This issue of the Lambda Alpha Journal of Man is comprised of a series of papers presented by Lambda Alpha members and faculty at Wichita State University in a seminar concerned with the relevance of anthropology today. Included is a paper by Dr. Harry Oxley, visiting professor from the University of Sydney, Australia.
A word about manuscripts

Papers submitted to the Lambda Alpha Journal of Man for publication should be typed double-spaced on non-corrasable paper following the pattern established in the American Anthropologist.

All references to literature must be correctly documented with the author's name, date of publication, and the page number, e.g. (Smith 1969:340).

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In the month of July, 1970 the mass media carried the story of the "tiger cage" prison at Con Son, South Vietnam. The revelation that political prisoners were being subjected to inhumane treatment by a political regime operating largely with the economic, political and military support of the United States shocked a substantial number of American citizens. What was perhaps more shocking was a series of statements by high level governmental officials in the United States that we should withhold our condemnation of the Saigon Government's prison methods because they were dictated by its own value system and not by ours. In other words, Americans were asked to sanction inhumane treatment of political prisoners because it was acceptable procedure in a society where life is supposedly "cheap" and brutality is more common and therefore more excusable.

Few anthropologists hearing this line of reasoning would not recognize that it was basically an employment of a very well established principle of anthropology - cultural relativism - once more being used to soften public reaction to certain kinds of objectionable behavior operating in a culture whose value is very different from our own.

The dilemma of determining what is "right" and what is "wrong" is, of course, frequently difficult within our own culture, but when such evaluation must cross cultural lines it
becomes even more difficult. Not too many years ago most anthropologists would have accepted the principle that the prison methods of the Saigon government were their own business and as good objective scientists they would have felt that it was quite proper to consider such behavior acceptable within the Vietnamese value system. Today, however, relatively few anthropologists would dismiss Con Son cruelty on the grounds of cultural relativism and this would lead one to suspect that perhaps it is time for a re-evaluation of this concept which has dwelt for so long near the heart of American anthropological theory.

While the idea of relativism has been around for a very long time in philosophical thought, the concept of cultural relativism as formulated by social scientists first came into fashion some fifty years ago when William Graham Sumner, in his book *Folkways* (1906), shocked his contemporaries by maintaining that even such practices as infanticide, headhunting, slavery, cannibalism, human sacrifice and religious prostitution were completely understandable in terms of certain cultural settings. Since they represented adaptations to particular circumstances these customs must be honored as justified and acceptable in an objective, scientific sense. A generation later, another champion of cultural relativism, Melville J. Herskovits, stressed that all cultures should be accorded equal dignity and be considered equally valid in spite of any customs which we as "civilized" Westerners might object to on the basis of our own code of ethics and morality. It was under the
chairmanship of Herskovits that the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association drew up the following statement on cultural relativism for the United Nations in 1947.

1. The individual realizes his personality through his culture: hence respect for individual differences entails a respect for cultural differences.

2. Respect for differences between cultures is validated by the scientific fact that no technique of qualitatively evaluating cultures has been discovered.

3. Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive, so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole.

Few anthropologists educated in America have had much quarrel with the general tenets of cultural relativism. Some have gone much farther in accepting the implications of the concept than others, however. For some it has merely represented a warning to seek local definitions for and attitudes toward the customs of the people they are studying in the field. Others have accepted cultural relativism as an edict to "live and let live", but others have gone the whole route, claiming that cultures practicing headhunting, cannibalism, infanticide, etc., were just as honorable as those which didn't and that no one had a right to condemn any form of behavior practiced by any people as long as their society sanctioned it.

While I believe that cultural relativism is a valuable tool in training students to study foreign cultures with an open mind, and while I believe that all societies could profit from a
little less ethnocentrism and a more tolerant attitude toward other peoples who are racially or culturally different, I cannot bring myself to respect "tiger cages", human torture or organized slaughter of human beings just because it is a cultural tradition of the people perpetrating these atrocities. Neither am I willing to accept My Lais, the collecting of Viet Cong ears as trophies or the pushing of prisoners of war from helicopters just because war is hell and it therefore has a moral code all its own.

As an anthropologist who has been trained in a discipline which values all human life, champions the underdog and applauds the cultural developments of prehistory which made man's life more secure and more comfortable I cannot bring myself to turn my back on human suffering or view death with a calloused eye in the name of cultural relativism.

Like Robert Redfield, I find that I simply cannot "look neutrally at the ideas that move history toward a more humane ideal and practice. I have placed myself squarely on the side of mankind and have not shamed to wish mankind well." (1953:141)

To a great extent the view which I have expressed above is shared by many other anthropologists today and has resulted in the condemnation of Project Camelot, the American Anthropological Association's Vietnam resolution and a growing body of published statements such as that of Stanley Diamond which appeared in the "Letters" section of the March 1, 1968 issue of Science. Here Diamond stated his objection to the idea of a value-free anthropology wherein scholars must only play the
role of the disinterested specialist whose loyalty is only to his methodology. "If anthropology is a science," writes Diamond, "it is a moral science," and it is the duty of the anthropologists, since we lay claim to great insight into the nature of human events, to take on the responsibility of helping to promote the survival and the cultural development of the human species.

Anthropologists have often excused their lack of effectiveness in finding solutions to human problems on the fact that anthropology is still a young science. We have said that we haven't found many answers but that we have asked some darn good questions. It is true that anthropology is a young science, but it will continue to exhibit the immaturity of youth until it develops a basis for moral and ethical judgment on a cross-cultural basis. We must establish a standard upon which to base criticism of those forms of human behavior which threaten man as a species or do him violence either physically or mentally. Like the "phony white liberal" who continues to claim that he likes all blacks (presumably because they are black) anthropology continues to like all cultures and all practices therein either because they were created by the "noble savage" or merely because they exist. Valuing all cultures equally is as unrealistic as other forms of stereotyping. Unless we have the courage and ingenuity to develop a yard stick for evaluating cultures we cannot judge the adequacy of any given culture to meet the needs and aspirations of its participants. Some cultures work better than others in sustaining human life and
promoting the human condition. Why are we afraid to say so? Native peoples are not only objects for study, they are human beings and they insist upon being treated as such. They insist upon being accepted or rejected as individuals who differ from one another in personality and behavior. Why can't we approach the multiplicity of cultures on the same basis? It is not enough that anthropologists classify and analyze cultural behavior; they must be critics of it as well.

