While most of their fellow urbanites look upon street children with disdain and fear, they miss the lesson these ragged youth can teach us about the contradictions of a society and a system ostensibly geared toward "development" and betterment for all. One problem with the study of development is that there is a tendency to see it as a powerful force tumbling over the last remaining corners of the "underdeveloped" world and pulling these corners into the world capitalist economy. To conceptualize development this way means to see the inherent problems it brings as unavoidable consequences of a process which nobody controls in the first place. When these problems do arise, all society can do is try to sweep up the residue of development as it goes along and to continue riding the tide that is, after all, washing the society as a whole onto the shores of the modern world. Thus street children who live and work in the streets of major urban centers throughout the developing world have been treated as residue, the unwanted grime that collects around the edges of an otherwise smoothly running machine, and traditional attitudes and actions toward them have been to try to remove them from the streets, either to institutionalize them or push them back to the marginalized neighborhoods from which they came.

While I set out to review the literature in this paper which shows how structural forces of development are in fact responsible for pushing children into the streets where they carry on a daily struggle to survive, I must emphasize from the beginning the fact that in development, choices are made, strategies devised, and policies implemented. These decisions are made by powerful groups of people, often in reaction to pressures from outside groups and nations, but these decisions must inherently benefit some people at the expense of others, the "others" being those who have traditionally maintained less power. This is a crucial point to make when those same powerful groups of people look at street children as criminals, or at least deterrents to the progress or development of their nation, for those children are simply the reflections of the effects of the very decisions the powerful factions have made. In this paper, I discuss the complementary processes of urbanization and industrialization in Latin America, especially over the past fifty years, and show how policies which seek to concentrate capital in the formal urban industrial sector of the economy have subjected growing numbers of families at the economic and social margins of society to increasing pressures. The burdens of survival fall to each member of the family and increasing numbers of children have ultimately become responsible for their own survival. I will describe the reality of such children in Colombia and Brazil, where the problem is of the greatest proportions, and where the larger society is finally been forced to look at the problem directly and is beginning to seek ways of addressing it in all of its complexity.
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) was the development strategy adopted by many Latin American governments in the 1940s. This tactic created an alliance between the state, national capital and international corporations in order to introduce new jobs in labor intensive manufacturing based on craft skills, working class traditions and low rate of technological change (Oliveira and Roberts, 1994: 53). Industrialization, with the offer of plenty of jobs in manufacturing, was a force of attraction to the city. As advocates of the "push-pull" theory claim, workers will not leave home and settle in a city away from their traditional way of life and their community relationships without a concrete reason or "push" factor. The push away from the rural area has been attributed to the changing relations of production between landlords and peasants, the wage differentials between rural and urban areas, government policies including land reform, and deliberate recruitment of workers (Peek and Standing, 1982: 5-6). The actual "push-pull" conceptualization tends not to take all of these possibilities into account, nor does it address historical and economic changes which stimulate migration, therefore, it has become obsolete in the original modernization-oriented form (Fernandez-Kelly and Portes, 1992: 252). It is important here to review recent works on rural-urban migrations which set out to understand some of the complexities of rural-urban relationships in changing economic contexts.

Roberts points out that with the push toward industrialization, Latin American economies went from being suppliers of raw materials to consumers of imported technology. Urban based industry became the dominant economic force, replacing the agro-mining sector (1978: 61). Yet the relationship between the rural and urban sectors of the economy is far from being one in which one sector displaces the other. Rather they both become more specialized and interdependent, a process which takes place on the international level, and whose specific characteristics influence incidences and patterns of migration. Roberts explains that urbanization implies territorial division of labor where agricultural areas specialize in certain crops and urban areas in certain industrial activities. On the international level, each country specializes in branches of production for export, leading to increased interdependence (1978: 9). Industrialization begins to unify the internal market of underdeveloped countries, bringing the even more remote and less developed regions into direct economic dependence on major urban centers, and this opens the doors for increasing migration to those centers (1978: 89).

