scale irrigation. Add to this the high incidence
of salinity throughout many of the coastal plains, and one begins
to understand the preponderance of swidden agriculture prior to
European contact, and its continued practice in vast areas of the region today. And, although the productivity of swidden may in some cases prove higher than that of sedentary agriculture (Dumond 1961), it is undeniable that sedentary agriculture is generally more conducive to high population density (Wolf 1959:60). This is borne out when the regional population density of Southeast Asia (126 persons/sq.mi.) is compared with those of the Indian subcontinent (305/sq.mi.), China proper (350/sq.mi.), and Japan (610/sq.mi.) (Fisher 1964:95).

Despite relatively low population density for the region, and Gourou's assertion that "the ladang (shifting agricultural) system is at the final analysis an inadequate economic basis on which a high civilization may achieve great political and intellectual achievements" (1956:52), there have existed numerous instances of state level organization in Southeast Asia. Funan, Champa, Khymer, Malacca, Srivijaya and Madjapahit are all examples of pre-colonial Southeast Asian states, or, as they are more often referred to, 'kingdoms'. However, a great many, if not the majority, of such 'kingdoms' owed their existence to maritime trade rather than agricultural economics. Funan, Champa, Srivijaya and Malacca, for example, while they cannot be characterized as strictly nonagricultural, owed their ascendancy to their trade route locations. As a consequence of this market orientation, the "maritime principalities were cosmopolitan in character and of necessity demonstrated a degree of social equality and tolerance that contrasted sharply with the hierarchy of land based kingdoms" (Legge 1964:29).

In addition to commercialism, there was another factor which retarded development of hierarchic social relations such as those...
which saw the emergence of a "classic" peasantry in Europe, and that was religion. The spread of Islam throughout the Malay archipelago tended to erode the authority structure of many political centers such as did exist, a case in point being the early Javanese "kingdom" of Madjapahit:

In bringing man face to face with God without the necessity of a mediating priesthood or a complicated ritual, it (Islam) implied a doctrine of equality which could offer a powerful solvent for the hierarchical order of Madjapahit (Legge 1964:44).

Granting, then, that the influence of maritime commercialism and Islam retarded, if not precluded, the emergence of a "classic" peasantry, what of those inland "kingdoms" which experienced neither the levelling influence of commercialism nor of Islam? Would not those mainland states, based as they were on sedentary agriculture supportive of relatively large populations, be productive of a "classic" type of peasantry? In the majority of cases the evidence suggests not.

The historical record reveals the majority of these inland states to have been relatively short-lived political enterprises with few being able to achieve the long term stabilization of authority necessary to transform a social hinterland into a peasantry in the classic sense. Fisher notes that "the history of the mainland states seems to consist of little more than a series of ding-dong struggles between successive invaders, each contending for as much as possible of the more attractive low-lands" (1964:125,94). Even the much referred to "Hinduized States" (Coedes 1964) were usually little more than imported palace veneer cast in an otherwise pre-state setting -- "the dominant conception of kingship and authority was personal and charismatic rather than
bureaucratic and institutional" (Scott 1972:13). Furthermore, there existed such a state of political flux in the region that those polities which may have at times approximated a state level of integration often as not oscillated between tribal (or chiefdom) and primitive state levels of integration (Leach 1954). Seldom did the power center possess a sufficient monopoly over force as to allow the evolution of rigid feudal type arrangements and dependencies such as obtained in medieval Europe.1 This was as true for the "Hinduized kingdoms" (Burling 1965:78) as for the scattered upland valley "kingdoms" of Laos (Halpern 1964:83).

The transient quality of Southeast Asian civilizations, and the spasmodic nature of their respective political organizations, may be attributed in large part to the abundance of, and easy access to, unoccupied land. Even those few areas of population concentration made possible by hydraulic agriculture, such as the Red River valley, were never far from a frontier which, should demands of the power center become repressive, could provide refuge. There existed, therefore, what Wolf refers to as a high degree of "tactical mobility" (1969:291). As Scott notes:

'going to the hills' for banditry or swidden farming was a traditional alternative for discontented peasants. Control of land in traditional Southeast Asia, then, did not automatically bring in its wake -- as it did in areas where fertile land was scarce -- an abject clientele dependent on the patron for its principal means of subsistence (Scott 1973:16).