One of the first fallacies we must rid ours of is that we are objective scientists who work in a value-free discipline. We have never been objective in our approach to primitive man and his culture. The idea that primitive man should be spared contamination by Western civilization has been a widely held notion for years and some anthropologists would even be happy to promote the idea of "human zoos" where primitive cultures could be isolated, untouched by the tainted hands of civilization. This is no more of an objective position than those conceived and carried out by AID people who openly admit they are in the business of changing people. The judgment that people should be left alone for their own good is clearly a subjective one. Many anthropologists (who are as delighted with the comforts and security of civilization as anyone) seem to have decided that the introduction of air conditioners, central heating and modern medicine would be degrading to all other peoples in the world except themselves.

Murdock (1965) has pointed out that the prevailing theory of cultural change has rested on the assumption that every
culture consists of learned behavior and thought that is transmitted with few modifications from one generation to the next. It implies that cultures have a kind of inertia that makes elements persist unless actively impeded or counteracted. He suggests that a better view would be that elements are supported by their success in meeting human needs. The contents of a culture are therefore cultural elements which have been tested or are being tested and found to be the best under prevailing conditions. One of these conditions is, of course, the state of knowledge.

It is naive to assume that the traits making up any culture are the best assemblage of traits possible. They represent only the best combination of traits that the members of the society have conceived of or have had the opportunity to borrow from other societies. With increased contact with other peoples, which normally results in expanded knowledge, many of the traits formerly considered adequate will be dropped in favor of more satisfying ones to which a society has been exposed. Many inhumane customs are continued, not because they are the best possible solutions to their problems, but because within the limited knowledge of the members of a society they are the best solutions which have occurred to them. It is even possible that some customs have no positive value at all but came into being as a result of peculiar sets of abnormal circumstances and continue to be practiced out of force of habit and out of a lack of awareness of how unproductive they are. It is even possible that there are sick cultures, just as there are sick
human beings, and that customs which work against the comfort and survival of man are products of a kind of cultural psychosis which the society cannot itself heal.

The matter of evaluation of customs cross-culturally is, of course, not likely to be a simple matter. While many anthropologists would agree that human sacrifice and human torture must be condemned they would not agree that other customs that civilized people oppose - such as plural marriage and indigenous belief systems - are objectionable. The job of developing standards of moral judgment will be a difficult one but it should be possible to glean from the writing and traditions of hundreds of great thinkers of the East and West, of the primitive and the modern world, a code of behavior which will best meet man's physical, social and psychological needs. It must be a code based on humaneness, love, freedom of participation and the right to live without fear of pain or hunger. We must develop this universal standard of moral and ethical behavior and then honor those societies which follow it and condemn those (even our own) which choose to violate it. It is high time that anthropology sharpened its theoretical tools and cultivated its conscience. The two need not be antithetical.

References


This contribution to the symposium is much compressed, because it attempts to combine the outlines of two essays in one. The first part-essay argues that applied anthropology can never be very satisfactory until its theoretical armoury includes some notion of evolutionary sequence. The second part points out that the essential components of such a notion already exist, and it suggests some additions to them.

But first let me preface both parts with a brief note on the nature of applied science in general. Man cannot "control" nature; he can merely learn better ways of living with it. Applied science is an adaptive technique by which man makes the best of natural laws which are themselves immutable. Pure science discovers (more or less) what the laws are, and applied science is called in to save practical plan-makers from unwittingly "bucking the system". For this is the one system against which no reasonable man ever knowingly rebels.

People call for a "relevant" anthropology because they see great flaws in our socio-cultural systems, and would enlist the aid of the scientific approach in repairing them. All well and good; but we cannot ask of applied social sciences that they give us the utopias of our romantic dreams. For there to be any kind of anthropological science there must be natural laws subordinating all social facts - including the cultures of potential utopias. Future developments in the social sciences
may well assist in the achievement of some current dreams; but they are quite likely to condemn a large number of other dreams as unfeasible. Those who now demand that our discipline develops a stronger practical side may yet come to curse it as a "dismal science" and wish they had kept their beliefs in the magic of noble intentions.

The question of practically relevant anthropology has given rise to two mutually exclusive fears. The first fear is that such anthropology will never be, and that we are doomed to eternity in an ivory tower. The second is that such anthropology is very present already, and a potential danger should it fall into the wrong hands; a complication here is the fact that anthropologists have no objective criteria for deciding which hands are the right ones.

It would be no great task to allay the first fear; the second is better founded. Usefulness and purity do not go together; practical ideas, like good iron, are as useful to the maker of swords or gyves as to the maker of ploughshares. But I think my later argument will have something to say on this question in particular.

Part 1. The Need for Evolutionism in Choosing Ends.

It is sometimes said that anthropologists can properly give advice on means but not on ends. On this view we could tell one group how to further a peasant revolt or another group how to stop one; but we could not give ourselves professional advice on which side should be supported. Advice, yes - professional advice based soundly in theory, no.
The view is time-honoured. Its supporting argument is that social scientists, cultural relativists all, cannot make "ethical" judgements during working hours. Anthropologists, it is said, can only weigh ends as moral "human beings". Such notions have the dual advantage of sounding very objective while saving our own pet socio-political prejudices from any rigorous investigation.

For, in effect, the view represents intellectual surrender to a compound of blind faith, fears, self-interest, delusion and sentimentality. It says that human affairs are, in the final analysis, guided by things other than reason. Which seems strange coming from social scientists.

Other professionals can more or less legitimately duck responsibility for the social consequences of their actions. Medical training does not qualify a doctor to judge whether the life he saves were better lost. There is nothing in higher mathematics or nuclear physics to say whether the institutions protected by an atom bomb are worth the cost. We may say that the doctor and physicist should concern themselves with these questions as men; but we cannot claim that they ought to do so as specialists.