Roberts offers a very relevant discussion of the kinds of transformations that take place in the agricultural sector of an economy in the context of industrialization. The increasing commercialization of agriculture transforms the relations of production, creating a rural proletariat that works for a wage and migrates seasonally. These wage laborers often live in towns, and when they migrate to larger cities, as they often do in periods of economic strain in the rural sector, there are less ties pulling them back to the country (1978: 92-3). The predominance of one form of agricultural production in a rural area over another is a source of variation in rural-urban relationships, so that areas of capitalist farming expel more people than areas of peasant farming, as peasants have more complex ties to their land even when they migrate to cities (1978: 90). Peasants are also subjected to the pressures of increasing population in the country side which puts greater pressure on the land holdings which are often insufficient for subsistence needs (1978: 92).

Some further issues factor into Robert's conceptualization of urbanization in the last fifty years. One issue is why a few large "primary" cities have been the target of the bulk of migration, especially during the height of ISI policy implementation. Roberts points to the historical role of these cities as the locus of raw material exportation when such activity represented a major force in Latin American economies (1978: 87). He also points out that migration to these cities was only so heavy during the initial stages of industrialization (1978: 105), but that a high annual population growth rate of 2.7% for the region (1970's) has had continuing effects on the urban social structure (1978: 91). He goes on to show the effects on changing trends in economic policies and paradigms that came into play in the 1970's. During this period, industrialization became more capital-intensive and dependent on technology. This lead to the stagnation of provincial economies in the face of the concentration of economic growth in the large cities. The specific type of economic growth, however, meant little potential to absorb labor into formal manufacturing jobs (1978: 87 and 107).

Peek and Standing (1982) concur with Roberts in asserting that migration has reflected changes in the structure of agricultural relations of production, or the "changing social relations of production between the producers and consumers of economic surplus," in other words, relations between peasants or wage laborers and landlords or commercial, agricultural and industrial capital (1982: 1). Population mobility is also influenced by the legal, ideological and political superstructure coexisting with the prevailing mode of production (1982: 1-2). The key issue
raised by Peek and Standing, however, is the active role taken by governments in repressing or stimulating migration. They give examples of diverse contexts in which governments have created policies which will influence population mobility (or lack thereof) in accordance with the interests of economically powerful groups of people. Thus as landlords wishing to exploit peasants in the pre-ISI context held sway over government policies, such policies sought to generally preserve class structures, legislation was passed to restrict mobility, and practices of debt bondage or requiring permission to leave a rural area were in effect (1982: 6 and 9-10). As governments came to play an active role in industrial expansion (and landlords adjusted the form of exploitation to fit this expansion), they came to introduce measures that directly or indirectly stimulated mobility (1982: 6). Peek and Standing explain that "defensive" policies are designed to retrieve a situation in which the relations of production are under stress, yet powerful factions wish to restrict mobility in order to extract more surplus from the agricultural economy, while "progressive, expansive, aggressive" policies are intended to accelerate the transition from one mode of production to another (i.e., land reform, private property laws, protective labor legislation). Whether or not this outcome is intended, population mobility is impacted by policies designed to alter social relations of production and patterns of development (1982: 6-7).

Peek and Standing argue that the traditional agricultural sector of the economy impedes the potential growth of industry by not providing surplus for investment or cheap food for urban workers, by restricting expansion of the domestic market for commodities, and by restricting labor supply and mobility. Thus, industrialization means pressure for changes in agricultural relations of production (1982: 14). Such changes are accelerated by government initiatives such as land reform, which is promoted as a measure to end quasi-feudal controls over rural workers and increase production and peasant welfare (1982: 16-18). In reality, when peasants do receive land, their holdings are too small for subsistence at a time when terms of trade were turning against agriculture (in the case of Colombia), creating a need for larger holdings in order to subsist (1982: 15). Yet reforms were often avoided in the case of the most productive lands under policies that precluded expropriation of "well managed" holdings (Colombia) and "rural enterprises" (Brazil) (1982: 18). When reforms were implemented and credit was given for technological innovations, greater productivity only lead to decreased unit prices for agricultural produce, putting the peasant who cannot raise production to ever higher levels out of business (1982: 20). Finally, even minimum wage legislation failed to curb migration by eliminating rural-urban wage differentials. Instead, rural employers hire workers at piece rate or on a temporary basis to keep artificially low wages. This benefits the industrial sector because rural wages determine the cost of labor and food in urban areas (1982: 22-3).