Not until the latter third of the last century did the process of rural social transformation commence in Southeast Asia in any appreciable manner. With the burgeoning colonial cash crop economy there occurred a rapid decrease in the amount of unoccupied land, as well as an unprecedented population increase for the area
as a whole. The resultant increase in land values, coupled with growing dependence on the forces of supply and demand (forces notoriously fickle in the case of cash crops) saw the emergence of credit, rent, and labor obligations in the rural sector. The ultimate result was the evolution of a wholly new structure of class relations.

Had it occurred at a different place and time, the combined impact of these economic forces may have spawned what is now referred to as a "classic" peasantry. However, such was not destined to be the case in Southeast Asia.

First, the process of rural social transformation never got under way in the region until relatively recently. Nowhere in Southeast Asia have rural class relations had the time to maturate into the "granite-like quality" and "imperturbable sameness" that characterized European peasantry (Handlin 1951:7). Instead, the transformative process has been compressed to the extent where it is common to find "primitive agriculturists" who have become transformed into "farmers" (Wolf 1966:2) or, as often, into landless proletariat, within the span of a few generations.

Secondly, it is possible to argue that once the above-mentioned economic forces made their presence felt rural social organization for the region became perhaps even more diverse than it had been formerly. Just as the various plantation crops; e.g. rubber, coffee, sugar, tapioca, require diverse soils and climatic conditions, they also demand dissimilar labor inputs. Coffee, for example, requires an intermittent labor input whereas rubber demands continuous attention. As a consequence, maintenance variables peculiar to each agricultural enterprise tended to affect different types of
dependency relationships in the rural sector which in turn affected the entire social organization of the societies concerned.

Finally, external social and cultural differences have played an important role regarding the various directions taken by socio-economic change in rural Southeast Asia. Superimposed on the socioculturally composite nature of the region have been the influence of no less than four European colonial establishments during the past century, each with its peculiar economic and socio-political policies. In each case, the rural social type which emerged was in many ways a reflection not only of prevailing ecological and cultural circumstances, but of a particular Euro-centric model as well.

In light of the ecological, sociocultural and historical diversity of Southeast Asian societies, it comes as little surprise that the processes of rural social transformation in Southeast Asia have not produced a homogeneous "classic" type peasantry. Instead, rural societies of the region are products of the interaction between those ecological, historical, and sociocultural variables which characterize particular localities. Put differently, individual societies represent localized sociocultural adaptations to specific microenvironments, each of which is comprised of its own distinctive mix of ecological, economic, and sociocultural elements. Consequently, to speak of a Southeast Asian peasantry or, for that matter, a Thai, Malaysian or Filipino peasantry, implies the grossest of abstractions.

The discussion has to this point focused upon the empirical shortcomings of the "peasant" concept. We might note in passing
that it suffers in other respects as well. In addition to being empirically unsound, the term admits to conceptual flaws in that it is both compound and categorical (see Lenski 1966:20). Just as the term "peasant" has been stretched to cover too wide a range of socioeconomic reality, so too has it come to encompass a variety of conceptual connotations. That is, we might speak of a particular society as being "peasant" in a political sense, but not in an occupational sense. As Geertz has noted, there are "cultural, occupational, and jural views of the peasant, and the relationship of these spheres, much less their relative weighting, is by no means clear (Geertz 1961:4).

In addition to being a compound concept, the "peasant" concept suffers an additional weakness in that it is categorical rather than variable. As Gerhard Lenski points out, "categorical concepts, by their very nature, force one to think in limiting 'either-or' terms" (1966:20). Thus, it would seem that the task facing the social scientist is that of substituting for categorical concepts (in this case "peasant") variable concepts amenable to structural and organizational differences of an intersocietal sort. The result is a conceptual perspective which allows the investigator to view classes of phenomena (in this case aspects of rural social organization) as points on a continuum.

In spite of the above-mentioned empirical and conceptual shortcomings, the term 'peasant' continues to be the conceptual sinew for anthropological and sociological studies of rural society. While this continuing reliance on the term is to a degree understandable in light of current interest in cultural and social histories of rural European societies, for anthropologists and
sociologists to persist in their use of the concept in researching post-colonial rural society cannot help but be baffling. While a thoroughgoing critical appraisal of ethnomethodologies employed in the study of contemporary rural societies is clearly beyond the scope of the present essay, it is nonetheless worthwhile to point out a methodological weakness characteristic of many rural studies, a failing which might in itself be a partial explanation for continued reliance on the peasant concept. That weakness has to do with the relative lack of comparative rigor.