In anthropology we have no such excuse. The specialists in human values and needs and beliefs and morals and strivings toward collective betterment - in historical and comparative perspective - are us. Us. If there is any rational answer as to what "ought" to be done between man and man it is we who can legitimately be called on to give it. And we cannot escape by
saying that there is no rational answer to such questions unless we can defend that view itself on scientific grounds - which we cannot do.

But now, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that we could formulate a concept of overall direction in institutional change. Such concepts are in fact the things which enable faith-holders to judge among ends. For us the concept would have to be tentative, testable and based squarely on observation. It would solve some difficulties:

(1) The problem of the means/ends difference would disappear. Ends would themselves appear as "means" - means of adaptation or of futile opposition to the laws of change. Therefore we could say more than "Thus you build your house"; we could (if necessary) add "But here it will get in the way of future developments and will have to be demolished before your children can inherit it." Or: "We can show you how to keep this structure going past its time but, if we do, it will inevitably fall on the heads of your descendents." We would be judging ends not in terms of ethics but in terms of a broader view of practicalities.

(2) We could forecast future problems and thus make possible some sort of preparations. We could sound warnings before events.

In fact, members of the "intelligentsia" (including professional anthropologists) are very prone to undertake both these tasks. And they base their arguments on extrapolations from the past into the future; in their common-rooms and parties and on their political platforms they are often unashamed evolutionists. I ask that their assumptions be brought out into the light, ruthlessly purified by argument, cast in testable form and carried into the formal workshop of social science.

Anthropology, specifically concerned with cross-cultural
existence they are of central importance. (Finnegan, p. 20)

The most common folklore are tales about Kanu, twins, heroes and animals, mainly spider. Morals are not an integral feature of the stories, but merely one of several stylistic devices used to bring them to a fitting conclusion. (Finnegan, p. 29)

Stories of people and heroes offer the greatest range for innovation and variation by individual story-tellers. One of the most common figures here is that of the hunter. He is given special powers for it takes a long time to train to be proficient. He is an important, if somewhat mysterious, person in reality as in the stories. Twins are frequently the central characters, and are commonly believed to also possess special powers. They are always shown as acting together and helping each other. (Finnegan, p. 33)

Limbatales cannot be classified as myths for they do not form any systematic theology, philosophy or mythology. Stories of origins are not taken seriously when they do appear. Even Kanu stories are light, not told at prescribed occasions or are in any way associated with a ritual. What is often described in Kanu or origin stories is a detached generalization about the relation and purposes of present human society.

Animal stories are the most popular, marked by humor and sometimes obscenity. The most common character is Spider, who is depicted as stupid, gluttonous, selfish and irresponsible, consistently outdone by his wife. The relation between him and his wife represent everything that is wrong or opposite in reality. Occasionally Spider is the cunning trickster who outwits larger animals. There are a few other animals with stock characteristics; the antelope, small, shy,
many primitive societies which show incomparable adaptation to their own particular ecological niches.

The classical writers seem agreed upon an evolutionary trend in role structures which could be summed up in more modern concepts. In terms of Parsons' original formulation of the "pattern variables", there is a tendency to change relative stress from ascription to achievement, from particularism to universalism and from diffuseness to specificity. In terms of Banton's distinctions (M. Banton: Roles), there is a change in stress from the "basic" role to the "independent" and "general" roles. G. and M. Wilson (Social Change, 1945) have suggested certain necessary cultural concomitants of such changes.

Later writers have strengthened these theoretical foundations but have not made any major structural additions. I wish to suggest the form which such additions might profitably take. For argumentative convenience I put my plans forward as answers to potential anti-evolutionist objections.

There are two main objections to the idea of an overall evolutionary trend; they are as follows:

(1) Changes often appear to show cycles rather than consistent direction. Civilizations fall as well as rise.

(2) Modern society, as other large-scale societies, has many sub-structures which by any evolutionary criteria appear "primitive". Patron-client ties, "old boy networks" and so on, exhibit a high degree of diffuseness and of particularism.

With regard to the first objection, we note a similarity between the processes of social evolution and of economic development under unregulated capitalism. In the latter case
we had, most notably in the pre-Keynesian era, a series of marked booms and slumps; each slump showed a relative lowering of the economic-activity level, but each boom showed a higher level than the last one. Thus economic development could have been illustrated as an upward-tending line, but the line would have been violently wavy rather than straight. So does it seem to be with the evolution of civilization - and thus we see that the broad evolutionist scheme gives a "long-term" rather than a "short-term" analysis.

Our short-term analysis is still to be attached; but, by analogy with economics, there is a clearly suggested approach to its making. Keynes explained the economic cycle largely in terms of two factors necessary to development (savings and investment) getting out of phase with one another. It seems quite possible that something similar happens in the evolution of societies; that two or more partially independent factors (such as, say, economy and ideology) tend to get out of phase. Pareto's cyclical theory could be seen as saying something like this. The idea seems worth following up; a multidimensional model of evolutionary process may well offer more than the uni-dimensional approach of either materialism or idealism.

To deal with the second objection I call in first of all a distinction between ideology and reality. The evolutionary trend applies both to ideologies and to realities but, I suggest, it is more noticeable in the former. Thus in modern society we have more nepotism and more stress on the importance of kinship succession than we pretend to have. I postulate a
universal tendency to "reality lag".

Secondly I call on Eric Wolf's distinction between "formal" structures and the "interstitial" groupings which seek to manipulate, circumvent or live within them. Patron-client ties and old-boy networks are examples of "interstitial" groupings. It is these interstitial groupings which show the greatest structural similarities to the primitive societies. I suggest therefore that the evolutionary trend does not apply to all structures in societies but primarily to the major formal structures.

There is a clear biological analogy to this last point. The human organism as a whole is a high-point in biological evolution, but some of its organs and many of its cell types do not differ much from their counterparts in lower life-forms. What can be said about the greater system does not necessarily hold good for all the component sub-systems.