Fernandez-Kelly and Portes (1992) contribute a more recent perspective to the Latin American urbanization debate as they argue that rural-urban migration must be seen as a deliberate strategy of labor recruitment. While differential advantages between areas determine the potential for migration, employers stimulate the actual flow (1992: 251-2). Migration, they claim, is taking place not between independent economic systems but within systems whose various sectors have experienced different types and levels of private and public investment. This is shaped by unequal exchange whereby political and economic power is concentrated in urban areas and depends on subordinating the rural sector. Thus, "migration is a nonrandom outcome determined by the logic of the productive system." The increasing globalization of the economy since the 1970s has meant intensive capitalist penetration of the country side and produced accentuated social and economic imbalance, hence outward migration (1992: 253).
The debt crisis in Latin America in the 1980s and themovement toward export-processing manufacturing and deregulation of national economies have altered the profile of migration, so that less of the flows goes to primary cities, as well as the relationship between immigrant workers and the formal economic sector (1992: 258).

Finally, Fernandez-Kelly and Portes argue that migration, especially labor migration, cannot be regulated solely by legislation. Rather, socio-economic changes enabling more equitable distribution of wealth and resources are necessary to reduce the need of rural people to move away (1992: 273). While this may seem to contradict Peek and Standing's argument that government policies affect migration patterns, I would argue that these viewpoints are in agreement because both deal with the underlying problems which cause people to move out of depressed rural areas, only that Peek and Standing's article argues that government policies in fact have a role in creating that depression.

The arguments presented to this point show how urbanization is stimulated by the need for laborers in the industrial sector of the Latin American economy and how people living and working in rural setting have been pressured to migrate to urban areas by their diminishing ability to make a living in the rural context. It has also been shown that the lack of opportunity to make a subsistence living in the country side is actually created, directly or
indirectly through development strategies of governments and the industrial sector of the economy. Yet if the purpose of this work is to understand the pressures that push Latin American children to work and sometimes even live in the streets, it is not enough to understand why there are so many of them living in the cities. What we must understand is once the industrial expansion pulled so many workers and their families into the cities, it ultimately failed them. The move to export-oriented industry mentioned above by Roberts and Fernandez-Kelly and Portes meant a move to higher technology and less labor intensive work, thus limited job opportunities. Economic crisis in the 1980's lead to well-known drops in real wages which meant decreasing buying power for families that were already struggling for a subsistence living. More people turned to the informal sector of the economy to find a wage and more members of the poorest families were needed to contribute to the family income. This is clearly not the first time families had to depend on children to contribute to family subsistence nor the first time children appeared in the context of the street, many of them as "abandoned" or independent beings. Yet in an era of regional and national economic crisis, the most vulnerable members of society, the poor and the young, were the first to be abandoned by the system. Decent housing, low-cost food, education, and formal employment were all out of reach for the poor, and the consequences of this were most exaggerated among the children.

The problems of poverty in rural areas are carried in to urban centers with the waves of migrants. As Gonzalez de la Rocha describes the situation of contemporary Latin America, the boundary of rural and urban contexts has become fluid and difficult to identify. Latin America is now fundamentally urban with higher indexes of absolute poverty in urban than rural contexts, but increasing poverty in the cities is related to the impoverishment of the rural population through migration (1995: 16). A decrease in public spending over all means fewer jobs previously provided by government agencies and fewer and weaker public services as well as cuts in food subsidies (1995: 16). As Fernandez-Kelly and Portes point out, the masses of migrants that do move into the cities seldom if ever integrate into the urban economy, rather they concentrate in specific residential and geographic areas and particular niches of the formal and informal labor markets (1992: 272). Overwhelmingly, migrants to cities and their descendants find themselves living in squatter settlements at the periphery of the city. Many of them work in the informal labor market rather than face the consequences of total unemployment, a situation that would translate to little chance of survival in a system that does not provide adequate social welfare.

The informal economy and informal communities of squatter settlements represent the structures that marginalized groups of people in the urban setting create for themselves in order to meet their basic needs which are not met by the State or the formal market economy. Attitudes among the general public and among government officials in particular regard to such activities and settlements are mixed. At the very least, the burden these marginalized people take on in providing for themselves when their nations face economic crisis goes unappreciated. Although, in one case, Gonzales de la Rocha cites the City Planning Department of Sao Paulo, Brazil as saying that the favela or squatter settlement model responds to a strategy that allows maximum capitalist accumulation. Settlers take over useless space and do everything in terms of community building, "reducing the need for investment in housing and infrastructure either by the public or private sector" (1991:7). More often, the self-sufficiency of poor populations in urban settings (which afford few resources, especially when compared to the natural resources in rural areas) goes unappreciated by the public and the institutions that are relieved of some of their responsibilities.