As has been pointed out by Lewis (1956), the nature of the comparative frame by which the anthropologist analyzes sociocultural behavior is highly variable. Depending on the problem at hand and the nature of the data available, the ethnologist may deal in global comparisons or, on the other hand, opt for comparisons within a single village. With respect to rural society, the data gathering phase continues to focus in many cases on the single "peasant" village. Following compilation of his ethnography, the researcher all too often pays mere lip service to the comparative phase of analysis by contrasting in a cursory fashion the behavior of "his peasants" against that of someone else's "peasants", in effect considering extraneous or otherwise not worthy of comparative scrutiny such variables as ecological relationships, colonial history, nature of articulation with the larger nation-state, and so on. The result has been a paucity of carefully conceived working hypotheses leading to middle range generalization upon which a more complete understanding of rural society can be based.

As an antidote, it is proposed here that a comparative frame encompassing a few villages located within a narrow geographical
radius is capable of yielding generalizations of higher quality and testability than have been generated by the bulk of "peasant" studies to date. The work of Robert Redfield (1941) has amply demonstrated the potential this method of closely controlled comparison holds for the understanding of subtle organizational variations in rural society. More recently, research utilizing a closely controlled comparative frame and conducted by myself in rural West Malaysia has yielded hypotheses pertaining to socio-political changes occurring in three villages differentially involved in the processes of modernization (Childs 1977). By dealing with a few villages located within the same general area it is possible to employ ethnographic and ethnohistorical methods of data collection to their fullest advantage and, in so doing, achieve a processual dimension in the study of rural society, a dimension conspicuously absent in many contemporary rural studies.

In summary, it would seem that if a narrow and/or middle range comparative study of rural society is to be fruitful, it is necessary to begin at a lower level of abstraction than that offered by the "peasant" concept. To preface a research effort with an attempted justification of a concept as ambiguous as "peasant" can only prove detrimental. In a comparative study of two or more villages, as has been proposed here, its usage implies a comparability, or similarity of features, which in fact may not exist. And, as one expands the comparative scope to regional proportions, the distortion increases accordingly. This is especially true in the case of Southeast Asia where, as has been shown, the concept is of dubious value in the first place.² This may help explain the relative lack of comparative rigor of rural studies in Southeast
Asia, as well as the discomfiture experienced by those who feel in some way obligated to use the term.

"When we try to fit a category from another theory to the situation under study, we can have much trouble finding indicators and in getting agreement among our colleagues on them. The result is that our forcing of "round data" into "square categories" is buttressed by a long justificatory explanation for the tenetative relationship between the two. Forcing data to apply to categories or properties is sure to arouse the disbelief of both colleagues and laymen from the start" (Glaser and Strauss 1967:37).

NOTES

1. A partial exception to this generalization would be the Red River valley area of Vietnam. However, as is noted in the following paragraph, ready access to a frontier was a factor which tended to inhibit the emergence of a "classic" peasantry even in this densely populated area.

2. Studies of African rural society, such as the work of Saul and Woods (1971) to cite but one example, suggest that the argument presented here is applicable to Africa as well.
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MIDDLE NEOLITHIC POTTERY GROUPS
of the
PELOPONNESE AND THESSALY REGIONS
of
MAINLAND GREECE

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INTRODUCTION

The Middle Neolithic of Greece falls roughly between 5000 and 4000 BC. It is a period of increased development for man. Stock-breeding is only 2500 years old, and agricultural activity is even younger. Community development, spurred from the Early Neolithic, is markedly increased with the development of the "acropolis" and walled fortifications. Settlements are now permanent and have become a center of social development for man; the community is a place he calls home.

Pottery also exhibits great improvement during the Middle Neolithic. Shapes are well developed, material is of good quality, and the decorated pots mark a high degree of artistic style. It is the Middle Neolithic pottery types of the Peloponnese and Thessaly regions that this paper will discuss.
TERMINOLOGY

The following paper on Middle Neolithic pottery uses terminology based on the convenient tripartite scheme devised by Weinberg in 1947 (Weinberg 1947, p. 171-81; 1954, p. 96). Systematically it divides the neolithic period into Early, Middle, and Late Neolithic. In recent years a Final Neolithic phase has been employed to provide leeway between Late Neolithic and Early Helladic (Phelps 1975).

