SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SYMBOLS:

OBSERVATIONS OF STUDENT-FACULTY RELATIONS
WITHIN THE ANTHROPOLOGY CLUB,

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I. INTRODUCTION

Symbolic Interaction (SI), as a sub-discipline of sociology or social psychology, first materialized through the work of the Chicago School -- Cooley, Horton, Thomas, and most important, George Herbert Mead. One of Mead's concepts is that

The human individual is born into a society characterized by symbolic interaction. The use of significant symbols by those around him enables him to pass from the conversation of gestures -- which involves direct, unmeaningful response to the overt acts of others -- to the occasional taking of the roles of others. This role-taking enables him to share the perspectives of others. Concurrent with role-taking, the self develops, i.e., the capacity to act towards oneself (Meltzer 1972:17).

With such starting ideas, others began to search for the ways in which consensus between individuals is reached through symbols: how the self is related to society.

Today, two main schools of SI exist, one centered around the followers of Herbert Blumer (Chicago School) at Berkeley, and of Manford Kuhn at Iowa State. Both schools concentrate on the study of process -- they differ on their choice of methods and underlying assumptions. Blumer sees the self as creating its own environment, role making, while Kuhn is more inclined to see the self as responding to normative prescriptions, or role playing. These different assumptions lead to different methodologies. Blumer, being more humanistic, questions whether human behavior is predictable. Kuhn, more deterministic, has developed a rigorously scientific operationalization of the units of social interaction.

While Blumer rejects the idea of structure, the Iowa school accepts it with the qualification that process pre-
cedes structure: All social structures exist only in motion...social structures always exist in some form of reciprocal action (movement) between two or more interactants" (Couch 1975:241). The Iowa School's techniques for explaining process, and therefore the building of structure, are

1) Use of the inductive method for observing events;
2) Breaking these events down into the smallest possible units;
3) Operationalizing the definitions of these units;
4) Noting the patterns that emerge, that is, arriving at the "forms of relations" emergent.

The definitions of forms of relations used in this paper are from the Iowa School, specifically, Sehested (1975) and Weiland (1975). These different forms of relations are taken to be hierarchical in the sense that they go from simple to complex, one being built out of the other:

Uncommitted Relations

1) Autonomy: Participants have a common focus, but no mutual responsiveness to each other. Example: a group watching a movie.

2) Autocracy: Same as autonomy, except one participant is the focus of the other(s) so a difference of self and others develops. These relations are non-cooperative. Example: an assassination, or a mother changing a baby's diaper.

3) Mutuality: Participants are mutually responsive to each other; it is present-centered with no shared focus or social objective. Example: a party.

Committed Relations

4) Solidarity: Consists of a shared focus, mutual responsiveness, a projected shared future, and shared standpoints. Can exist at four levels: (1) solidarity responsiveness, (2) solidarity reaction, (3) solidarity action (external and internal), and (4) solidarity relationship. A "we" consciousness is developed.
5) Accountability: A differentiation of self and other occurs (the "me" is identified) so that self and other have different lines of action and commitments (a division of labor). An "I-you" consciousness is developed.

6) Authority: Is like accountability but the future of both members of the interacting unit is controlled by one of them alone. It is different from autocracy in that there is a shared projected future and both parties consent to the relation. An "I-it" consciousness is developed.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLIDARITY RELATIONS

All of the above forms of relations allow people to act toward and away from others but it is through solidarity that people first learn to act with others. It is in this way that symbols are acquired, their meanings agreed upon and shared, which allows for complex communication, conceptualization and abstraction.

Solidarity can be defined (Sehested 1975) as two or more people taking parallel actions toward the same focus and who are mutually responsive to each other's actions:

1) A shared focus is present to which each person responds in a similar way; 2) Mutual responsiveness between the co-participants is present in which the individuals also respond to each other or acknowledge each other's response as being the same; 3) A projected shared future that locates each individual to the others (congruent functional identity) is established the same for each co-participant; and, 4) Shared standpoints (how individuals see themselves as relating to their environment) are presumed for the co-participants.