I note that I bring in these three distinctions, (short-term/long-term, ideology/reality, and formal/interstitial) to improve the evolutionist model and make it workable. I do not introduce them as a "last-ditch stand" to patch up illogicalities. In fact I find them very useful in explaining the details of the reason why evolution takes the form it does; and mere hole-patching does not make a utensil better than new. But this essay is not the proper place to pursue such questions. A prima facie case for evolutionism's feasibility was all that was required, and this I have attempted to give.

I would go so far as to say that the promise of evolutionism for applied anthropology is great enough for those dubious
about its validity to give it a second look. If it is wrong, and I am wrong, it is of no use. Good practice can only be built on good theory.
Wayne Parris

There is a widely accepted view that conflict is a part of the biological heritage of *Homo sapiens*, a view strengthened by recent popularized publications on aggression and territoriality. These publications by stressing the biological relationship of *Homo sapiens* to other primates, both living and fossil, present an incomplete view of the hominid evolution towards a bio-cultural organism. Growing out of the same primate relationships are social mechanisms leading to the reduction of aggression and in which cooperation and similar actions are surely as adaptive as are hostility and aggression.

Even if the "innate" or "instinctive" characteristics of hostility and aggression were admitted, other similar "drives", "needs", and the like, such as hunger, sleep, sex, while biological in origin, are without exception culturally conditioned by all human groups. Thus, aggression is always subject to social conditioning, and numberless ethnographic examples verify this. In most "primitive" societies, hostility to the point of annihilation is rare, and even killing is either infrequent or conditioned by ritual elements.

The conclusion that must be reached is that war, especially in the modern context, is a cultural artifact, that it is learned behavior, as is all culture. If learned, it can be unlearned, i.e., changed. Since social and cultural changes never take place simplistically, but always within the total context of
society, it would seem that anthropology could contribute much by studying how group patterns of hostility affect and are affected by the total structure of society, and how change might be directed to lead to reduction of hostility. Devices to intensify hostility are notoriously effective, affecting the same mechanisms that would be used to reduce hostility. In other words, change can occur in either direction.

In Homo sapiens culture is the most unique adaptive trait. Culture is as "natural" to Homo sapiens as are bipedalism, erectness, digital dexterity and other biological traits. If by culture, Homo sapiens has developed the massive patterns of aggression seen in modern war, and which threaten to lead to annihilation of the species, it is by culture that these will be changed. As a discipline which claims culture as its subject material, the relevance of anthropology to the problems of international conflict is most obvious.
According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary the word relevance means "bearing upon, or applying to, the case in hand; pertinent. Relevant implies a traceable and significant connection." With this definition in mind I feel that I can discuss more intelligently the proposition of the relevance or significance of anthropology.

Anthropology, as the study of human society, should be in a position to aid in the problems of the 20th century. Problems of cultural diversity, lack of understanding, and the most basic of all problems, that of effective communications, are all within the range of anthropology. This is not to say that anthropologists alone have all the answers to the problems of our world, but they at least understand the necessity of knowing the cultural values of interacting parties.

How does the above relate to the practices of cultural and biological genocide that is being practiced by various political bodies of the world? First, the conflicts that exist must be understood. Second, understanding and cooperation must be introduced into the areas of the greatest social priorities, those that allow or help each to maintain their strengths while seeking resolution to their common problems. One, however, must acknowledge that to do this an impartial cultural inventory of the participants and analysis of the needs must take place. The dominant set of values must not in this case override or be permitted to dominate the investigation of the whole.
Rarely, however, does the dominant power allow an unbiased investigation, for the investigation does not define the position of the MOST FAVORED STATE, that position used by major powers for continuation of their dominance.

*Atlas*, January 1970, described, complete with photographs, the practice of genocide being used by the Brazilian Government and many other "interested persons". How was this disclosure treated by the major Western powers? In most instances, it was not treated at all. There was an official U.S. protest, according to this article. But there was no official sanction taken against Brazil. Why not? The real reason is that the U.S. and other major powers of the West, Great Britain and France, are guilty of the same types of transgressions. Further, it would not have been in the interests of these powers to chastise Brazil, as they might lose part of the economic market they have in Latin America.

Anthropologists do not, traditionally, take a stand or involve themselves in "ethical" or "moral" issues. Is this because they are merely recorders of facts about various cultures? Do they lack sensitivity, or are they trained so that they can take in stride the constant barrage of antihumanitarian acts without so much as a raised eye-brow. Are these acts so unimportant that they do not find their way into the field notes of these same observers?

In November, 1968, a copy of the open letter of protest that was sent to the president of Brazil was printed in *Current Anthropology*. Reaction seemed to be minimal. The United States
made their symbolic protest, and the government of Brazil made a minor investigation. But nothing happened as a response. There is another point of interest. What about the anthropologists who have been working in Brazil in recent years? Why have we not heard from them? Are their hot-house cultures so important that they cannot see what is happening to them and, further, to their "special" people. Or is it that they are more interested in their own esoteric investigations?

A close parallel to the above situation is found in the recent incident at My Lai, as described in Transaction, March, 1970. Yet this case is not the same. Public opinion in the U.S. does not see U.S. involvement as being the same cultural and biological genocide as that occurring in Brazil. I personally view them as being the same. However, one does not have to look halfway around the world to find these practices. Consider the Native Americans and the Blacks!

Problems stated without considerations for solutions are of no value today. We have enough problems, and an excess of rhetoric to accompany these problems. But rhetoric is not enough.

I frankly believe most contemporary anthropologists desire nothing more than their academic "ivory towers" and their "classroom rhetoric". This allows them to be more "objective" because of their lessened involvement. This is not to say that these anthropologists or their works are less significant or relevant. Webster's definition of relevance was "something that is pertinent or a traceable and significant connection."
So any aspect, regardless of how remote or esoteric, falls within the range or scope of "relevant" anthropology. This includes all, from archaeology to contemporary social anthropology.