This system was contrived for Southern Greece, but has now been adopted for use throughout the Greek mainland. However, it should be understood that Thessalian sites hold their own nomenclature. A system devised by Tsountas in 1908 divided the neolithic into Thessaly A and B. Milojić (1950) further developed the sequence into Frühkeramik, Protosesklo, and Vorsesklo, these being three phases corresponding to Early Neolithic; Thessaly A corresponding to Middle Neolithic (with which this paper is concerned); Thessaly B corresponding to Late Neolithic; and Dimini being transitional between Late and Final Neolithic and Early Bronze Age (see chart at end of text).

Milojić and others (French 1972) feel that Weinberg's tripartite scheme lacks flexibility. They propose that areas of Greece; i.e., Central Greece, Peloponnese, Boeotia, etc., should have their own cultural "phase" names. This, however, could lead to a rapid proliferation of confusing and complex terminology, which in turn, would lead the reader into deciphering the area and date to which the phase name belongs. Furthermore, it would tend to make correlations with other
mainland sites difficult. Until a simple, more flexible phase name system can be worked out, the tripartite scheme shall have to suffice.

In the Middle Neolithic a further subdivision is made and is used in both the Peloponnesian and Thessalian sequences. These divisions are simply Phases I, II, III; or, early, middle, late, and will be used interchangeably in this paper. Also, the abbreviations EN., MN., and LN. (Early, Middle, and Late Neolithic) will be used when appropriate.

A number of terms used in this work need clarification and definition before the reader begins.

1. Urfirnis: is a category of pottery characteristic of the Peloponnesian MN. It is distinguishable by its particularly streaky glaze and its inherent glossy quality that makes burnishing unnecessary. Another feature is the "scraped" appearance of its unglazed interior surface.

2. Tectonic: (p.80) pertains to constructive design of the pattern; or, in an architectural sense, we may add the meaning artistic structuralism.

3. Reference to figures are placed in quotes; e.g.(7;1,2). The first number is the figure page; the second number (s) refers to the particular drawing on that page.

SHAPES of the Peloponnesian and Thessaly

The repertory of the Peloponnesian Urfirnis shapes consists of bowls and cups, pyriform jars, carinated forms, and collared jars.

A dominant type of bowl which shows continuity throughout the Early and Middle Neolithic is the open shallow bowl.(1;1,2). This bowl appears in a variety of sizes and has been found with every type of base, from the early ring (1;3) to the later pedestal (1;4). Figure 1;2, is a typical bowl of all Middle
Neolithic phases in the Peloponnese. Other shallow bowl forms include straight sides (usually with conical bases or high pedestal "fruitstands", (1;4), and concave forms in which the upper section splays slightly (1;5).

Medium-sized open vessels range in size and proportion from small hemispherical cups (1;6) to large hemispherical bowls (1;7), with predominantly straight sides.

Closed bowls were a common feature of the Early Neolithic. The large, deep closed bowls eventually merge into the Middle Neolithic pyriform jars (1;8).

The flaring or splaying rim on bowls and jars is characteristic of the Peloponnesian MN. The rim angles upwards (1;9,10); the early phase having rims on a globular form with a gradual development towards a more angular or carinated shape in the late phase.

The pyriform jar, some with S-profiled walls, has been placed by Phelps (1975:133) into three categories; concave (2:1), medium (2;2), and narrow (2;3). Actually these categories merge with each other. The concave pyriform jar develops out of the bowl form and is transitional between a bowl and a jar. The distinction between bowl and pyriform shapes, is that the latter are deeper and have more profile.

Carinated bowls of all sizes are common in the middle and late phases of MN (2;4,5) with many resting on conical bases (2,7). A few carinated dishes are found in the extreme latter part of phase III (more within LN), but are only known at Corinth (2;6) (Weinberg 1937, p. 501).

