Epistemic utility and theory-choice in science: Comments on Hempel

dc.contributor.author	Feleppa, Robert
dc.date.accessioned	2011-03-29T19:41:15Z
dc.date.available	2011-03-29T19:41:15Z
dc.date.issued	1981
dc.identifier.issn	1573-0964
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10057/3459
dc.description	Access to full text is restricted. WSU Libraries provides access to electronic copy of this article via commercial databases and library online catalog: A link to Synthese online: http://libcat.wichita.edu/vwebv/holdingsInfo?bibId=1335331
dc.description.abstract	Professor Hempel has sketched a number of turns in the problem of induction, showing us in the process that the traditional problem of justifying inductive inference is inextricably bound up with problems concerning rational criteria of hypothesis and theory acceptance. In taking us through these various turns he surveys, and provides us valuable insights into, several of the guiding trends of a vast and often highly technical literature. In the interests of highlighting this valuable feature of his paper and to provide some focus for our subsequent discussion, I shall briefly review some of these turns, placing emphasis on what Hempel notes as the central relevance of certain questions raised by Richard Rudner concerning the character of scientific criteria of hypothesis acceptance. There are a number of, to my mind unsettled, issues concerning the task of the scientist qua scientist-particularly, the range of considerations that figure in the acceptance of hypotheses, and, indeed, how such "acceptance" is to be construed-and I shall direct the latter part of my commentary to these issues.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	D. Reidel Publishing Company	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Synthese 46 (1981) 413-420. 0039-7857/81/0463-0413
dc.title	Epistemic utility and theory-choice in science: Comments on Hempel	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Peer reviewed