I have no argument with the fore-stated position, but I feel personally and professionally that this is just the beginning or the basis for a much broader interpretation and participation in human culture. The archaeologist and all other varieties of anthropologists have a responsibility to a wider involvement than to just their own particular specialities, or their individual allegiances.

So we have a responsibility to help protect, and inform the rest of the world when we find programs of genocide or complete extermination. We must tell the world when we find abuse of other human beings, regardless of the oppressors. Nor can we stand in the way of change. For human museums are as abhorrent as is programmed destruction. We are not Gods, and we should not control other human lives. We must contribute to the state of peaceful interaction in this world.

Tomorrow will come even if anthropology ceases to exist altogether. But I do not want to live in a world devoid of the ameliorating effects of anthropology. Presently the possibilities of a universal ethic do not, in my opinion, exist. Should one ever be possible, I feel that it will be in response to the contributions made by anthropology. With this view of the world I believe that anthropology is extremely important to the future of the world. Yes, it is relevant.
The topic, "On the Teaching of Anthropology" is one which lends itself to a number of approaches. Teaching is the primary role of the anthropologist in American society. Although it is the means by which most anthropologists earn their money, or at any rate, it is the activity for which they are paid, the particular relationship between the anthropologist and his livelihood is generally ignored in the professional publications. Generally, anthropologists are given no formal training in educational methods and theory, and when the anthropologist confronts a classroom full of students, he is given no systematic prescription concerning just exactly what his role should be in the classroom, except for the fact that he knows that he is expected to somehow teach anthropology. The general classroom environment, although it is a common habitat of the anthropologist—the culture area in which the concepts of the discipline are transmitted and expanded from generation to generation—has seemingly been avoided as an area of anthropological research. The classroom is the social environment in which anthropologists are trained, and constitutes a microcosm of the larger cultural framework with which it is associated. Anthropologists, perhaps more than any others, are most acutely aware of the importance of learning. The culture model, the major conceptual framework of the anthropologist, is actually a model of the learning process, a model which demonstrates that human behavior can be analyzed most accurately as the result of specific and
measureable environmental factors. The literature on this subject indicates that while anthropologists are very knowledgeable concerning the factors of enculturation in non-western societies, there have been few systematic attempts to apply this knowledge or to expand it at home.

Perhaps the reason that theory and methods in education have been largely ignored by anthropologists lies in the fact that the relevance of such studies has never been firmly established. The key issue of the symposium for which this topic has been proposed is relevance, and it is my task to determine whether or not the topic of teaching is a relevant area within the discipline. The question of whether or not something is relevant is essentially the question, "How does it help us?", "What is its significance as a tool?" The general tone of this symposium has been one of extensive investigation and personal commitment concerning the relevance of anthropology in our contemporary world, with considerable attention being focused on a continuing discussion of the question, "What can we do, as anthropologists and students, to promote understanding between conflicting groups?" There is little doubt that in many American universities, students, teachers, administrators, and the general public constitute more or less conflicting groups. We have become increasingly aware of the magnitude of such a task, and we generally have found that anthropology in its present form is not equal to the expectations we associate with the study of these conflicts. We would like to believe that the anthropologist is qualified to be a "superman", a universal culture hero.
who, with his superior insight into human behavior, is capable of being a voice of reason in a world of crisis. It would definitely require, by present conceptions, superhuman effort by all anthropologists to alleviate present cultural crises of the contemporary world, and most anthropologists would probably admit that our discipline presently has no systematic prescription for anthropologists of this generation to follow in the area of human relations. In a shrinking world which escalates and intensifies cultural contact and conflict, it is not feasible to assume that the present generation of anthropologists, despite the presence of some truly gifted individuals, can save the world, if, indeed, it requires saving. It is in view of this perspective that the topic of education becomes powerfully relevant to anthropology. If we are not supermen, perhaps we can educate others to transcend our own inadequacies. This is an alternative which is no longer possible to ignore, and still claim relevance for our discipline. If Western culture is to become world culture, and there are implications that it may, it is crucial that anthropologists begin extensive investigation into their own cultures. The American classroom seems, to me, most in need of critical scrutiny. If we desire relevance in anthropology, a place to start would be our own classrooms.

In order for anthropologists to make their educational methods more relevant to their students, it is of primary importance that the teacher be aware of the general cultural make-up of those students. This necessity has been emphasized
in most anthropological publications on education, which generally sound a call for more extensive investigation in the learning environment in which anthropologists generally operate. In order to meet the needs for relevance in the discipline, it is necessary to take advantage of the classroom, the university, and the academic community as a legitimate area of field inquiry. To take advantage of this potential for using the classroom as a field, it is necessary to encourage dialogue and discourage monologue—the teacher must assume that something of value can be learned from the student. If anthropologists are willing to impart the right of self-determinism in effecting social change in non-western cultures as Sol Tax suggests, it seems inconsistent that we should deny this right to the students in our classrooms whose cultural make-up may be radically different from our own in many respects. Every educational technique which promotes coercion and deference between teacher and student is, in my opinion, one which is contrary to the aims of what education should be. It is my belief that monologue (as maintained by the lecture system) and comparison of student performances (which ignores the importance of individual and sub-cultural differences) are practices which need to be re-examined in terms of their educational and ethical implications. Anthropology, illustrating the immensely varied forms that human behavior manifests, can play a key role in revitalizing American education, and make possible the development of the kind of supermen we most need, men who are aware of their own conformities and differences, and who are capable of communicating this awareness to others.
Anthropologists have debated the idea of whether or not man is innately nasty or whether this is a learned characteristic universal to most, if not all men. Bohannan (1967:xii) would have us believe that conflict is both useful and necessary, although it must be controlled. Konrad Lorenz (1966:242-3) argues that a human equivalent of phylogenetically ritualized animal fights is needed. Ardrey (1961:318) states that "man is a biological invention evolved to suit the purpose of the weapon." Halloway (1968:35,36) speaks of man's aggression as adaptive to threats to his existence. Montagu (1968:16) refuses to accept the innate nastiness of man and suggests that there is no reason to suppose that conflict occurred before the development of agricultural-pastoral communities. Gorer (1968:32) states that evidence can be multiplied that man as a species "has no inhibitions against killing his fellow men who do not belong to the same pack."