Collared jars are divided into low (3;1,2), medium (3;3,4),
and high (3;5,6) collar types, with either globular (3;3) or narrow (3;4) bodies. Collared jars are a continuance from the Early Neolithic, but show a marked increase in the Middle period. They exhibit a great variety of shape and proportion, and no doubt, function.

The standard type of lug for the Middle Neolithic is the spur. It is usually confined to bowls and is set just below the lip. A new feature of the period is handles. They never became very common and are confined to pyriform and collared jars.

In the Thessaly region of Northern Greece, the repertory consists of bowls, mugs, hemispherical and globular jars, and carinated bowl forms.

The most common types of bowls are wide open shapes with a flat bottom and splayed lips (4;1,2); and a wide open type with nearly vertical sides (4;3). Bowl shapes gradually develop wider and lower rims (dishes) and are set upon high conical bases (4;4); preceding the Late Neolithic "fruitstands" (4;5). There is also a wide variety of medium, straight-sided, hemispherical bowls with raised bases (4;6) and small narrow-necked closed bowls (4;7a,b).

The hemispherical and globular jars are a carryover from EN, or Protosesklo, with the raised base being an addition of the Middle Neolithic (Holmberg 1964:16). Medium collared (5;1) and high collared (5;2) are more numerous than low collared pieces. Many of the jars have extremely narrow or funnel-necked collars with very robust bodies (5;3). Narrow shaped jars appear to be nothing more than globular elongations (5;4). An excep-
tional to the jar repertory is the "bail-handle" form found at Tsangli (5;5)(Wace and Thompson 1912:112).

From the earliest sequences of Thessaly A are found bowl-shaped mugs with splaying rims (6;1). These are the most frequent mugs, or cups, found; although pryniform or pot-bellied types are common (6;2).

What is said to be characteristic of the middle and late phases of Thessaly A is the carinated bowl form (6;3). The bowls usually have one or two tubular handles in the concave upper part and a raised base for support (Holmberg 1964:112).

Handles are very prevalent in the Thessaly A period. They occur on bowls, mugs, and jars, and usually take a vertical or tubular shape, some having raised edges.

Peloponnnesian and Thessalian shapes are basically the same. Differences may be seen in bowls and cups. The closed bowls and globular jars of Thessaly are not as refined as the Urfirnis shapes. However, the mugs of Thessaly and especially the handles are developed far better than those of the Urfirnis ware.

**FABRIC**

The fabric of Urfirnis ware is uniform throughout the Middle Neolithic, and the Peloponnese. Ware quality is good, being well formed, thin-walled, and thoroughly baked. Two classes of fabric are used in description: fine ware and coarse ware. (The same applies for Thessaly).

Characteristically, the fine Urfirnis fabric is hard and dense, has a granular texture, and is tempered with gritty
white particles and sometimes fine mica. White grits vary in number and are dispersed throughout the clay. Inner surfaces of the more closed vessels are smoothed down with a broad blunt tool. When the tool is drawn across the surface, sharp incisions are created by the dragging of the gritty particles along with the small blades of the tool (Weinberg 1937:500; Phelps 1975:126). The exterior surface is treated in the same manner only the incisions are smoothed out.

Color of the fine fabric ranges from light pink to deep brick. Being well-fired, the color is uniform throughout; only occasionally a dark non-oxidized center is found.

Coarse ware is made in much the same way. The ware is generally porous and sometimes has large white grits. The color is usually dark (brick) and is often mottled.

The quality of the fabric in Thessaaly is no less than that of the Urfirnis ware. The fine fabric is usually thin-walled, well-baked, and on the whole is clear of grit, even though white particles occur at times. Sponginess, a characteristic of Protoseesklo, is no longer found.

The inner surfaces are well-smoothed and the wares' exterior is normally well-burnished. Color ranges from a lustrous cream to black. Red and white are the two most common.

The coarse ware is thick, the clay is mixed with sand, and the surface is not highly burnished. The thickness is more common for incised ware and large storage jars. Color ranges from yellowish-brown to gray to black.

Brief mention should be made as to why the potters created two types of fabric. The fine ware was mainly for decorative
purposes and it became a medium for the individual potter to artistically express himself. It may be safe to assume that the fine and highly decorative wares were also used for religious purposes. The coarse ware on the other hand, was utilitarian. It was used for cooking, storage, etc., and was also cheap and needed less care in manufacture.