The informal sector of the economy has become very relevant in the struggle for subsistence, and is yet more relevant to this discussion as it is the context in which street children carry out many of their remunerative survival activities. Roberts reminds us of the significance of this sector of the economy in the context of survival when he writes that the informal economy is "a dynamic form of economic activity with considerable capacity for absorbing labor and which represents the transfer of the peasant mode of survival to the city" (1978: 111). The term "informal economy" has been described by numerous definitions, all of them being quite broad. In general, we can say that informal economic activities are those which are unregulated and not carried out under the auspices of formal enterprise. Long stated that the informal economy is characterized by a high percentage of self employment, low average income, low skills requirements, higher concentrations of younger, older and female workers, and in urban areas, higher percentage of migrants from depressed rural areas (1978: 178-86). Oliveira and Roberts give the estimate that the informal sector has accounted for about one third of urban employment since the 1940's, and claim that the role of the informal sector has changed with the supply and demand of labor. Demand depends on changes in the phases of industrialization and the growth of service sector employment while supply is affected by rural-urban migration, education, and rising female participation in the labor market (1994: 51).
A distinction between formal and informal sectors of the economy may have become more solidified during the 1970's when regulations and labor codes became a significant feature of the urban labor markets. Social security became a benefit of formal work rather than universal citizen right while welfare for unemployment was left to individuals, families and communities through mutual assistance and kinship (Oliveira and Roberts, 1994: 57). These authors go on to blame the problems of informal employment on the ineffective nature of State intervention. Historically and especially during the crisis of the 1980's, informal employment becomes a substitute for State welfare. They claim this sector of the economy has grown in the last decade and a half due to the pressures of urban poverty made worse by the failure of the State and market to provide housing, social services, etc. During the 1970's, labor supply increased due to migration, the delayed affect of natural increase, and the greater participation of women in the labor market. At the same time, labor demand in the manufacturing sector fell with the transition from ISI to export-oriented industrialization. Changes in the world economy and debt increased demand on external finance and external creditors imposed austerity and privatization policies, thus the State lost importance as an employer and provider of welfare (1994: 60) They suggest that what is needed is an increased minimum wage, enforcement of social security and labor laws, general benefits for women with small children, and stimulation, through State purchasing and credit policies, of goods and services of the informal sector (1994: 69).

The informal economy can be seen as a mechanism which provides for work opportunities crucial to the survival of families in the face of declining State support, but it is also important to see that this sector of the economy articulates with the formal sector in such a way as to cut costs in the reproduction of labor as well as to provide services directly to this sector at lower cost. Bromley shows that street occupations, especially public transportation and food retail, are important for the functioning of the urban socio-economic system. In some cases where significant capital investments are required or official controls are exercised overzealously, there is a shortage of provisions with an increased cost for services, problems which can be offset by the presence of street traders and service providers. He points out that removal of street traders would encourage price speculation in shops and reduce sales of some agricultural and manufactured goods. If lottery ticket sales were abolished, government revenues would decrease and social welfare institutions would be closed, and if scavenging was halted, more manufacturing materials would have to be imported (1982: 74-5). Fernandez-Kelly and Portes add that informal workers keep the costs of industrial production low as subcontracted shop keepers, industrial home workers and service providers, and they often initiate small businesses (1992: 255). This review of the activities carried out in the informal sector which support the industrial sector is by no means exhaustive, yet it does illustrate the point that informal workers contribute to the economy by providing services and accomplishing labor intensive tasks at a very low cost to the public and the industrial sector.