But despite theories and rhetoric, many intellectuals, including anthropologists, are alarmed at the technological progress that has been achieved for the purpose of destruction and the lack of concomitant progress in devising methods to resolve these conflicts that threaten to engulf the human race. The topic has come to resemble the old cliche about the weather: everyone talks about it, but no one does anything about it.

Anthropologists, of course, have written about the problem. Berreman (1968:393) quotes both Gouldner and Chomsky to rally
support for anthropology to abandon the "myth of a value-free social science" and to accept their responsibilities: technology is not value-free. He quotes Wilhelm's charge that "ethical neutrality is a veneer for irresponsibility." Although the power of the pen is not to be despised, I don't believe that these rallying calls can substitute for the kind of action that is needed today.

Anthropologists have of course passed resolutions denouncing racism, expressing opposition to the inhumanity and cruelty of both napalm and other bombing in the Vietnam war, and spent invective on traders, officials and missionaries who lack cross-cultural insight and who are hopelessly bogged down in varying degrees of ethnocentricism. We have bemoaned the genocide perpetrated on native Americans in North America in the past, and still practiced in some areas of South America. It is also true that some anthropologists have spent time and energy to improve the treatment given to minority people. But in spite of these exceptions it is my impression that verbiage is the rule, and action the exception as a method of expressing our concerns about bigotry and exploitation.

Not all anthropologists agree that as a discipline we have any responsibility beyond recording facts we observe. As intellectuals, as specialists in the study of man, and as members of the human family, I think we should concur with the opinions expressed so well by C. Wright Mills about our responsibility:

"Everytime intellectuals have the chance to speak yet do not speak, they join the forces that train men not to be able to think and imagine and feel in morally and
politically adequate ways. When they do not demand that the secrecy that makes elite decisions absolute and unchallengeable be removed, they too are part of the passive conspiracy to kill off public scrutiny. When they do not speak, when they do not demand, when they do not think and feel and act as intellectuals - and so as public men - they too contribute to the moral paralysis, the intellectual rigidity, that now grip both leaders and led around the world." (1960:151)

But the responsibility to speak out and to dissent is only one facet of the kind of action we might take, and is only indirectly related to the problems of conflict. We have, in the United States, large populations who have suffered through the discriminatory practices of the majority for centuries. The blacks have, in recent years, brought their case dramatically to the attention, if not to the conscience, of the American people. The case of the native American and the Spanish-American is still largely unheard. Is anthropology not in a position to give some guidance and leadership in finding solutions to these problems? What processes can be invoked that will reconcile man with man when exploitation has divided and hatred has polarized them into positions that appear to be feeding upon themselves from crisis to crisis?

As a relative newcomer to the field of anthropology, I must admit that I have but a short acquaintance with a portion of the theoretical work that has been published. But I have not come across any theory which addresses itself to the problem of how the wounds that fester as a result of racial and class exploitation can best be healed. Marx calls for revolution, which will destroy, rather than cure. Christianity says love God and neighbor, but on the other hand, the greater part of
Christianity has repudiated the teachings of Christ and blesses Christians for killing rather than denouncing them. In any event, anthropologists have, by and large, written off the Christian message as a viable solution to the problems of man. But in this time of spreading conflict, there is an urgent need for a method which will effectively bring a reconciliation.

In my opinion, there are two ingredients necessary for reconciliation. One of these is that the wronged party be given an effective forum to air his grievances; the other is that a method for restitution to the wronged party be instituted. Anthropology has studied conflict in many cultures; we have observed how conflicts are perpetuated or resolved, or when a truce is called; how these methods have been used or disregarded by many diverse peoples, from the Eskimos and their song duels to the courts of the Ashanti. The American courts are designed to settle disputes and to administer justice impartially. But the current record of the American judicial system demonstrates that it is inadequate for conflict resolution in many of today's stress situations. When it deals with riots, rioters and the National Guard, chances are that the judicial process will incite more riots instead of resolving conflict. Does not the study of man include a quest for the answer to this problem? Are there any methods of restitution, any principles for reconciliation, that anthropologists could propose to the nation? If the anthropological study of conflict does not address itself to these stress and conflict problems at home, it can hardly be deemed to be a relevant
science in today's world.

America, of course, does not hold a monopoly on conflict. Conflict is generated on the basis of at least two movements, both of which should be of concern, and within the realm of competency of anthropological theory. One of these is the rise of nationalism and the conflictual interests of tribalism and other ethnic groups in many of the nations of the 'third world'. The other is the movement, often by revolutionary means, towards a more equitable distribution of economic resources.

Both of these movements are influenced by the American presence, whether it involves the U. S. Marines, the U. S. diplomatic corps, the foreign aid program or U. S. private enterprise. The record of American involvement indicates a good deal less altruism than appears on the surface, a great many more benefits to private American enterprise than is usually acknowledged, and a surprising amount of naivete and ethnocentricism on the part of Americans abroad. Instead of alleviating conflict, American policy seems often to have provided an incendiary spark to a stressful situation. If anthropology has expertise in fathoming and interpreting the functioning of "primitive" nations, their economies, their loyalties and their dreams for the future, then I believe it should provide guidance and, where necessary, ruthless criticism of government and private industry in their approach to these situations.

If anthropology were to address itself to these problems, and if some practical solution to the conflictual situation
existing in the nation and in the world should be developed, a procedural problem would still exist. Should anthropologists coyly sit on the sidelines like wallflowers at the dance, or should they brazenly, with loud emphatic voices proclaim their expertise to government and industry who may not even recognize their own needs?