FINISH

As mentioned in the previous section, the surface of Ur-firnis ware is worked down with a blunt tool. Following this is the treatment of smoothing down the exterior of the vessel, and the interior treatment of bowls. Burnishing the surface of Ur-firnis ware is sometimes practiced. This process is important since it renders a vase less porous; it is functional as well as decorative.

A slip or clay wash (actually a glaze in the case of Ur-firnis) is applied to a great number of pots. Jacobsen puts the estimate of slipped pots at 70% for Phase II of the Middle Neolithic (Jacobsen 1969:366). Slip colors range from red or orange to black; the most common being a reddish-brown or mahogany.

The slip of the early phase is often thin, dull, and streaky, giving the appearance of having been swabbed on with a cloth. At Franchthi, Jacobsen (1969:363) notices that the early 'non-lustrous' slip develops into a high lustrous appearance in the middle phase. Phase II ware has an inherent glossy quality (glaze), and is the high point of technological expertise in Ur-firnis ware.

The degree of luster depends on the chemical composition and fineness of the slip, the thickness of application, firing
conditions, and the smoothness of the surface. The latter is important for the Urfinnis glaze. The surface must be smoothed down to attain a high luster from the slip; otherwise, it will be dull (Phelps 1975:128-9). However, if the surface is smoothed too much or well burnished, then the slip will not adhere.

Burnishing is done in two ways: 1) light burnishing before the slip application; and 2) burnishing after the slip application. If in the first method the burnishing has not eliminated all the tool marks, the slip will be thicker in the depressions, creating dark streaks. The streaks left by the "brush" application of the slip may often be seen crossing the surface marks.

In the second type of burnishing, the outer surface of the slip is worked to bring out luster. The tone is generally unaffected.

Parts of the vessel were often left in reverse and decorated with painted patterns. These patterns were applied in much the same manner as slips; the only difference is that the paint was applied more thickly to make a darker color. The darkest part of the decorated slip would be where lines of the patterns intersect.

In Thessaly A the pottery is covered with a thick slip that varies in color from red-brown to black to white. Burnishing varies from low to high. The finished ware is of two types; monochrome and red-on-white or white-on-red. A third type, coarse ware, is without a slip and is lightly burnished (Wace and Thompson 1912:13-5).

The slip colors of the fine monochrome ware are red (the predominant color), black, and white. The slip is usually applied over clay material of the same color (red slip over red
material) and is highly burnished giving the pot a deep rich color and a fine luster.

Of the painted ware the red-on-white consists of two varieties. In the first, the vessel is covered with a thick white slip and a deep red slip is painted over it in decorative patterns. In the second, the vessel is again covered with a thick white slip and then over this is applied a thick red slip. When the latter is still damp the potter scrapes out linear patterns in the red, exposing the white slip below. Care must be taken not to scratch too deeply, so as not to damage the white slip below. On the other hand, too shallow a scratch will leave a pinkish tinge. Both types of these red-on-white have a brilliant burnish.

White-on-red ware has a burnished red slip decorated over with a matted white paint. The white paint is applied after the burnishing of the red slip, this making the former very flaky.

Less common wares of the period include a red-brown on buff in which burnishing is done after firing (Wace and Thompson 1912:15). An incised ware with small geometric designs arranged in chains has a slip applied between the incisions. Towards the latter part of Phase III in Thessaly a gray-on-gray appears followed by a black burnished. The gray ware lasts a very short time and may be transitional to black burnished which is characteristic of Thessaly B (see chart).

The difference in finish treatment between the contemporary pottery of Thessaly A and the Peloponnese is great. In Thessaly we find: 1) the color range is wider and includes the fine white
slip; 2) burnishing is used effectively as the only means of bringing out luster; and 3) slip application is thicker and often a slip of a different color applied over another.

The Urfirnis glaze is the "trademark" of Peloponnesian pottery. The clay slip used produces an inherent gloss and does not require the burnishing that Thessalian pottery needs to bring out luster. It is the chemical composition and fineness of the clay wash that is mainly responsible for the glaze effect. The color of Urfirnis is usually a mahogany or darker — never white.

PATTERNS

Urfirnis patterns are constructed of simple lines that vary in width. The lines can be straight or wavy and form rectilinear and geometric patterns.