Different levels of solidarity can be distinguished based on how people will jointly act together in the future. In most instances, these levels are evolutionary in that the
preceding level(s) must first be present before another can develop. The most elementary level is of solidarity responsiveness in which the coparticipants have a mutual awareness that they have had a common experience in the past. This most basic form of solidarity experience is formed when two people become aware that they are attending to the same focus, but not necessarily to each other's reactions to the focus. When both individuals respond to the focus in the same way and are aware that they are responding the same way, solidarity responsiveness has been developed. At this low level, no joint action has as yet been projected, only a mutual awareness of shared experience is recognized, which each has experienced independently of the other. Eye contact or touch is usually the medium through which this level is experienced and is past and present oriented.

To illustrate this, a hypothetical organizational meeting of an Alcoholics Anonymous chapter can be used. As individuals enter the meeting hall, they assume that the others present are also alcoholics (have a shared common experience) and assume, perhaps incorrectly, they have come to find help for their problems (shared standpoint). They seat themselves without acknowledging the presence of others (autonomy) and focus their attention on the speaker at the podium (autocracy). As the speaker talks, he may make statements that elicit grunts of approval or disapproval from the audience. If individuals in the audience should turn to each other and make eye contact or touch one another, acknowledging each other's similar reactions to the speech, they have elicited a solidarity reaction. If, after the speech, the audience
does no more than leave the hall, no further joint action has been projected by the solidarity reaction. If, however, at the end of the speech the audience is invited to drink coffee and informally chat, the vocalization between individuals (mutual responsiveness) may provide the basis for development of the next main level of solidarity, solidarity action.

People may share their past experiences with each other verbally -- in this context standpoints are made known -- which may be discovered to be shared by others present. The shared focus may then be abstracted into "alcoholism", not just the person at the podium directing their attention. For those present to form a group which won't dissolve after the first meeting, a shared future must be projected. This development leads to solidarity action wherein coparticipants act towards a shared focus to achieve a social objective, in this case, to solve their drinking problems. Congruent functional identities are established and parallel lines of future action must be indicated. Congruent functional identities are a projection of a shared future wherein each can locate the self in relation to the others. As a "we" or "us" consciousness is developed, coparticipants see their future actions as being equal to each other.

Different types of relationships can be present simultaneously within a group so that along with the development of solidarity, authoritarian, autocratic, and autonomous relations may be present. Some people at the AA meeting may choose to stand and drink coffee alone then leave (autonomy). Others might have been forced to attend the
meeting by a court ruling (authoritarian). Through vocalizations these different standpoints are made known and the shared focus is lost. Responsiveness to each other's reactions might establish a new shared focus on which solidarity action may resume: Two people discover they were both forced to attend the meeting by the court, think it is disgusting, and decide to leave together to get a beer.

Solidarity action may be external and directed towards an object, or internal and as basic as "talking about" something through shared symbols. This talking about something may be the basis for taking action towards an object (a move from internal to external solidarity action). This is the most difficult stage in group formation. Congruent functional identities must be established if solidarity action and relationships are to exist and this must be done as equals if the "we" is to remain. It is much easier for the group's form to become authoritarian or accountable at this point. In accountability, a division of labor would occur -- each person would have a different task to perform which he alone would be responsible for. In authority relations, the superordinate would assign each individual his future task and the emphasis would be on how well the subordinate performed. An autonomous relationship could be reinstated where each person was responsible for his own actions alone, with no responsibility to the group. This would most likely be the case with the AA meeting--everyone returning home with no commitments made to the group.