In my opinion, we do not have the time, nor do we have the moral right to sit back and wait to be asked to the next dance while America and the world burns. The only excuse for quietly classifying burins and end scrapers to the nth millimeter and not addressing ourselves to current conflict situations is that these problems are outside the realm of anthropology. And if this is so, then let us also frankly admit that anthropology is not relevant in today's world.
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Characteristically, the scientist has been primarily concerned with the description of observed phenomena, and the maintenance of a neutral position when an evaluative interpretation of his data is required. This sterile goal is similarly represented in the discipline of anthropology as a major requirement for those of the profession. Thus, to support and clarify this position, a concept has been adopted which was formally introduced by W. G. Sumner in 1906: Cultural Relativism. Other than reaffirming and elaborating upon Sumner's definition, the concept had not been seriously appraised until quite recently. Therefore, the doctrine of cultural relativism should be examined, for though it has contributed to the descriptive approach of our profession, it has done little to promote the relevance and the pertinence of the discipline.

Of the many definitions for cultural relativism, Herskovits has given us one of the most detailed and qualified accounts. In summary, he states that judgements are found to be attributable to the experiences which individuals have, and these experiences differ with each culture and its participants. Therefore, the evaluations of a particular society are valid only within the context and influence of its culture; and are relative only to the cultural background from which they are derived. Further, this relativity includes the facts of the physical world which are perceived through the same
"enculturative screen" as are values. (Herskovits 1967:48-9). Thus, from this definition, any statement which would claim to be of an absolute nature would be invalid, for all experiences are conditioned through a cultural looking glass.

Upon appraisal, the above definition is, in itself, quite limiting and may produce some rather unsatisfactory situations. Among these, one finds that the thesis, by its own description, should not be considered as valid outside of the confines of the culture within which it was formulated. (The thesis is the product of one particular cultural frame of reference: the democratic thought of Western society.) Further, the facts established by the physical sciences of our Western world (as well as, the facts which are derived from a cross-cultural ethnographic study) are invalid simply because such data is relative only to its respective cultural context! Such embarrassing situations, however, are methodological problems and not the focal point of this paper, though it should be obvious that a definitional structure of this nature cannot lend itself to the production of a sound theory which may be readily used by anthropologists.

As for the intent of the cultural relativism doctrine, the surface presents itself as being applicable to modern situations with which the anthropologist may be confronted, for the concept bespeaks of tolerance and understanding for the values and beliefs of other peoples and cultures. As a result, an impression is given that the values of tolerance and understanding are an universally accepted phenomena, and are the answer to
"the ills of mankind." In promoting this view, however, two very significant situations are ignored. First, the historical frame of reference of some cultures is not recognized, for there may be no prior basis for the inferred value of variety or the need for respect. Thus, the acceptance of such a concept of cultural relativism and its proposals would be highly unfeasible and virtually unacceptable for them. Secondly, in asking for tolerance, the concept may become inapplicable in situations outside of the laboratory. When faced with such atrocities as those of Nazi Germany or Brazil, the anthropologist may rely on his "citizen" culture, and denounce his discipline, which claims to be the "study and understanding of man."

Unquestionably, if his study and its facts in reference to relativism are valid, he should not find it necessary to abandon them. If he does, the discipline to which he adheres must be classified as nothing more than a myth and purely irrelevant.

As a final point of criticism, cultural relativism tends to do little more than promote the status quo. When deduced to a simple statement, the intent of its position may read as follows: "What is, is good." To be objective, and delete the statement's tolerant implications, it would merely state: "What is, is." If this be the case, then our science has not moved forward in the least. In holding such a position, one will find it difficult to deal with the phenomena of change in cross-cultural situations. (Herskovits illustrates this very well when he can give no general statement about cultural dynamics, other than change occurs in a variety of ways.)
Thus, what the position of relativism promotes, is merely a sentimentalistic, naively optimistic, and prejudiced concept in relation to cultural change. (Bidney 1962:443) It calls for the preservation of nothing more than a number of human zoos which may be cultivated for the interests of a few inquisitive young anthropologists and curiosity-seeking tourists. Therefore, with such inadequacies as those mentioned above, the concept of cultural relativism must be reappraised and limited in its application to acquire some degree of relevance; and another concept should be instituted which will apply to the existing situations of change and "crises" in the world.

In order to establish the relevance of relativism, as well as the discipline as a whole, anthropology must begin a search for cultural invariants. This, however, is not a proposal for a set of absolute values, but rather one for the initiation of a group of norms which may be accepted universally. The assumption that we should be or are a natural science and, in turn, remain neutral in the case of value judgements must be discarded. The pursuit of anthropology is a humane one, and cannot hold a neutral position. Only by presenting the various cultures we encounter with a set of feasible norms, will the discipline be able to promote the goal of relativism: the tolerance of and respect for other cultures.

This does not mean that the concept of relativism is completely irrelevant, for it cannot be wholly discounted. However, its relevance has mostly a methodological significance for the
collection and analysis of data. It must function as an aid in the evaluation of those norms which will prove to be universally feasible. Anthropology, and its "Golden Rule" (relativism), has been merely describing cultures for much too long a time. The discipline must now move on to prescriptions, evaluating ourselves and man in the process.

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Science has two basic aspects; the first is the so-called pure or basic science, the other being its application or applied science. The majority of anthropological work is of the former nature, though there is a growing trend in its application. "The science itself (supplies) the problems out of its own unfinished business." (Keesing 1964:7)

Applied anthropology has been expanding rapidly in recent years. In the field of applied anthropology the problem concerns itself with practical or utilitarian need; the application of the scientific method is, or perhaps should be, the applied anthropologist's tool of communication. The range in which an applied anthropologist may concern himself encompasses a vast area; from the military to the medical, from the political to the economic. "The most extensively applied field is that of social anthropology, especially when predictions of human behavior are called for." (Keesing 1964: 7 & 8)

According to Raymond Firth, the student of primitive man may be of use in the development of "backward" communities. Firth states:

There is a bridge to be built between the savage and the civilization that is forced upon him; and the anthropologist can play his part in this social engineering. (Firth 1950: 379)
The philosophical basis of action anthropology is not simply applied anthropology in the sense of being apart from "pure" research. On the contrary, action anthropology is derived from pure research, and it is this pure research that must compliment its practical application. Neither is given priority and both must be mutually compatible. Increasing knowledge yields constructive action. The job of the action anthropologist is to take this knowledge and apply it in a manner which is in accordance with the value structure of the people involved. It is his job to show facts - facts rooted in the scientific method, not facts arising out of his own personal-moral judgment, and to explain how these facts might improve the conditions in which a given "primitive" people find themselves.