The running type design is the most common pattern found. The patterns are divided into three groups: 1) the simple horizontal band (7;1,2) found on the upper part of the rim and sometimes as "necking bands" at carinations; 2) continuous zig-zags and chevrons which may consist of one broad line (7;3) or a group of parallel lines meeting at angles (7;4,5); and 3) chains of filled triangles and lozenges (7;6,7). Triangles are often filled with cross-hatching.

Rim pendant decoration consists of solid inverted triangle motifs (7;8). Tails are eventually developed on these (7;9,10). Short vertical lines are also used as rim motifs (7;11).

Static motifs consist of vertical lines, broad or thin (7;12,13) and the complicated "tectonic" pattern of Phase II (8;1-4). The intricate "tectonic" patterns mark (along with
the fine glaze) the high period of Urfinnis ware development.

In decoration of the open bowl the simplest motifs are of the early phase. These designs are usually basket weaving patterns (9;1) or simple cross-hatching (9;2). The common motif of all phases is the multiple chevron with triangles on the lip (9;3). An elaborate pattern was the division of the bowl interior into quadrants using solid or wavy lines as fillers between broad lines (9;4,5).

Characteristic motifs employed in Urfinnis ware include solid motifs of triangles, squares, lozenges, and dots (9;6-9). Broad lines are used to emphasize and are used in chevron and tectonic patterns, with wavy and thin straight lines as fillers.

Thessalian patterns consist of the so-called solid style (stepped triangles and squares in a zig-zag pattern); and linear designs with straight or wavy lines and broad flame or wolf's tooth bands running around bowls.

In the running type pattern the solid style design uses triangles, lozenges, and rectangles to form either a stepped pattern (6;1) or a zig-zag arrangement (5;5). Linear patterns are made up of thin wavy or straight lines bordered by thicker lines that run around the bowl in a ribbon or broad chevron pattern (10;1,2). The edge of the broad line has a development from a saw-toothed edge (10;2) to stretched-out spine (10;3) to the common fire flame pattern (10;4). These running ribbons rarely meet at ends; instead one end terminates near the lip, the other near the base (10;4,5).

Rim pendant decoration consists of a thin or broad painted line (10;2-7). Some carinated shapes have a solid toothed
pattern with an open triangle in its center, placed around the rim (10;6). Solid inverted triangles are also found.

Linear decorations are comprised of thin straight lines, many in the form of chevrons (10;8) and wavy lines often in a general motif pattern (10;10). Vertical and zig-zag lines sometimes run the height of the bowl (10;9a & b).

Open bowl decoration consists of simple linear designs on the interior edge with the flat bottom decorated with an X (11;1). Another common pattern has thin lines running vertically across three areas of the inner rim. Below the line a broad, spined ribbon circles the bowl. The center is decorated with a star (11;2). In Phase II an interesting whirl pattern appears (11;3). Once believed to be rooted in Samarra (a cultural development in the northwestern area of Mesopotamia contemporary with the Greek Neolithic period), most scholars now believe the whirl pattern to be indigenous to Greece.

Thessalian motifs are somewhat simple; much like Urfirnis. Rectangles, triangles, and lozenges (11;4-6) are the most common types. They are arranged in a stepped pattern (6;1), or used as filler decorations in bands.

In the northern Thessaly region incised ware is found (Wace and Thompson 1912:14). Patterns are formed by wedge-shaped and round incisions arranged in chains of geometric design (11;7).

THE SPREAD OF POTTERY AND RE-EVALUATION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE

The arrival of pottery in Greece appears to be sudden and widespread. General opinion is that the potters arrived with their well-developed forms from the Aegean and Near East. Close parallels are drawn by Weinberg (1954,1965a) between Greece and
Fig. 11
the Eastern Mediterranean, all well within the diffusionist framework. However, with the recent shift in C-14 dates (Renfrew 1971), the Early Neolithic in Greece is partly synchronous in development with the settlement of Catal Huyuk (an "advanced" cultural development in Anatolia with pottery sequences dating to the eighth millenium B.C.) and at least 2000 years earlier than Neolithic Egypt (Theocharis 1973: 112-113). Scholars are now modifying their explanation in saying that the Neolithic developments in the Near East, Greece, and the Balkans are practically parallel with one another. The old view held that the Neolithic developed in the Near East, then spread across the Aegean to Greece, then up to the Balkans. But the evidence for the spread across the Aegean is practically nil, and with the recent upset in C-14 dating a great deal of compiled evidence is going to have to be re-evaluated.