But perhaps through internal solidarity action (talk) a small group decides to commit themselves to a rehabilitation center for Gestalt therapy (external solidarity action).
They then have made their drinking problem publicly known and would be labeled (named) by outsiders, which would intensify their solidarity. They then would start the last level of solidarity, a solidarity relationship. If they unanimously agree to form a Gestalt group within the rehabilitation center, they have pledged to act together in unison. Their group consciousness is to the degree that each one's individual acts will be seen in light of benefiting or hurting the group as a whole. They may begin to see themselves as an object and give this object a name, much like other clubs do (the Odd Fellows, the Masons, the River Rats, etc.). In high levels of solidarity relationships, it is assumed that all coparticipants will respond to new foci in the same ways without negotiating standpoints or forming solidarity action. The relationship is not bounded by time or space.

If the group is to remain in solidarity form, it is essential that the commitment to act is fulfilled, although external solidarity action alone, without internal solidarity action, is unlikely to lead to a solidarity relationship. People must talk about and reinforce their standpoints. Solidarity commitments may be made without solidarity responsiveness beforehand; in these cases group enthusiasm dies quickly. Those people sent to the rehabilitation center by court order have been committed to a relationship without having gone through a solidarity responsiveness stage. It would be probably that this type of group would not be as lasting as those which had previously been responsive to each other and the shared focus.
III. FORM OF RELATIONS OBSERVED FOR THE ANTHROPOLOGY CLUB,
WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY, FALL SEMESTER 1975

In the Fall of 1975, observations were made of the Anthropology Club at Wichita State University, with particular emphasis being placed on whether a solidarity relation would be developed. The club, however, evolved through several forms of social relations from the organizational meeting to the final meeting of the semester. Brief periods of autonomy, mutuality, and solidarity in the organizational meetings were necessary for the accountable relation that persisted through the other meetings to form. Autonomous, authority, and solidarity relations existed simultaneously for various sub-groups within the club.

Organizational Meeting

The organizational meeting of the club was held in the Campus Activities Center. Even though individuals within the room had perhaps known each other previously and conversations (mutual responsiveness) were conducted by dyads and tryads, as a group, the form of relation was autonomous. People related to the same focus but not to each other. The focus shared by all was an interest in anthropology. The meeting began and the advisor introduced herself and the focus became shared—all present in the room attended to her and through her retelling of the past history of the club, all were exposed to a common shared past. This autonomous form of relation was to be present at all the meetings in one way or the other and may have been responsible for the group not being able to form a lasting solidarity relationship.

The advisor then had everyone in the group introduce
themselves. This produced a brief period of mutual responsiveness. Each person related to each other not as an object but as an individual person. People responded to each others' smiles and eye contact. The shared focus of "anthropology" was not important in this stage. Through this type of contact, individuals in the group became coparticipants but did not think of themselves as a collectivity. No commitment to a shared future had as yet been made: no mention of future meetings or activities had been brought up.

The nomination and voting for club officers was the only observed instance of solidarity of all present at any meeting. If, in the formation of committed relations, accountability cannot be established until after solidarity (Weiland 1975:92), voting for officers in an organization is a very significant step.

In the first level of solidarity, that of solidarity responsiveness, coparticipants are aware of a common experience (all present were interested in anthropology and shared the club's past history through the advisor's speech) and attended to the same focus (the advisor conducting the election). The advisor presented the purpose of the club and made her standpoint known. Through the mutual responsiveness of introducing each other, a commonality of shared experience was developed. Each responded to the other, rather than the group. Calling for an election, however, implied a shared common future, which leads to the next level of solidarity, action: coparticipants acted towards a shared focus to achieve a social objective -- continuation of the anthropology club. In order for solidarity action to occur, all functional identities must be the same;
that is, each person's vote must have equal weight -- no "vetoes" are allowed. At this point, all present had identified themselves as students in anthropology, except for the advisor, who did not vote, and one other person present, who also did not vote. In the act of voting, all functional identities were congruent and all actions parallel. A "we" consciousness was briefly present as all affirmed the election of the president. In other formal organization situations, this same idea is produced when votes are taken by vocal "ayes" and "nays" in unison, or when "amens" are said in unison to signify the action or standpoint of the person speaking is accepted by all.