Clearly, where the intensive labor provided through the informal sector is an advantage to the public and industrial sectors of the economy, it is a disadvantage for the workers and their families. What they put in to the economy is not equal to what they get out of it, so that they provide essential services to society and receive little or no social and welfare support, have limited access to health, education, housing, and other amenities, and do not even receive adequate incomes to cover basic food and clothing needs. This is the point at which the family has to resort to emergency strategies for survival when all members must provide for their own basic subsistence or contribute more time and labor to the household to enable other members to work longer hours in search of a subsistence level of income. One of the first outcomes of increased pressure on family subsistence in that the women enter the work force, a move which has the paradoxical effect of increasing the number of incomes for the family while at the same time increasing competition in the labor market and driving down worker's bargaining power, thus incomes. Nevertheless, data for the region shows that, where female labor participation was steady at 18.2% in the 1950's, the rate increased rapidly from the 1960s to the 1980s, especially in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, where 26-28% of women over the age of ten were working by 1980 (Oliveira and Roberts, 1994: 59). The authors report that labor participation in Brazil increased at a higher rate among women with less education and among those in the 30-49 year old age group (1994: 65).

As it has been suggested already, it is the increased unemployment and decreased wages of the men in the household which force women (and eventually even children) to seek an income (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1995: 17; Oliveira and Roberts, 1994: 67). The increased economic pressures and the budgeting these involve, along with the changing roles of different members of the household economy had consequences in terms of household composition and relationships of the members. In many cases, it could be said that the presence of a male household head could become a burden. While men still earned much higher wages on average, and the absence of such a figure in the household economy raises the chance of permanent poverty, a household which is not headed by a man
tends to be characterized by more balanced patterns of consumption with less money going to alcohol and cigarettes and more to food, clothing, health and education (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1995: 22).

Women and children in male headed households in the context of urban poverty are also more vulnerable to the domination and subordination of gender and generation. Domestic violence and conflicts between individual and collective interests increase as a consequence of mounting tensions generated by use and control of income (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1995: 23-4). The nature and legal status of family relationships as well as household composition have changed with the pressures falling in the household. Consensual unions have increased among the poorest households in the region during the 1980's while the number of extended households have also increased as a strategy to decrease housing costs and increase the number of incomes per household. Statistically, extended households are still not more numerous than nuclear family households, but they may contain more individual members (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1995: 19 and 23-24). In Brazil, the issue of defining the family is a matter that was addressed by the 1988 Constitution which set out to modify relations between the State and the family. The family was officially conceived as the foundation of society, and it was the responsibility of the State to protect it. A nuclear family was defined as a stable union between a man and a woman and/or a parent-child unit. Statistics showed an increase in complex families from 1960 to 1984 from 1.5% to 8.7% of families, and an increase in nuclear families with changes in internal dynamics so that single parent households went from 6.3% to 11% of households (Goldani, 1990: 525-6).

As we note the compositional changes taking place in the context of Latin American households, we must not let the implications of the trends and statistics escape us. Gonzalez de la Rocha calls it to her reader's attention that the very mechanisms that have been adopted within the household to confront the changes imposed by economic policies have been instrumental to the immediate survival of the domestic group, but at the same time have worked as mechanisms for the intergenerational reproduction of poverty (1995: 12). She discusses the effects of economic pressures and changing household patterns on children. For example, she finds that children living in the context of consensual unions tend to have lower scholastic achievements (1995: 23). These problems are only exacerbated when children have to go to work at an early age. In that case, children tend not to reach higher levels of schooling which affects the type of incorporation to the labor market they will experience at entry and later in life, and it determines the levels of remuneration they will receive. Elements of short term strategy limit possibilities for long term advancement (1995: 24). I will return to the issue of education later in the discussion of street children and their work.

As I turn the focus to the literature that deals directly with childhood work and street children in Latin America, I will continue to discuss many of the themes already addressed in this paper in terms of how these trends relate to children. The study of issues relating to children is so important, first of all, because world demographic trends are such that by the year 2000, half of the world's population will be under age 25 and in underdeveloped areas of the world, more than a third of the population will be under age 14. With the current economic pressures and their manifestations, it is estimated that tens of millions more children will be working or living in the streets by then, and a large proportion of these will be delinquents (Sawyer, 1988: 153). It would be helpful to contextualize these numbers in terms of current statistics on the areas addressed by this paper, but it must first be said that data on the actual numbers of street children are not completely reliable, especially considering the difficulties in defining the term "street children." Thus, we find that in 1971, it was estimated that 40 million children in Latin America were "abandoned," 20 million of which lived in Brazil, and 3,000 to 5,000 of which were concentrated in the city of Bogota, Colombia alone (Connolly, 1990: 129). However, there are questions about whether or not children living in the streets part time are actually abandoned as many of them maintain ties with their families, and at the same time, these statistics may not give a workable sense of how many children work in the streets while living at home. We will return to such problems in the area specific studies of Brazilian and Colombian street children.