Turning to the specific period discussed in this work, we find that the ceramic development in Greece has a certain continuity from the Early Neolithic up until the end of the Middle Neolithic (as evidenced by Jacobsen at Franchthi). The black burnished ware from the north is a break that marks the beginning of the Late Neolithic. Weinberg, however, believes the whirl patterns of Thessaly (see p. 82) are derived from the Samarran pottery (1965a:295;1965b:592) and accounts for Urfirnis ware as an arrival of a new population from the Near Eastern Halaf culture (1965a:292-6).

I do not intend to write a polemic against Weinberg, but I believe on both accounts above he uses selective evidence
in drawing these conclusions. In the case of the Thessalian whirl it is very dangerous to contend that it had its origins in Samarra. Why would the whirl pattern be the only influence? What about architectural techniques and figurines? It is very unlikely that one simple pattern would find its way into a repertory of designs that is immune to its contemporary neighbors—especially the highly developed Urfirnis ware.

In the case of the Urfirnis arrival, Jacobsen (1973:264), shows at Franchthi a continual ceramic development throughout the Early and Middle Neolithic. The theory of a new intervening population has a weak basis. First it is reasonable to assume that a population transfer from the center of the Near East to the Peloponnese would leave traces along the way. None have been found. Secondly, a population immigrating to another is capable of influencing, as well as changing, not only the pottery techniques of the existing society, but also other major components; such as, architecture, figurines, and economy. At present no traces of these changes are found. Further work must be done in the area.

In concluding this paper, it is only proper to place the Middle Neolithic in the whole of the Greek Neolithic. As mentioned in the introduction, the Middle Neolithic dates between 5000 and 4000 B.C. The beginning of the Neolithic period in Greece dates to approximately 6400 B.C. The terminating point is around 3100 B.C., when the Bronze Age is making its rise.

The pottery of the Greek Neolithic reaches its height of development during the Middle period. The Late Neolithic experiences a cultural influence from the north; an influence
from which the pottery enters a period of decadence. Black burnished ware rapidly replaces the Urfirnis and monochrome vessels. The fabric of the black burnished is rough and the decoration is simplistic. It is not until the Mycenaean Age (1400-1100 B.C.) that we find pottery comparable to that of the finest decorated wares of the Middle Neolithic.
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Fig. 1 - 1 & 2 convex form; 3 convex with ring foot; 4 straight side high pedestal; 5 concave form; 6 small cup; 7 large bowl; 8 large deep closed bowl; 9 & 10 flaring rim bowls. (Phelps 1975).

Fig. 2 - 1 concave pyriform; 2 & 3 medium and narrow pyriform; 4 & 5 carinated bowls; 6 carinated dish; 7 carinated bowl on conical base. (Phelps 1975 - Weinberg 1937).

Fig. 3 - 1 & 2 low collared jar; 3 & 4 medium collared jar; 5 & 6 high collared jar. (Phelps 1975).

Fig. 4 - 1 & 2 wide open bowl with splayed lip; 3 wide open bowl with vertical side; 4 conical base; 5 LN "fruitstand". 6 medium hemispherical bowl; 7 small narrow necked closed bowls. (Wace and Thompson 1912).

Fig. 5 - 1 medium collar; 2 high collar; 3 narrow-necked globular; 4 narrow jar; 5 "bail handle" jar. (Wace and Thompson 1912; Holmberg 1964).

Fig. 6 - 1 bell-shaped mug; 2 pot-bellied mug; 3 carinated bowl (Wace and Thompson 1912).

Fig. 7 - Urfirnis motifs (Phelps 1975).

Fig. 8 - Urfirnis "tectonic"patterns (Phelps 1975).

Fig. 9 - 1 & 2 basket weave and cross-hatch; 3 multiple chevron; 4 7 5 quadrant design; 6 - 9 basic motifs (Phelps 1975).

Fig. 10 - Thessalian fire-flames, wolf's teeth, and motifs (Wace and Thompson 1912).

Fig. 11 - Thessalian bowl interiors and motifs; 7 incised ware (Wace and Thompson 1912).