Not everyone voted for the same person, but there are several ways in which the group could have continued. A secret ballot does not place all standpoints in the open. Those who don't agree with the outcome of an election can modify their standpoint by re-negotiating with themselves: they can perhaps reason, that if the majority voted for so-and-so, he must be the best person; I was wrong in not voting for him and I now agree he should be president. An alternate reaction would be to decide not to come to any future meetings. That person would return to an autonomous relation in the group, not projecting himself into the shared future of the club. It is conceivable that some other people might, if not happy with the result of the election, make their dissatisfaction vocal. In this case, there is no shared standpoint; the dissidents try to establish solidarity responsiveness again by drawing attention to themselves and try to re-negotiate a new standpoint more to their liking. They have destroyed the "we" consciousness of
solidarity action. In order for it to be reformed, a new focus on which all can agree must be found. If this cannot be done, the group will dissolve. The dissidents can leave the group, in which case those remaining will be further strengthened in their "we-they" consciousness. An authoritarian context may also be present which will force the will of the superordinates onto the subordinate dissidents to keep still and not express their dissatisfaction. In general, this seems to be the observed situation for the Anthropology Club; in fact, the main reason for its continuation.

Voting for officers is an instance of internal solidarity action. In external solidarity action the focus of the co-participant's action is outside the group; they act toward it as an object. Internal solidarity action employs verbalization and symbolization to talk about something abstract. The object of the talk may be to plan for future external solidarity action. This is the case with the election of officers, the executive branch of an organization, the branch which executes or acts out the will of the group. It is important to realize two points:

1) Election and affirmation of officers is done with group consensus (solidarity action). This is perhaps why formal organizations have rituals in which group consensus is stressed. It serves the same purpose as the group amen in a church service -- all present acknowledging acceptance of the stated position. (For the same reasons given in the paragraph above, another form of relation, the authoritarian, may influence actions to be the opposite of standpoints).

2) Through the election of officers the coparticipants have lost their congruent functional identities. The officers have committed themselves to future actions which the other coparticipants have not. The form of the club has become accountable.
In accountable relationships, a shared focus exists, but differentiated functional identities indicate different lines of future actions for coparticipants. The future for both is interdependent. An "I-you" consciousness is developed. Each coparticipant is responsible only for how he has committed himself to act; i.e., what his functional identity requires. The functional identities of the club officers require that they direct the meeting. The newly elected president, as he walked to the front of the room and differentiated himself from the others, became the shared focus of the group's attention. At all other meetings the president always stood in front of the rest of the club, symbolizing his functional identity. This symbolization always reminded members of the form of relation of the group -- accountable -- which undoubtedly influenced their reactions.

The president asked the group for suggestions on what they would like to see the group do in the future. This seemed to be an effort to recreate mutual responsiveness again to negotiate a shared standpoint on a new focus that would lead to solidarity action -- decide what the topic for the next anthropology club meeting would be. Many ideas were brought up; co-participants were mutually responsive to each other, but in this case, no shared standpoint was developed. Whereas everyone had agreed that officers should be elected, no one could agree what subjects for meetings would be best in the future. The functional identities set up in the accountable relation eased the situation: the president said that the officers would get together and talk things over. From that point on, the choice
of topics for club meetings was not brought up at a general meeting but once, and at that time no comments were made by coparticipants (mutual responsiveness was not developed) and the subject was dropped.

One standpoint was shared at the organizational meeting about future action -- the idea of a party. This is interesting since a party is an instance of mutuality: there is no shared focus or social objective, it is present-centered and those present are attentive and responsive to each other on a one-to-one basis.