As I have argued that the structural forces of urbanization are implicated for putting children on the streets, several authors have made this same specific argument in terms of children in depressed economic situations. Rodgers and Standing tie child work to rural emigration in terms of their work in domestic and farm tasks which allow other family members to migrate in search of employment. As the family members establish themselves in cities or as children find a lack of opportunities for work and schooling in the rural setting, the children will often migrate to the cities (1981: 35). Bequele and Boyden (1988) also argue that rapid urban migration and a shortage of employment opportunities have made the street an increasingly important arena of socialization and a central element of the work experience of urban children (1988: 25). Sawyer describes the situation almost as a chain of events, whereby industrialization causes urbanization and sedentarization which, along with poverty, causes the
Aptekar's alternate explanation for the situation of street children, as he explains in an article based on this same work, is that Colombian boys in matrifocal families (based on African traditions) are socialized to leave home at puberty. (1988, xx and 1989: 103). Because this practice weakens the position of men within the household, it is seen as defiant of the dominant patrifocal social structures in Colombia (structures based on the Spanish model of the family). At any rate, Aptekar sees the practice of putting children out to fend for themselves as a crucial move to teach independence, survival skills, and self-assurance. Furthermore, programs for these children designed to help them "adjust" to society are misinformed and seek to make children into obedient masses of workers (1988: xxi and 1989: 104). Much of the study sets out to prove how well adjusted the children are in terms of their environment and presents tests which show that they have normal IQ ranges and sound emotional and neurological functioning (1988: 99-100).

I present Aptekar's arguments here as an approach that must be considered in terms of this paper since, after all, the three hypotheses he takes to task refer to the major points of my argument. It is not my wish to discredit the author and the validity of his data, but I would argue that his evidence does not manage to discredit the hypotheses he wishes to dismiss. The first point I can make in this comparative study is that while the argument for conflicting cultural values and family structure may explain some of the cases of abandonment in Cali, Colombia, the fact that there are street children displaying similar characteristics in cities across Latin America and the world, and that the problem has intensified according to similar patterns in response to global pressures, support the argument that the phenomenon is caused by more far-reaching structural pressures. The issue most important here, however, is the way Aptekar portrays life on the street as a proper and perhaps even healthy way of life for children. Such an attitude can only be destructive in that it allows for complacence in a situation which demands public outcry, governmental assistance, and heightened awareness. Although his attitude does allow him to make the argument that the employment and educational opportunities directed at these children should be designed to be more appropriate to their reality, this argument can be made without portraying their reality as it is to be desirable for the children.

Two other studies of the street children in Bogota undertaken during the 1970's give an understanding of the social organization of street children and the every-day lives and childhood careers of these young workers. The street child in Bogota is commonly referred to as "gamin" or "street urchin," and is defined as a child whose family links have been debilitated or broken so that he prefers to live in the streets where he lacks substantive education and protection (Granados Tellez, 1976: 2). When he takes up life on the street, it is impossible for the "gamin" to survive on his own. If he finds food, for example, other "gamines" will steal from him and he will not be protected when he sleeps in the street at night (Munoz and Pachon, 1980: 47). For this reason, the "gamin" will join a "gallada," or a gang of street children. The gang is usually made up of between 15 and 50 boys over the age of 14, lead by one or more chiefs who leads the group because he is known as brave and strong and is able to defend himself and the "gallada." There is a strict division of labor within the "gallada" so that each boy will specialize in one area such as robbing, begging, selling stolen goods, cooking, defending the "gallada's" work zone against other "galladas," etc. There is also a hierarchy of relationships within the group determined by age and level of incorporation into street life, so that the chief is one of the oldest members, followed by an active body of members who have some power, and finally the "chinches," or young members who participate sporadically in the group and often suffer subordination to other members of the "gallada." Within the gallada organization," faults and transgressions are punished severely, especially in the case of betrayal of "gallada" secrets which will be punished with expulsion and maybe even death (Munoz and Pachon, 1980: 37-8 and 47-8).