As opposed to being predictive, action anthropology is clinical. No attempt is made to apply general anthropological principles directly to the body of observed data existing at any fixed time. Rather than a fixed "blueprint" of what must be accomplished, it is more a design of "if : then" statements derived by the anthropologist. Nothing is force fed; the people themselves make all the decisions which might influence their future.

Action anthropology requires the "intellectual and the political independence that one associates with the pure researcher; it depends on university and foundation connections for support rather than those of a client or government."

(Tax 1964: 257) It also requires the anthropologist to take
his objectivity, which may be founded in his ivory tower, and let some world of affairs be his temporary field laboratory. The biologist can rationalize losing an occasional frog, the psychologist, an occasional rat; but like the medical doctor, anthropologists deal with human lives. The action anthropologist must be equipped to face unusual demands and risks. He must accept the problems of a community as his own; he may never be completely successful, "he must be prepared for disappointments and frustrations, without even the satisfaction of blaming others besides himself." (Tax 1964: 257)

It is no wonder that this method of research has not become common, or indeed fully accepted as legitimate. The stakes are high and the game dangerous; but action anthropology is nevertheless, quite in the tradition and spirit of general anthropology, and promises to provide the best demonstration of its meaning and its use. (Tax 1964:257)

Many examples of action anthropology could be listed. The Fox project, initiated by Sol Tax, at the University of Chicago, is perhaps the most popular manifestation of action anthropology in the United States to date. In 1948 this field-training situation commenced in Tama, Iowa; its function being under the category of "pure" rather than applied science. The Fox Indians were to be studied. As the work advanced, the students became interested in the current problems of the Fox (or Mesquaki) Indians, and became attracted to them as a people. From this arose a desire to help the Fox face their practical difficulties; thus resulting in a formula designed to help these people to achieve their goals.

The Fox have traditionally considered themselves as
failures whenever the white population has interfered with their style of life. They feel that they cannot be whites; and because of the whites, they can never be Indian again.

In our value system, we feel that one's life career should be marked by a constant effort to make the real self, reflected in actual behavior, coincide with the ideal self. The Fox do not see this "to thine own self be true" theme as we do. They formulate no "ideal self", however, they are content to accept themselves as they are. They are only motivated by external factors; they are not concerned with internal moral sanctions. They seek public approval; they fear condemnation. Gearing states:

The effects of this contrast are great. White individuals, if psychologically healthy and not self-consciously marginal, can engage in a sustained effort in a single direction over a long period of time, and-here-is the crux - they can do so more or less independent of their group. In contrast, a Fox is guided almost exclusively by his moment-to-moment relations to others; he bristles under long-term rigid work schedules; he becomes listless in situations requiring isolated self-direction. (Gearing 1960: 295-297)

This affliction, as seen by White Eyes, is laziness. Thusly, our "hard work" American tradition looks down on the Fox; the Fox feel guilty, consider themselves as complete failures, and simply do not know which way to turn. The hardworking Iowan taxpayer finds it difficult to sleep at night, knowing that he is, in part, supporting this "lazy" Indian. This same taxpayer feels that soon the Fox will assimilate and cease to be a burden.

Two major attempts were made by action anthropologists to break this destructive cycle. The first attempt was via
This adumbrates the most significant distinction between action anthropology and applied anthropology as ordinarily conceived. It emphasizes the right of Fox self-determination, or as Sol Tax bluntly puts it, the freedom to make mistakes. The Fox are faced with the need of making decisions relevant to their future. The function of the anthropologist is not to impose his own decisions, much less those of administrators and other whites. His function is to act as a catalyst, to help clarify issues for the Fox and to make available to them possibilities of choice which may not have occurred to them, or which might not have been available to them apart from the programme of action anthropology. (Piddington 1960:205)

If the Fox reach a final decision, it is the right decision. The action anthropologist must not interfere, if and when his suggestions are not carried out. This policy works. "Thus, factionalism in Fox society has rendered abortive many attempts by whites to improve their condition." (Piddington 1960:205) Factionalism is hardly significant when the Fox are dealing with their own problems in their own way.

With the example of the Fox Indians, we can see how pure research has given birth to action anthropology. According to Sol Tax, the two most important aspects of action anthropology that have come directly from the Fox project are: (1) that in
fact pure research is the starting point, and (2) that the action anthropologist must be prepared to abandon any concepts found undesirable by the people in question.

Other examples of action anthropology are many and varied; unless one sticks to a completely non-governmental definition. The government, which has excellent means by which to obtain funds, I feel, should not be completely foreign to action anthropology. In this sense, I disagree with Sol Tax and others who feel that government funds must mean government control. I should hope that this will not always be the case. I see no reason why action anthropologists cannot become part of the government, and be the controlling mechanism by which much of these funds are regulated. If action anthropologists had more influence in the Peace Corps, for example, there would be little question regarding the effectiveness of this government agency.

In the case of the hurricane stricken Tikopia, for example, Raymond Firth, in 1952, was successful in obtaining government food supplies and regulating their distribution. Here again, the Tikopia made the final decisions, the government control that Tax speaks of, was unquestionably handed over to this action anthropologist.

The study of any such community requires helping the people of a given community to firstly discover their goals and then to try and help them in their achievement. There will always be competing goals and wants and forces in the society, this cannot be solved by simply educating the people. Here the
anthropologist must assume the part of both actor and observer.

(Tax 1964, 256)

It is possible for a people to live in a civilized society and at the same time retain their cultural heritage, if these principles are not threatened.

The results are proving themselves in an understanding of the problems of new nations, of North American cities, even of the organization of universities. Indeed, the unique community of anthropologists of the world that I mentioned as being now in existence was helped into being directly by what was learned from American Indians. The same understanding may some day help the peoples of the world to achieve the common goal of peace.

(Tax 1964, 257)

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