Accountable, Authority and Autonomous Relations Within the Club

At the following meetings of the club several forms of relations existed simultaneously. The club officers, through meetings separate from the general meetings, had developed what appeared to be a solidarity relationship which they presumed, or wanted to extend, to the entire club membership. The majority of people present at the meetings, though, only acted in an autonomous relation. They were present to hear the guest speaker (their common focus) and not relate to the anthropology club or others present. Over-riding these two relations was the authoritarian relationship of faculty to students. It became difficult to know what form of relationship was being observed since some solidarity acts can occur without solidarity being present (Weiland 1975:91), and it may be possible for one form of relationship to be manifest even though another form may be responsible. Authoritarian relationships can make subordinates appear to agree, and so on. Relations existing prior to and simultaneous but outside the anthropology club may have contributed to
the confusion in distinguishing the form the club took. Individual accounts obtained from various members of the club revealed this to be so, but are highly subjective. Each individual account indicated each person viewed the club as having the form of relation he was most involved in:

1) The club officers had entered into what appeared to be a solidarity relationship. Their functional identities were similar (almost congruent) in comparison to those of the other club members. Their relationship did not seem to be one of accountability to each other. They may have, as individuals, accountable relations to the club but among themselves there was no visible "I-you" consciousness. They always asked "What can we do to help the anthropology club?" They faithfully attended meetings and acted as a unit, even sitting together at meetings. Most interaction at meetings was done by the officers (excepting the faculty).

The officers tried to extend the solidarity relationship to the entire club. The president always used the pronoun "we" when asking the group's okay before planning further activities. The students in the club, acting in an autonomous relationship, did not feel obligated to commit themselves one way or the other, and did not, in most instances, become responsive. The president took their silence for a sign of group consensus or indifference.

2) Individual conversations with students only occasionally present at meetings confirmed that their relationship within the club was autonomous. Most came to the meetings only to hear the guest speaker. If the topic was not of interest to them, they did not attend the meeting.

3) The authoritarian relationship of faculty to students seemed to dominate the proceedings whenever the faculty were present. At those meetings, applause (a sign of responsiveness) was always initiated by a faculty member. Faculty viewed the situation in an "I-it" fashion, the "it" being the club. When asked in a separate conversation why the first speaker was selected, the faculty advisor said, "The reason I did that is I want people to think that this year's club is going to do things. We (inferring to those in charge as a collectivity) had to get started right away and it needed a push -- without a push nothing gets done." The first speaker was also a faculty member. At the end of his speech he turned the meeting over to a representative of another organization, who asked for donations for his own organization. The faculty speaker had not discussed this beforehand with the club officers or the faculty advisor. When asked why he hadn't, he answered that he had known beforehand and that was enough (authoritarian).
4) Other forms of relationships between different combinations of students and faculty also existed. A solidarity relationship among archaeology students may or may not have existed, but was assumed by other club members. Personal friendships, etc., existed which, although they could not be detected at all club meetings, influence it nonetheless.

Mutuality

The anthropology club's Halloween party was entirely different from the normal club meetings. The mutual responsiveness of a party (and the intoxicants) erased the distinctions of authoritarian, accountable, and autonomous relations of club meetings. This is perhaps so because mutuality is not a committed relationship. Everyone at the party interacted as individuals, each choosing to remember or ignore the relations of authority present at other times. There was no shared focus and no steps made toward solidarity action at the party.

At the next regular meeting of the club there was some indication that the mutual responsiveness of the party was carried over. During the meeting, some groups of people carried on their own conversations (mutuality) so that the focus of the meeting was not shared. When the president first asked if the club would accept a challenge by the geology club to a volleyball game, there was no responsiveness from the group. The president repeated the question and people began to respond. A show of hands was made for all who wanted to play. This was a break from the established pattern of interaction within the club. It could be interpreted as internal solidarity action (talking about playing volleyball) moving to external solidarity action (committing through a show of hands an intent to play ball); or as an accountable relation where functional identities are given to only those who committed themselves to play volleyball. No faculty members were present
at this meeting, so it is not possible to say whether the mutuality of the party or the absence of authority figures effected the interaction. The external solidarity action never materialized and the anthropology club never took up the challenge of the geology club.

