Are two heads better than one? Evidence from the thrift crisis

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dc.contributor.author	Byrd, John
dc.contributor.author	Fraser, Donald R.
dc.contributor.author	Lee, D. Scott
dc.contributor.author	Tartaroglu, Semih
dc.date.accessioned	2012-04-23T19:16:52Z
dc.date.available	2012-04-23T19:16:52Z
dc.date.issued	2012-04
dc.identifier.citation	Byrd, J., D.R. Fraser, D. Scott Lee, and S. Tartaroglu. 2012. "Are two heads better than one? Evidence from the thrift crisis". Journal of Banking and Finance. 36 (4): 957-967.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0378-4266
dc.identifier.other	WOS: 000302046900003
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10057/5086
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.009
dc.description	Click on the DOI link below to access the article (may not be free).	en_US
dc.description.abstract	We employ a natural experiment from the 1980s, predating the ubiquitous clamor for independence influenced corporate governance structures, to examine which governance mechanisms are associated with firm survival and failure. We find that thrifts were more likely to survive the thrift crisis when their CEO also chaired the firm’s board of directors. On average, chair-holding CEOs undertook less aggressive lending policies than their counterparts who did not chair their boards. Consequently, taxpayer interests were protected by thrifts that bestowed both leadership posts to one person. This is an important policy issue, because taxpayers become the residual claimants for depository institutions that fail as a result of managers adopting risky strategies to exploit underpriced deposit insurance. Our findings corroborate recent evidence that manager-dominated firms resist shareholder pressure to adopt riskier investment strategies to exploit underpriced deposit insurance.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Journal of Banking and Finance;2012:, v.36, no.4
dc.subject	Unitary leadership	en_US
dc.subject	CEO duality	en_US
dc.subject	Financial regulation	en_US
dc.subject	Financial crises	en_US
dc.subject	Corporate governance	en_US
dc.subject.classification	BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
dc.title	Are two heads better than one? Evidence from the thrift crisis	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Peer reviewed
dc.rights.holder	Copyright © 2012, Elsevier