Granados Tellez reports several findings of his survey which help shed light on the situation of street children, though it must be kept in mind that this is an isolated survey of 110 "gamines" in Bogota. According to his findings, 53.7% of his sample were born in and around Bogota and that the remainder of the sample grew up in cities larger than 50,000 people (1976: 37). This shows that the children had all grown up in the urban context and socialized into urban culture. The fact that these children were not themselves migrants does not contradict the claim I have made that they are effected by forces of migration and urbanization, for many of them may be children or grandchildren of migrants, and in any case, they are effected by the changes in the labor market which have taken place under the pressure of migrations. Granados Tellez also found in terms of education that 64.5% of his sample had completed four years of schooling while 28.2% were illiterate (1976: 37). While these findings are low and support the claims in some of the other works cited above that education is limited among children who work, it can
also be considered a fairly hopeful sign, in terms of children's abilities to handle multiple responsibilities, that these numbers are not lower. Finally, over half of the sample stated that their parents had separated because of fights, a point which shows the kinds of stress that falls on the household and is often responsible for pushing children out. Granados Tellez shows that frustration, discomfort in living conditions, and lack of fulfillment build up inside the individual psyche in the context of urban poverty and lead to personality alterations and defensive behavior and escape mechanisms such as alcoholism, aggression, uncontrolled sexuality and delinquency. Male heads of households who are unable to fulfill the role expected of them by society are very likely to take out these frustrations on those closest to them, and this is a common force for children to leave their homes (1976: 4 and 11).

Street children in Brazil have received a great deal of attention in international circles as the violence and oppression they experience in their lives reaches appalling levels. While economic pressures and migration bring large populations into the cities and obligate children to go out to the streets to search for a means of survival, political and cultural forces work to push them back, sometimes violently, to the far corners of the squatter settlements that have built up around the cities as the infrastructures of the urban centers were unable to incorporate the waves of new immigrants. Scheper-Hughes and Hoffman write that the tolerance of violence is a legacy of the Brazilian military rule of 1964 to 1985 when civil and military police tortured and murdered "subversives." These institutions have retained power in democracy and now act to enforce the apartheid-like code which aims to keep poor people and black people "in place" (1995: 148). Many children become victims of this kind of terror especially when store owners hire off-duty police and death squads to "get rid" of children whose very existence is an attack on "decent people's right to walk down the street in safety" (1995: 147). Street children make a daily practice of defying the unspoken segregation as they invade the city centers, beaches, and parks and commit petty crimes, get intoxicated in public and refuse to disappear. But social attitudes toward the notion of "street children" manifest this symbolic and psychological segregation even when the children refuse to leave the public arena (1995: 140-3 and 149). Though they rebel against the attitudes and oppression of society, they face the hazards of street life from illiteracy and hunger to toxicity from drugs, sexual exploitation and AIDS (1995: 149).

The form of segregation discussed by Scheper-Hughes and Hoffman is not reserved for children, but rather it characterizes the social isolation of favelas, or shantytowns. One such favela in Porto Alegre is discussed by Shirley (1990). The favela phenomenon is more than a century old, and through its development, impoverished people have established community links, self-help and support networks independent of outside social structures (1990: 255-7). Drug gangs play a prominent role in the life of the favela and are seen as community leaders for their wealth, weapons, and organized structure. They keep peace in the community which is in their interest and they contribute economically and employ many children as lookouts, runner, and couriers. On the other side of the social divide are the police, none of whom enter the favela while they are on duty for the viscous reputation that it has (1990: 265-8).

A survey study carried out in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in 1989-90 revealed some note-worthy results much like the Colombian studies. The study begins with some more current statistics which estimate that two-fifths of the world's street youth live in Latin America, mostly in Brazil, where there are between 7 and 17 million such children. Most of the children from this survey came from peri-urban slums and had parents, but left for reasons of economic necessity and family dysfunction (Campos, et. al, 1994: 320). With increasing age, the children are more likely to sleep in the street and lose contact with their families and get involved in illegal activities. Two-thirds of the street-based children belong to the "turma," a group that provides support, companionship and protection much as the Colombian "gallada." Group solidarity is maintained with a secret language with code words, gestures and letter substitutions (Campos, et. al., 1994: 322-4). The study found, furthermore, that street-based youth are more likely to have been institutionalized, to have used drugs, and to be sexually active (Campos, et. al.,1994: 324). In the conclusion of the study, the problems of lack of support are emphasized, as Campos, et. al., point out that many street-based children do not have adults in their lives to turn to as they face life, events such as arrests and violence and every day hassles of street life, only peers and institutions (1994: 327).