IV. EXPLANATION OF WHY THE ANTHROPOLOGY CLUB EXHIBITED AN AUTHORITY RELATION AND NOT A SOLIDARITY RELATION

So far this paper has dealt only with the forms of relations observed, and has not attempted to explain how these came into being and are perpetuated. I had presumed the club would take a form of solidarity, but since it hadn't, I was at a loss to explain why not. I held the belief that the purpose of the anthropology club was for one and all to pursue and share their interest in anthropology and that anyone present at a meeting would have the same opportunities and rights to do so.

Since the form of the club, for the most part, was authoritarian or accountable, an unequal distribution of power existed and a political structure can therefore be said to exist (Bailey 1969:12). Structure, in Bailey's terms, "is a set of rules about behavior: these rules list the rights and duties of particular roles" (1969:10). A political structure, using terms drawn from game theory, then "...contains rules about prizes, personnel, leadership (teams), competition and control" (Bailey 1969:20). Bailey makes a distinction between contract teams, in which membership is for a gain or profit, and moral teams, in which members are committed to an ideal or leader (1969:28). Most importantly, leadership in moral teams is through the manipulation of symbols (Bailey 1969:83).
So, to begin an explanation of why the club exhibited the forms of relations it did, the reason for the existence of the club seemed to exist in an authoritarian context, while the justification for the club's existence was egalitarian or in the form of solidarity. Barthes' (1957) use of myth as depoliticized speech can be applied to this situation. While he used the concept of depoliticizing of myth to explain acceptance by the bourgeoisie of the myth of freedom of opportunity, when none really exists, it can also be applied to a university system in which a definite class system does exist and there is a scarcity of rewards. These are not the material objects of production, in an economic sense, but are "capital of the mind"—an idea developed by Alain Touraine (cited in Sennett and Cobb 1972:184). The myth perpetuated in American universities is that all have an equal chance to achieve higher status through their mental abilities.

But how are these mental abilities to be evaluated? There can be no higher statuses, no upward mobility, if all are equal. So, a few "elite" must be separated from the masses, and to do so, "badges of ability" (Sennett and Cobb 1972) are bestowed on the select few at the expense of the many. This is done by those in authority in the university who act as judges or umpires in what Bailey (1969) refers to as moral teams. Rewards, then, are not objects, but statuses, and leadership in this type of political group is through the manipulation of symbols.

Symbols can also be seen as values. F. Barth (1966) has explained how values can come to be shared by a group—-that is, how group consensus is formed. Assuming that individuals only engage in transactions that will give them greater reward than what they lose, in order to minimize their losses in a transaction,
they will look towards the experience of others rather than make a trial-and-error decision on their own, and in this way individuals "collectively grope towards a consistency of values" (Barth 1966:14). It becomes logical to follow what has been done by those already wearing "badges of ability" -- those in authority -- who can then easily impose their values on their subordinates.

Sennett feels that in American society today, a person is "subject to a scheme of values that tells him he must validate the self in order to win other's respect and his own" (1972:75), and he must turn to those in authority to do so.

... the more a person becomes emotionally involved in rewards from higher authority, the more dependent he becomes on someone else who is not a comrade for the things that give him self-respect (Sennett and Cobb 1972:197).

Sennett would then see the prime motivation for receiving rewards not in materialistic goods but in validation of the self via the shared values of a society, in the case of the university, recognition from authorities by way of degrees, grades, etc. The idea that all men are equal, then, can be regarded as a myth when it is manipulated at this level of abstraction since at the more specific level of university sorting, people are in no way equal. Myth, then, can be manipulated and symbolized as a value, or as Barthes puts it, "Myth is a value" (1957:123). It works to sustain the system in that the observed differences between individuals must be due to the fault of the individual, not the system, therefore making him doubt his self-worth, remain passive, give up, etc. (Sennett and Cobb 1972:256). For the system to remain believable, the individual's "injured dignity served a purpose in maintaining the legitimacy of a reward system that cannot deliver on its promises" (Sennett and Cobb 1972:155). Through badges of
ability the few gain dignity while the masses lose it and the few legitimize their power.

In other words, within the anthropology club, not being given a badge of ability such as receiving a reward, being elected an officer, receiving good grades, or being a faculty member, etc., is the individual's own fault, and he doesn't have the right to make his viewpoints known. He is not an equal and can't enter into a solidarity relationship. In a group he remains autonomous. But in such situations as parties, he is less likely to do so because there is no projected future and there are no differentiated functional identities. A laboratory experiment which attempted to isolate factors contributing to behaviors observed in groups where cohesiveness was based on either personal attractiveness, desire to perform a specific task or goals, or on prestige, reported

If cohesiveness was based on group prestige, group members tried to risk as little as possible to endanger their status: they acted cautiously, concentrated on their own actions, and adjusted to their partners as the social environment. One partner would easily assume a dominant role, and the submissive member was influenced more, without their actually trying to establish this relationship (Back 1958:197).

In regards to motivation, it is helpful to remember Bailey's distinction between contract teams where followers agree to support a leader in turn for a certain reward, and moral teams, whose members are morally committed to an ideal or a leader (1969:28). I would argue that the university system makes students members of a contract team. They compete for grades, diplomas, etc., while the faculty don't have to prove their worth in this way, at least to their students, and view the situation as participation in a moral team. The faculty see their reward in the good of anthropology, for their department, for the
student's own good, and other altruisms. It must be remembered that these are idealized types and in reality many forms of relations and teams can be seen to exist simultaneously.

There does seem to be agreement among some researchers, such as F. Barth and Couch, that there is a "developmental primacy of action over institutionalized value" (Barth 1966:16), meaning that repeated action must first precede acceptance of values and symbols and that a lack of consistency in shared values results from a failure of transactions to take place.

Within both moral and contract teams, Bailey states that

...there have been several anthropological studies which show how rituals which symbolize and reinforce common religious values are performed when men are beginning to show too much concern for their own personal interests and to quarrel with one another over the distribution of material benefits.

Under certain conditions, when his followers are beginning to look too closely at the balance-sheet of their relationship with the leader, it is a sensible tactic for him not to use his resources to reward the dissatisfied followers, but to stage a ritual of collective solidarity, which, hopefully, served to renew his long-term credit remain in legitimate control (1969:44-5).

The faculty want to instill their value system, their idea of a moral team, onto the students. Yet just wanting to do so is not enough. Through symbols such as seating arrangements, beginning discussions and applause, etc., faculty members make known that they are in control. This is an ambiguous situation; it needs to be "naturalized" in Barthes' terms.

This may be the reason why the faculty pushes for the preservation of the anthropology club: it is a ritual attesting to the "solidarity relationship" of all participants when, in fact, it is their very knowledge that such a relationship doesn't exist. This is the depoliticizing of myth Barthes talks of, the erasing
of signs of power and inequality, the naturalization of the existing order. The myth is perpetuated to hold the existing social structure together and at the same time the social structure perpetuates the myth. This idea, better expressed by Geertz, is that "models of" and "models for" patterns of behavior are inter-transposable (1965:208). "In ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined [fused] under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world" (Geertz 1965:213). F. Barth uses the same notion of circularity to insert a feedback concept which allows for slight changes over time in both social structure and symbolic system to be inter-related.

In summary, like Barthes, Geertz sees cultural patterns as symbolic systems and these symbols "deal with bafflement, pain, and moral paradox by synthesizing a peoples' ethos and their world view" (Lessa and Vogt 1965:205).
REFERENCES