As the Brazilian government seeks to deal with the overwhelming number of street children, their approaches, as discussed earlier, are to either institutionalize the children or support NGO programs to provide services to for them. Public responsibility for orphaned, abandoned, destitute and delinquent children has traditionally been executed through the National Child Welfare Foundation (FUNABEM) and the state level version of this, FEBEM. Children are sent to the "schools" by juvenile courts, often as a part of a cycle which begins as street children are picked off the streets by the police, sometimes in massive sweeps to rid the streets of them. The aim of the institution is to suppress delinquency as much as to protect the children. The effects of detention are to increase psychological and social marginalization, undermining the child's ability to cope with the world upon discharge (Sawyer 1988: 127-8).
Sawyer claims that of the 427,000 children in Brazil's institutions, only 14,000 have committed crimes, yet more go to prisons than to child-care establishments. They come out of these prisons prepared for a life of crime, carrying permanent mental and sometimes physical scars (1988: 163). Scheper-Hughes and Hoffman note that some progress has been made on the part of the government in recognizing the urgency of this problem as evidenced by the first national convention of street youth held in Brasilia in 1986 and the Child and Adolescent Statute in 1990 which gave children the right of due process so that they would not be held indefinitely. On the other hand, they note, children are placed in adult prisons, and the government has not adequately addressed the roots of the problems which caused 5,000 children to be murdered in Brazil between 1988 and 1990 (1995: 145-6).

Myers advocates alternative programs for children which address their diverse needs through the volunteer work of NGOs. He argues that to make an efficient program for children, the first step is to debureaucratize the problem and make it one of public interest changing the plight of street children. Additionally, committees and political campaigns must be formed to defend street children and influence government decisions (Salazar, 1991: 277). In his own piece, Myers discusses programs that combine work and education, such as the CESAM (Salesian Center for Minors) program which provides contract services (office managers, market packers, etc.) to businesses. One thousand children were employed in this program, with legal documentation, rights and benefits, and hours that accommodated schooling (1988: 129). Taking the success of small programs as an example, the government and UNICEF established an Alternative Services for Street Children Project in 1981 to implement policy and program changes through FUNABEM. The impact of the Project was mixed and while FUNABEM reoriented its policies toward the encouragement of community based alternatives to institutional care, after five years of this policy, only 1.6% of the budget was dedicated to support services for street children (1988: 132, 137 and 140). It is a commentary on the approaches of Latin American governments in general to the problem of street children that the government will make concessions to programs that seek to implement changes, but only to the point that these concessions do not interfere with the overarching goals and aims of the government and the powerful and wealthy members of society which they represent. The structures that desperately need to be changed in order to alter the forces that create new masses of street children are the very structures that the governments and the powerful people have an interest in preserving.

It is a hypocritical system which produces and maintains the phenomenon of street children. It is a system that hoards the wealth and glory into the hands of the few and begrudges the weakest and most vulnerable members of the society the small crumbs they dare try to claim for themselves. The indignant public looks on the ugly specter of its own impoverished offspring and wonders at the temerity of this mass of children that they dare to exist among more worthy, decent, productive members of society. Yet it is never questioned who commits crimes upon whom. The society of the powerful, the wealthy, along with the government are guilty of neglect and of willful ignorance of the structural changes that must be implemented in order to curb the great extent of economic and social crisis. Street children can no longer be overlooked as nameless faces in the shadows of busy streets. The crisis that has engendered them is beginning to engulf too large a part of society, and the children themselves are forced to greater and greater extremes in their efforts to survive. These children who have been ignored for decades as an unfortunate blashmish on an otherwise positive road to modernization must now be seen for what they are, a sign of the true nature of the process of modernization, urbanization, industrialization and capitalist accumulation, and their needs must be addressed, because their needs are not only their own, but those of society as a whole.

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